I ILITARY NCYCLOPEDIA BASED ON OPERATIONS IN THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS 1943 - 1945 MA HEADQUARTERS 15 ARMY GROUP IT At Military ncyclopedia BASED ON OPERATIONS IN THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS 1943 - 1945 PREPARED BY G~3 SECTION HEADQUARTERS 15 ARMY GROUP ITALY CONTENTS ' PAGE FOREWORD xxi THE TERRAIN OF ITALY xxiii « LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxv Chapter One — PERSONNEL . . . . . 1 Section 1. Infantry Replacements . . - 3 2. Armored Replacements . . . 4 3. Assignment and Reassignment of Officers . ... . . . 5 4. Rotation— Temporary Duty in U.S. 6 5. Army Detachment of Patients . . 8 6. Women's Army Corps . 9 7. G-l Reports . . . . . . 10 8. iAQ- Casualty Division . . . 13 9. Rest Centers ■ ,' .. . . 13 10. Special Service Activities . ... 17 11. Chaplain Activities . . . . 19 12. Awards and Decorations . . 20 13. Military Justice ". . 21 14. Mail . • . . . . 23 15. Post Exchanges . and Officers ' Sales Stores . .. . . 25 Chapter Two — INTELLIGENCE ... . 29 Section 1. Fifth Army Interrogation Center . 31 2. Interrogation of Prisoners of War in Divisions and Regiments . . . 35 3. Enemy Order of Battle . . . 37 iii CONTENTS PAGE Section 4. Exploitation of Captured Documents 41 5. S Force (6-2) . : .- . , . . 41 6. Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams . . . 48 7. The Translation Section, G-2, Fifth Army . . ,. . '. . 45 * 8. The Italian Liaison Section, Gr-2, Fifth Army . . . . . 46 9. Control of Partisan Activities . . 48 10. Aerial Photography . . . . 49 11. Photo Intelligence at Division Level 63 12. Target Section, Fifth Army, G-2 . 65 13. Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance in the Fifth Army . . . . .- 69 14. Briefing and Interrogation of Tac- tical Reconnaissance Pilots . . 73 15. Patrol Operations under Winter Conditions . ... . 77 16. Dissemination of Information . . 82 17. Psychological Warfare Branch . . 83 18. Counter-intelligence . . . 94 Chapter Three — OPERATIONS AND TRAINING . 105 Section 1. Combined Staffs in the Italian Cam- paign . . . . 107 2. Liaison . ... . . 110 3. Command Reconnaissance . . Ill 4. Air Cooperation .... 112 5. Combat Patrols • 114- 6. Combat in Cities and Towns . . 116 7. Assault, of an Isolated Hill , . 117 8. Night Attacks ; , . . . 118 9. Rolling Barrages . . ; . . 119 iv CONTENTS PAGE Section 10. Employment of Tanks with Infantry . 120 11. Employment of Mechanized Recon- naissance Units . . 121 12. Support of Mechanized Reconnais- sance Units 13. Defense ot a Bald Hill . IJiZ 14. Preparation or Defensive Jb ires -t oo 125 15. Coordination ot Anti-Tank Defense . "1 O A 124 16. Pox Holes . ' . 125 17. Digging in Flat Water-logged Country . . 1 Ofi I/O 18. Passive Air Defense . -t 0£ lib 19. Artificial Moonlight 13U OA Direct Illumination of Targets 1 OA io4 21. Indoctrination of Mew Units . i ok loO Infantry Unit Training Centers loo O o 23. Training in Rest Areas . 1 OQ loo 24. Infantry Conversion Training "1 OQ lob 25. Schools . 140 26. Traveling Training Teams 142 27. Desirability of Training all Combat Infantry Men in use of all Infantry Weapons •. . . 1 A A 144 28. Marksmanship Courses "t A K 140 29. Partisan Activities . .. : 147 30. ; Task Forces . -; • ■ 151 31. Rotation of Units and Individuals on Front Line Duty . ■ ' 154 32. Desirability of Organic Armored Battalions in the Inf antry Division . 155 33. The Infantry Supporting Weapon- Cannon Company and the Assault Gun . . .,: ; . 157 V CONTENTS PAGE Section 34. Mobile Command Posts for Divisions and Regiments . . . . 158 35. Location of Command Posts . . 161 36. Transportation Required to Move an Infantry Battalion ... . 162 37. Rations for Front Line Units . . 162 38. War Dogs . ' . . . . 164 Chapter Four — INFANTRY . . . . . 167 Section 1. Aggressive Action . . , . 169 2. Fire Control in Small Infantry Units 170 3. Junior Leaders in the Attack . . 170 4. Marching (Assault) Fire . . . 171 5. Use of Cal. .50 MGs in Defense . 172 6. MG Defensive Fires— Use of FPL . 173 7. Use of Tracer Ammunition at Night . 174 8. Grenades . , . . • 175 9. Flares . .'. . . , V , . 176 10. Use of the Bayonet . ,' . . 177 11. Utility of the'Carbine^ SMG, and the Automatic Pistol, . .; . . 178 12. The Browning Automatic Rifle . 178 13. The Heavy MG Cal. :30 Compared to the LMG CaL .30 . , ' . 179 14. Caliber .30 MG Fire . . : ... .. . 180 15. Alternate and Supplementary Posi- :tions; for MGs and Mortars . . 181 16. Maximum Firing Capabilities of the 81mm. Mortar . , . . ; . • 182 17. HE for 81mm Mortars— Light Pro- jectile Compared to Heavy .; . 182 18. Use of Smoke Shell for 81mm Mortars . . : 1 . . 183 vi CONTENTS PAGE Section 19. Replacement of the 81mm Mortar by the 4.2" Mortar . . . . 183 20. The 37mm Gun as an Infantry Close Support Weapon . . . . 184 21. 57mm Anti-Tank Gun . . : . 185 22. Comparison of the 75mm Pack Howitzer with the 105mm MS Howit- zer for Infantry Cannon Companies 185 23. Assault Team Weapons . . 187 24. Relative Merits of Cal. .30 Ball and Cal. .30 AP Ammunition . . . 188 25. Ammunition Stockage for Mortars and MGs on Positions in the Defense 188 26. Pioneer Equipment of Infantry Units 190 27. The Soldier's Pack . . . 190 Chapter Five — ARTILLERY . . 193 Section 1. Adjustment of Artillery Fire by High Performance Aircraft (Arty /R) 195 2. Centralized Control of Artillery Air CP's ' . . ., . "'' . 198 3. Night Observation with Artillery Air OP's . .... . 199 4. Reconnaissance with Artillery Planes 200 5. Position of Air OP for Observation . 201 6. Artillery Air OP Landing Fields . 202 7. Operations Sergeant for Air OP . 203 8. Artillery Air OP Pilot and Observer 203 ..?. The L-5 Liaison, Plane . s ... . . 203 10; Air OP and the 4.2" Mortar . 204 11. Air OP's and the Variable Time Fuze . . ' . . , . 204 vii CONTENTS Tanlcs as A rt i Ilcrv 205 .JL«_>. _L ci ilJv JL/CiJ lil U V Cl iS Clio ilx IJ.HCJ. J « . 205 1 A 14. . Tank Destroyer JJecoiinaissance VjUiXljJclIIj . . . ■ 907 ID. lowed v s. ©eir-i ropeiieci lanit ues- TY*f\.~KT£XTf* bL U<y fcrx - . . . 208 -ID. UbU OX JXeuUCeil l^XldlgO Willi O JL u (Inn 20^ 17 TTiTn"nl fivin pnf r»"f -tliA Tank l^Aftf.rnvpv as an Assault Weapon . 209 18. Use of the S" Illuminating Shell 210 1 Q' Xif. jjixe jriaiib . . . ill OA Deployment of Artillery in Mountain x ei l a j li . .. . . 91 ^ 21. A rr^lprv (^niir*piif vfltirnici onrl lVTptTmf] s •of Attacking Targets . 213 22. Maps for Artillery .... 214 23. 215 24. LXXXIjKj X. xLLkJ 1. LCI 1. . • . . • 228 iiO. oix-vrun x>atteiieo xo-i lJigiii r leiu jxi iiiiei y . . . 2fi rl w A Titi -fi i vovnii' A vHll pw in XXPttV V -CXlXljJ. all CvX 1/ ill l»i-J.l\>l J XXL Ground Bole . . ... 239- 27, Artillery Support of Bombers . 240 28. Artillery Training* 240 29. Artillery Use of Colored Smoke 242, 30. Smoke Element in HE Shells 242. 31. Plash Reducer Ml for the 155mm Gun 24a 32 T-} -i O'Tt ^ A r\ o*l f» "R^l TP -LXlgll -flllgltj X' lie . • . . 243 OO. lie lii-men- ijrapnicai ruing lauie . 9AA use or jLt~ 10 ^niiiiuiiiLioii 111 xuo Howitzer Ml . 245 35. Use of Captured Artillery Materiel . 24& viii CONTENTS Section 36. Photo Template "B" . . . 37. Camouflage of Artillery 38. Artillery Notes from Battle Experi- Chapter Six Section ences SIGNALS 1. Friendly Hazards to Wire Circuits . 2. Cabling of Field Wire Circuits Along Highways . . . 3. Method of Tagging Field Wire Lines 4. Repeating Coils in Trouble Shooting 5. Applicability of Wire W-143 (U.S. only) 6. Wire Net recommended for Infantry Rifle Company .. . 7. Wire Equipment and Personnel for TD Battalions (U.S. only) . . 8. Techniques Employed in Effecting Wire Communications during River Crossing Operations 9. Availability of Organic Personnel for Recovery of Abandoned Field Wire 10. Assignment of Telephone Code Names . . . 11. Necessity for "Priority" Telephone . Calls (U.S. only) '. . . . 12. Use of Telegraph Sets within a Division . 13. Practicability of Teleprinter Switch- boards at British Army ' Group and Army (British only) 14. Minimum Requirements for Wire Communications within Army Group 15. Use of Telephone Carrier Between Corps and Division • • PAGE 246 246 247 251 253 253 254 254 255 255 255 256 258 259 260 260 261 261 263 ix CONTENTS PAGE Section 16. Shelters Required for Switchboards and Terminal Equipment . ■ 264 17. Types of Circuit for which 5 and 10 pair Cables were used (U.S. only) . 265 18. Utility of MAL compared with EPL " for Rapid Line Construction . . 265 19. Types of Wire Used for Army and Corps Wire Axes . . . . 266 20. Construction of Spiral Four Cable (Quad Cable) Routes . ; ... . 266 21. Use of Several Carrier Systems on Open Wire Leads . . . . 267 22. Use of Foreign Transposition Scheme .in Rehabilitation of Open Wire Routes , . . . . . 270 23. Radio Requirements which were not met by Existing Equipment .• . 271 24. Radio Sets for Air OP Communica- tion . " . : .. . . . . 272 25. Tank-Infantry Communication . 273 26. SCR-536 to direct a Tank Dozer (U.S. only) . :-' . ' ' V . 275 27. Operation of Radio Link Between Division and Regiment (U.S. only) 275 28. Location of Radio Transmitters at Division, Corps and Army . . 276 29. Enemy Fire on Radio Transmitter Sites. ; . , .. . . . 278 30. Practicability of Link Sign Procedure (U.S. only> ...... ■ ,7 . 278 31. Requirements, and Provision of Air Messenger Service at Army Head- quarters and Below . . . 279 x CONTENTS PAGE Section 32. Handling' of. Priority Messages by MTlT.Q iVLUlJO . . . . . . 97Q DO. Reproduction, and Distribution of Messages (U.S. only) OS A 34. security Classification or I eletype Circuits .- . 981 35. Practicability oi including a Radio xeietype j-jiiik in a xjaiiu. xjiiie oysiem (TJ S only1) 281 T-Tl 0"lll ^-Jt1 Q /-I 12» {"tnrVl 1" A Si'tTCl'fciTYl Q "P/IT* XXJLgXL VTidtltJ Vyi J'p.lU kjj O UCl-U-H TT-ni-fc T^qq "Mian i)iv"ictinTi Sl,i~'PAV)0*'rh \J 111 tO U.L iCoo ULLCtll XJ L V JtoliUll kJ vJLlg W.I . 282 ol. Traffic Control C om m ttnication 989 38. Electric Power Requirements for Signal Installations (U.S. only) . OQQ 39. Provision oi Communication (Special- ist Replacements within a Field Army (u.b. only; ..... 40. Signal Information and Monitoring Services (U.S. only) . 284 41. Additional Communication Require- ments of an Armored Division (U.S. Army; . . . . . . -ENGINEER 291 293 XLiHIiy xIOVlolOIl Ol X OpOgI dpiilt' TntolliwriO/B . 293 Orffliii nation of At*tyiv Tjnp*inppr 8-2 K_J LI KJ KJ\5\j \/X\J XL • • * • 294 XLOctCLo . . . • • 5. Mule Trails . 300 6. Bridging Lessons . . 30cr 7. Treadway Bridge Construction in Rapid Currents and Flood Water . 303 xi CONTENTS PAGE Section 8. Comparison of River Crossing Equip- ment . . . . . . 305 9. : Show Clearance . . . 309 10. Mine Laying Policy . . . 311- 11. Importance and Best Methods of Recording Minefields . . . 312 12. Mine Detection in Forward Areas . 313 13. Mine Clearance ... . 313 14. General Lessons on Camouflage . 314 15. Camouflage of Vehicles— Disruptive Painting . . . . . 317 16. Engineer Supply System . . 317 17. Carriage of Bridging Equipment . 319 18. Small Unit Dumps . . V - 320 19. Engineer Equipment . . „. 320 20. Special Vehicles vs. Normal 254 Ton 6x6 Trucks for Carrying Bailey Pontoons . 324 21. Armored or Assault Engineers . 324 22. Comparison of U.S. and British Water Supply Equipment . 326 23. Division Engineer Battalion . . 328 24. Organization and Equipment of Treadway Bridge Company . . 329 25. Heavy Pontoon Battalion . . 330 26. Engineer Light Equipment Company . . . . . 330 27. Engineer Medium , Maintenance Company . . . . • 331 ,28. Engineer Camouflage Battalion . 333 29. Engineer Dump Truck Company . 334 30. Engineer Depot Company . . 335 xii CONTENTS Section 31. Engineer Topographic Company 32. 33. Chapter Eight — Section 1. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Chapter Nine — Section 1. 2. Water Supply Battalion Operations . Fire Fighting . . SUPPLY . . , . ' . . Supply: Administrative, and Evacua- tion (SAE) Instructions Average Daily Consumption of Sup- plies, Anzio Beachhead Supply over Beaches in a Landing Against Opposition Stacking of Combustible Commodities in Depots Subject to Enemy Fire or Bombing . . . Control of Excess Equipment Reorganization of Units in a Combat Zone ... Utilization of Local Resources in a Foreign Country Real Estate Problems Problems Concerning the Requisi- tioning of Facilities and Payment for Local Supplies and Services . Supply Problems in Connection with Employment of Italian Troops . Supply Problems in Connection with Employment of U.S. Equipped For- eign Troops . . Organization for Supplies in an Army Composed of Allied Troops . ORDNANCE . . . Army Ordnance Organization Army Ordnance Command, Head- quarters . • . . PAGE 336 337 340 343 345 346 347 352 352 353 354 354 357 358 359 360 361 363 363 xiii CONTENTS i Section 3. Third Echelon (Non-Divisional) Ordnance Field Headquarters . 4. Fourth Echelon Ordnance Mainten- ance, Supply and Evacuation Field Headquarters 5. Ammunition Service Field Head quarters . 6. ProvidingjOrdnance Service to Using Units . . 7. Third Echelon Maintenance Proce dures * . . 8. Ordnance (MM) Company Sub-Depot . Operations 9. Fourth Echelon Maintenance Proce dures . . . 10. Supply Procedures . . . 11. Evacuation Procedures . . 12. Methods of Reporting on Major Item Supply Status, Maintenance, and Supply Status Changes . 13. Stock Control Procedure . 14. Army and Base Inter-Depot Opera ting Procedure . . . 15. Balanced Artillery Firepower . 16. Replacement of Major Items . 17. Replacement of "War Weary' General Purpose Vehicles 18. Introduction of New Equipment 19. Utilization of Local Resources . 20. Watch Repair in. the Field . 21. Brake Drum Turning and Relining 22. Ammunition and Bomb. Disposal Policies and Procedures . 23. 'SpecialProjects and Field Expedients PAGE 366 402 406 xiv CONTENTS PAGE Chapter Ten — QUARTERMASTER . . . . 413 Section 1. Organization of the Office of the Army Quartermaster in the Fifth Army . . . . . . 415 2. Formulation of a Civilian Labor Policy . . . . . . 420 3. Retention by Army of Control over Quartermaster Units . . . 422 4. Coordination of Reconnaissance for Dump Sites . . . . . 422 5. Use of Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters . . . . 423 6. Administration and Supply of War Dog Platoons . . . . 424 7. Improvised Equipment in Quarter- master Installations . . . 425 8. Coordination of United States Army and Foreign Military Systems . . 429 9. Anzio Beachhead Experiences . 430 10. Modifications of Daily Telegram Sys- tem in Fifth Army . . . \ 431 11. Army Base Dumps and Rail Transfer Points . . ... . . . . 433 12. Innovations in Fifth Army Class I Truckheads . . . . . 434 13. • Bakery Equipment — United States vs British Equipment . . . 435 14. Ration Improvements Resulting from Combat Experience . . . 436 .15. Operation of Cold Storage Plants . 437 16. Distribution of Class II and IV Sup- plies through Class I Truckheads . 437 17. Class II and IV Sub-Depots / . 438 xv CONTENTS PAGE Section 18. Class II and IV Back-order System . 439 19. Suitability of Winter Clothing . . 439 20. Salvage Collection and Repair Opera- tions in Italy . . . . . 442 21. Mobile Field Range Inspection and Repair Group . . . . 444 22. Mobile Typewriter Repair Shop . 446 23. Clothing Exchange and Bath Units . 446 24. Remount Problems .... 448 25. Gasoline Supply . . . . 449 26. Graves Registration Procedures . 451 Chapter Eleven — TRANSPORTATION . . 455 Section 1. Development and Organization of the Fifth Army Transportation Section ..... . 457 2. Policies of the Transportation Section ...... 461 3. Location of the Army Transportation Section • • • • • • 462 4. Truck Group Control . . . 462 5. Transportation Road Patrols . . 463 6. Feeding Stations . . . . 463 7. Transport — Maintenance . . 464 8. Permissible Loads on 25^ ton, 6x6 Cargo Truck . . 465 9. Use of the One-Ton Trailer . . 466 10. Transport — Special Equipment . 466 11. Transport — Heavy Lift Equipment . 467 12. Communications for the Transporta- tion Section . . . . 469 13. The Freight Division — Organization 471 xvi CONTENTS PAGE Section 14. The Freight Division — Sub-Freight Operation at a Railhead or a Sub- Area of an Army Supply Zone . 473 15. The Freight Division-^Coordination of Operations with Base Section . 474 16. Evacuation : Prisoners of War . 475 17. Traffic Control . ... 476 18. Highway Traffic Control Code . . 476 19. The Movement Control Division . 477 20. Movement Control — Traffic Control Posts 479 21. Movement Control — Field Super- visors . . . . . 480 22. The Traffic Engineer Division . . 481 . 23. Traffic Engineer Division — Signing 482 24. Traffic Engineer Division Sign Pro- duction . . . . . . 483 25. Military Police Traffic Posts and Patrols .... . ... 485 26. Light Lines and Blackout . . 487 27. Emergency Traffic Control Under Winter Conditions . . . . 487 28. Eoad Posts . . . . ' . 489 29. Port Development by a Field Army in Fast Moving Situation Paralleling a Shore Line . . . . 490 30. Supply Maintenance of a Limited Beachhead for a Prolonged Period Based on the Anzio Operation . . 495 Chapter Twelve — MEDICAL 507 Section 1. Hospitalization and Evacuation Report ...... 509 2. Communicable Disease Report . . 509 xvii CONTENTS PAGE Section 3. Special Medical Hospitals . . 510 4. Functional Reorganization of Two Army Medical Battalions . . 510 5. "Holding" Hospitals . . . 511 6. Army Venereal Disease Treatment and Diagnostic Center . . . 511 7. Neuropsychiatry Hospital . . 512 8. Division Psychiatrist and Division Rehabilitation Center . . . 512 9. Use of Field Hospitals as Surgical Hospitals . ... . . 513 10. Army Dental Clinic . . . 514 11. Reserve of Medical Units . . 514 12. Selection, Demining Preparation and Protection of Hospital Sites . . 515 13. Employment of Corps Medical Ser- vice in Evacuating Division Clearing Stations . . . . . . 516 14. Evacuation of Field Army Hospitals to Base Sections .... 516 15. Evacuation by Hospital Ship . . 516 16. Evacuation of Casualties from Moun- tainous Terrain . . . . . 517 17. Problems of Sanitation in a Limited Area . . . . . . 518 18. Louse Control . . . . . . 518 19. A Method of Venereal Disease Control . . . . ' . ... 519 20. Trench Foot — CansesandPreventives 519 21. Supply of Blood in Forward Areas . . 521 22. -Medical Maintenance Units . . 521 23. Protection of Medical Supplies in an Amphibious Operation . . . 522 xviii CONTENTS PAGE Section 24. Requirements for Nurses • ■ . 522 25. Connecting Ward Tents . . .'• . 522 26. Increasing the Mobility of the Dental Service . . ■ . . . . 523 27. Medical and Dental Care at Rest Centers . . '.. ... 523 Chapter Thirteen — CHEMICAL WARFARE . . 525 Section 1. The 4.2" Chemical Mortar . . 527 2. Smoke in Italy . . . . 528 3. Flame Throwers . . . . 529 4. CWS Ammunition Detachments in Ordnance ASPs . . . . „ 529 5. Through Routing of CWS Supplies to Using Units from Base Depots . . 530 6. Winter Operation of Smoke Generators ..... 530 7. Smoke Generator Maintenance . . 531 8. Improvization of CWS Equipment . 531 9. Chemical Maintenance Contact Parties . . . . . . 531 10. Assembly Line for Ammunition Modification . . . . ■ 532 Chapter Fourteen — ALLIED MILITARY GOVERN- MENT 533 Introduction . . ... 535 Section 1. Organization and Planning . 536 2. Training . . - . - . 542 3. Operations . . . - 544 4. Relations with Italian Government Territory . . . . . 545 5. Organization of Allied Commission . 546 xix CONTENTS PAGE Section 6. Personnel and Replacements , . 547 7. Supplies and Transport . . 547 8. Local Government . . . . 549 9. Agriculture . . . . . 554 10. Commerce . . . . . 555 11. "Finance . . . . . 555 12. Food . . . . . . 558 13. Industry . . ... 560 14. Labor . . . . . . 562 15. Public Works and Utilities . . 564 16. Shipping. . . . . 566 17. Transportation . . . . 566 18. Communication ■ . . . 567 19. Displaced Persons and Repatriation . 567 20. Education . . . . . 568 21. Legal Affairs . . . . . 569 22. Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives . 572 23. Partisans . ... • ■ 573 24. Public Health and Welfare . 574 25. Public Safety . . . . . 576 26. Italian Armed Forces . . . 579 27. War Materiels Disposal and Pris- oners of War . . . . •• 580 28. Public Relations ... . . 580 xx FOREWORD Military operations in Italy were influenced to an almost inestimable degree by the natural mountainous characteristics of the country. In general, its topography, climate, road-net, the construction of its buildings, and the location of its villages favored the defense and confronted any attaching force with a series of obstacles, formidable in themselves and, in combina- tion, well nigh insurmountable. To meet these conditions, new techniques had to be devel- oped, and variations of standard tactical doctrine devised. The improvisations and adaptations used throughout the campaign to meet the varied situations presented led to the development of many new procedures, methods, and expedients^ Early in the campaign the value of compiling the know- ledge gained by experience in operations was fully appreciated. Many notes and comments were recorded in various memoranda, reports, records, and publications at various times by various headquarters. Many items, however, had never been recorded. It was felt that the compilation of such materiel, illustrating the practical application of the doctrines and methods contained in our manuals and texts under the conditions met in Italy, would be of great benefit in the immediate future and particularly in the post-war period. It was also realised that the completeness and accuracy of the contents of such a compilation depended in large measure upon the collection of pertinent data while expe- riences were still fresh in the minds of those contributing information and experiences. This encyclopedia has been compiled by 15th Army Group with the foregoing in mind. The chapters on all matters not of xxi FOREWORD an administrative nature present the combined experience of both the U.S. Fifth and the British Eighth Armies. The solutions to the problems encounter eTTwere~tfobl^ fitted to meet the conditions which confronted our troops in Italy. Some of the procedures and methods developed would have been impracticable or unsuitable other theaters. Controversial matters were also resolved in the light of the existing situation,, and the conclusions reached obviously cannot be considered as conclusive for the Army as a whole. Final decision on such matters must be based on the experiences of our armies in all theaters. xxii THE TERRAIN OF ITALY In order that this compilation of procedures, techniques, and expedients may be studied in its proper perspective, the following brief summary of the major characteristics of the Italian peninsula is presented. - a. Terrain The terrain of Italy is generally mountainous. The broad flat valleys of the principal rivers, the Po and the Arno, and the narrow coastal plain are in contrast to the rugged Apennines. The mountain slopes were steep and sometimes rocky, cut into irregular patterns by twisting valleys and deep gorges. Transverse rivers cut the mountains into a succession of ridges that gave the defender a succession of strong natural positions. All the land in the valleys and on all but the steepest mountain slopes had been under cultivation for centuries and the soil, after prolonged periods of rain, became bottomless mud. Most mountain slopes were terraced and covered with vineyards, fruit trees, or olive groves. b. Climate and Weather Climate and weather naturally influenced opera- tions to a marked degree. Prolonged periods of rain developed mud that restricted vehicular movement to the hard surfaced roads, while severe cold in the high mountains had the effect of slowing up both combat and supply operations. c Villages and Houses Villages and houses were scattered in indiscrimi- nate profusion all over Italy except in the highest mountains. They were located most commonly in the valleys but many Were on mountain slopes and some crowned the heights of reasonably tall mountains. All buildings were of stone or brick construction, with thick walls that were invulnerable to all fire except direct hits by artillery. They afforded, excellent com- manding positions when located on dominant terrain. xxiii THE TERRAIN OF ITALY of. Road Net and Communication Routes The road net was limited and restricted. The metalled road system consisted of a few main routes usually widely separated and joined by poorly constructed and fre- quently impassable secondary roads, which were usually narrow, and in mountainous regions cut into the steep slopes. Numerous gorges and streams necessitated extensive bridging of the highway routes, and single or multiple span stone bridges punctuated all highways at frequent intervals. In the mountains, gradients were steep and dangerous. The narrow twisting mountain trails made vehicular movement hazardous at all times and particularly so during winter when mud, snow, and ice covered them. The majority of mountain trails could accommo- date only a single file of troops or pack animals. Maneuver through terrain of this sort was slow and difficult. Frequently it was limited to small unit operations along a large front. e. Demolitions The systematic and extensive demolition opera- tions of the enemy aggravated the problems presented by the already limited road net. Practically every bridge on the routes of withdrawal, and nearly all bridges on lateral roads were thoroughly demolished. Sections of mountain roads were blown out, and when main highways funnelled through narrow streets in villages and towns, buildings were blown to obstruct the roads with piles of rubble. Extensive engineer operations were necessary throughout the campaign to permit -wheeled and tracked vehicles to support the advanee. xxiv ABBREVIATIONS AFHQ — • Allied Force Headquarters ALO — Air Liaison Officer AMG — Allied Military Government Arty/R — Artillery Reconnaissance (Air) ASC Air Support Control ASP — Ammunition Supply Point BDA — Bomb Damage Assessment BSL Bomb Safety Line CIC Counter Intelligence, Corps CLN Committee of National Liberation CSDIC Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Center DOP — Detachment of. Patients EEIST — Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams FPN — Field Post Number FSS — Field Security Service GSI (b) ■ — British Counter Intelligence Branch GSI (OL) — British Intelligence (Civil Liaison) IOSS — Intelligence Objectives Subsection ISUM — Intelligence Summary ISLD — Intelligence Service Liaison Department JICA Joint Intelligence Collection Agency LCI Landing Craft Infantry LCM Landing Craft Medium LOT Landing Craft Tank LWB Long Wheel Base MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Force M & D Mail and Distribution XXV ABBREVIATIONS MT A — Missing in Action i-VXOXv lVJ_diiIl Olippiy XXOUbG — Naval Officer in Charge OB V/XU.fcJX UJ. X>clLLlt? OSS — wmce oi o ti <iiegic oer vices P*RTT ill u — Photo Reconnaissance Unit PWB XT OlLUlU^iCclX VValldre BOalU BAG -l-VKjy dl xjlX XXXUX yjU vjUiUb RCT _ r? O fTlTVl CkTlTQl 1 /~kTVl liof E Tl O TTY\ XA liIItJH 1<A1 l^ULUUcl t X ticiill — xLoyai xungineers T? /HP it/ JL — Radio Telephone — Supply, Administration and Evacuation — Tactical Reconnaissance (Air) TCP — Traffic Control Post VD — Venereal Disease VHF — Very High Frequency xxvi Chapter One PERSONNEL 1 Chapter One PERSONNEL 1. Infantry Replacements The need for maintaining combat units constantly at T/O strength by the early replacement of casualties became apparent early in the campaign. Initially routine methods of replacement, involving the dropping of casualties from unit rolls, the requisitioning of replacements, and the filling of such requisitions from replacement sources some distance in rear of the divisions required a period of at least four or five days. Studies to determine practical methods of shortening this period were linked with plans to provide the infantry divisions with advance allotments of replacements to be trained * with and assimilated into units prior to their employment as replacements for combat casualties. Experience in late 1943 and the early .months of 1944 wherein a shortage of infantry replacements occurred, crystalized opinion. Befqre the attack on the Gustav Line in May, 1944, each division was given an overstrength of 750 infantrymen. This over strength was broken down by the divisions and an over- strength of 250 allotted to each infantry regiment. The 250 was further apportioned by the regiments to each rifle and heavy weapons company. During the defense phases these men received battle indoctrination and training with front line units. Prior to the s'tart of offensive operations, surpluses allotted to the companies were withdrawn, generally to a training area in the vicinity of the regimental Service Co. bivouac area, and their training continued. In the case of one division, surpluses were withdrawn to a division replacement unit located in the division rear area, and there retained under division control. As casualties occurred, these men were forwarded as replacements to the units with which they had trained. The 750 overstrength for the divisions was maintained by replacements from the rear. 3 PERSONNEL For the purpose of maintaining combat units at T/O strength in officer personnel approximately 50 company grade infantry officers were furnished each infantry division as an advance on replacements to he absorbed by attrition. These officers were assimilated into the units in the same manner as was the enlisted surplus. It was the consensus of division commanders that this number was not sufficient for infantry, and that the number should be further augmented by the inclusion of Field Artillery and Engineer officers in the overstrength allowed. The above plan proved to be a practical solution to the problem of immediate replacement "of battle losses, and con- tributed largely to the success of the attack on the Gustav Line and all operations thereafter. 2. < Armored Replacements Whenever possible, armored units including the armored division, tank battalions, and tank destroyer battalions Were authorized advance replacements. These replacements were organized as complete crews. Surplus tanks and tank destroyers were likewise authorized, and these crews and the equipment Avere immediately available as replacements for casualties.. In most instances the loss of a tank did not entail the loss of the entire crew. However, the practice of feeding one or two replacements into a crew in action to replace casualties was found to reduce the efficiency of the crew and to be wasteful of manpower eventually. Advance replacements were held *in areas in the division rear, and were trained together as crews. "Whenever a crew in action suffered casualties which caused it to become non-effective,- it was withdrawn with its vehicle to the rear and a hew crew and vehicle sent in as replacements. Casual- ties were replaced in the old crew which was^fchen reorganized and trained as a unit to be used as a replacement crew when needed. k This system enabled armored units to sustain their maximum strength over prolonged periods of combat. 4 PERSONNEL 3. Assignment and Reassignment of Officers * The assignment and reassignment of officers presented a problem that became increasingly difficult as the campaign progressed. During the early period of the organization of the Fifth Army and of the Base sections in the Mediterranean area, vacancies existed for officers1 of all degrees of capability and of varied training, and experience. It was not difficult at that time to place an officer in a position which was suited to his individual abilities. However, as time progressed, orga- nizational vacancies in the army were filled, and. at the same time the base sections 'reached a point where it was no longer easy to absorb officers found to be unsuited by temperament or experience to serve in a particular assignment. The higher the grade of the officer in question the more pronounced the problem became. Under the most favorable circumstances, which involved only the mutual exchange of an officer relieved from duty in the forward areas with an officer in rear areas, a delay of considerable duration was occasioned by the necessity of train- ing and orienting each officer in his new duties. The procurement of suitable battalion commanders pre- sented major difficulties. It was usually found necessary to request officers from the United States for such assignments.. These officers were handicapped during the period of their indoctrination by lack of battle experience, and in consequence did not receive the complete confidence of their men. After a successful action this lack of confidence disappeared. In oases where the new battalion commander was unable to per- form properly the duties required of him after a reasonable triaL reassignment or reclassification was indicated. If officers could have been made available, a practical and favored solution would have been to allow each division and separate battalion, an pverstrength in field officers. Initially, in an effort to avpid the detailed procedures and delays of reclassification procedures, commanding officers were authorized to transfer officers found unsatisfactory in their S PERSONNEL current assignment but deemed Suitable for assignment else- where. Ah officer in that category was sent successively to each higher command for the purpose of reassignment. If not sooner reassigned, he eventually reached a replacement pool. Here he was required to appear before a Board of Hearing which determined his proper disposition. Frequently the board found that reclassification proceedings were the proper solution and referred the case back to the unit concerned for their initiation. This was found to be a cumbersome and unsatisfac- tory method involving prolonged delays, and it was abandoned. The operation of the reclassification system under revised Army Regulations proved satisfactory. At the time of the landings in North Africa, Task Force commanders were given authority to make combat appointments and promotions. Subsequently this authority was granted to succeeding commanders, and resulted in securing many junior officers of excellent caliber with battle experience and proven leadership and ability. 4. Rotation - Temporary Duty in U.S. The return of military personnel to the United States was based on War Department policies and on directives issued by the Theater Commander. These policies and directives con- templated .the return of the most deserving personnel, either on rotation, (in which event they would not return to the same theater), or on temporary duty with return to the same unit prescribed. They directed that selection of personnel be based on length of overseas service, length of time in combat, decorations received, and wounds sustained. The number of persons to be rotated from the army was controlled by a quota established monthly by the theater commander: Various methods of selection were given exhaustive study and trial. In order to arrive at a fair basis of selection and to spread the selection of rotation personnel as equitably as possible throughout all units of the army, a mathematical method of selection was worked out. Each unit was asked 6 PERSONNEL to recommend each month up to one and one half per cent of its assigned strength for rotation. This total was about twice the number that could be expected to fall within the quota^ As recommendations were received at army headquarters each individual was given a numerical rating by a point system. Each month of service overseas counted one point, each decor- ation for meritorious service one point, possession of the Combat Infantry Badge two points, membership in a Distin- guished Unit two points, a wound four points. Holders of the Distinguished Service Cross were given high priority and their selection was usually automatic. Selections to fill the balance of the army quota were apportioned among the units of the army in proportion to the strengths of units. Individuals having the highest numerical rating in each unit were 'selected. The return of personnel to the United States on temporary duty for periods up to forty-five days was accomplished without the sestriction of a quota. Unit commanders determined the number of individuals that could be spared, and selections were made by the army on the basis of available shipping space. Individuals returned to the United States on temporary duty were normally away from their units for a period of at least four months. In unusual cases, involving key personnel, air travel was authorized to shorten this period. The replacement of personnel rotated to the United States was a continuing problem. It was not found practicable or expedient to retain personnel selected for rotation until their replacements had arrived from the United States: Under authority of the theater commander, individuals selected re- ceived orders and departed with a minimum of delay. Initially, directives required that requisitions for rotation replacements be made direct to Theater Headquarters. This procedure often entailed prolonged delay in the receipt of replacements. Sub- sequent directives changed this procedure, and Army was authorized to requisition rotation replacements from the army replacement depot, if not available elsewhere within the army. The depot filled that part of the requisition for which suitable personnel were available in the depot, and forwarded the 7 PERSONNEL balance of the requisition to the Replacement Command where the balance was filled if possible from its depots. That portion of the requisition still unfilled was forwarded by the Replace- ment Command to Theater Headquarters, Which filled it by reassignment, or, if suitable personnel were not available, by requisition on the United States. If, after a period of six months, the rotation vacancy still existed the army commander was authorized to fill it by promotion. In the majority of cases the replacements received were not of the same value to the Unit as the individuals they replaced. Many enlisted replacements were overgraded for the duties they were expected to perform in combat. Frequently non- commissioned officers had received, their ratings while assigned in different branches or on jobs where the requirements were entirely different. These men required additional training and orientation before they could properly perform the duties of their grade in their new assignments. Officer Replacements lacked battle experience. In consequence it took some time for them to become as skilful or capable as the officers they replaced. In the case of battalion commanders the problem was particularly acute. In numerous cases a junior officer commanded the battalion over, a prolonged period of time between the departure of the battalion commander on rotation and the arrival of his replacement. Inasmuch as the junior had in most cases battle experience lacked by the new com- mander, the morale of the unit was usually adversely affected during the period of readjustment. Some undesirable results of temporary duty in the United States were noted among returned individuals. The physical benefits in most cases were marked, but in some cases there was a let-down in morale and in mental attitude which required a period of reorientation before the soldier again reached his former state of efficiency. 5. Army Detachment of Patients A Detachment of Patients (DOP), composed of two officers and sixteen enlisted men, was established by Army to 8 PERSONNEL administer and account for personnel during periods of hospitalization in Army hospitals. The DOP received a daily Admission and Hospitali- zation Report (WD AGO Form E5013) from each Army hospital. On this notification that a soldier had been admitted to an Army hospital, the DOP picked him up as attached unassigned to the DOP, effective the date of admission to the hospital.. The soldier's organization was immediately notified by the DOP to drop him from its organizational rolls* , and strength. At -such time as the soldier was disposed of from the Army hospital system, he was dropped from the strength of the DOP^ and his organization notified. The DOP forwarded to the unit a copy of the admission slip, and also the disposition slip on which the final diagnosis had been entered. A suspense file was kept by the DOP to assure the transmittal of Service Records and allied papers of patients transferred to Base Section Hospitals. The DOP also received the A & D Reports from Base Hospitals, and notified all divisions assigned or attached to Army of the dispositions of former members of their command who had been admitted to Base Section Hospitals. This was. helpful in the forwarding of mail, and also enabled the divisions to maintain contact with key personnel whom they especially desired to recover. > A permanent file of all patients admitted to and disposed of from Army hospitals was kept at the DOP. A detachment of the Women's Army Corps consisting of two officers and fifty-seven enlisted women was attached to the headquarters of Fifth Army early in the campaign. This was initially a self-supporting unit with necessary administrative and mess personnel. Experience taught that a separate mess for this detachment was unnecessary and undesirable, and it was discontinued. Enlisted women ate in the headquarters 6. Women's 9 PERSONNEL company mess with the men, and the officers in the officers mess. The mess personnel were transferred to other units and were replaced by qualified clerks. The detachment was divided into two echelons which were assigned respectively to the forward and rear echelons of the headquarters, one WAC officer serving at each, echelon. Enlisted women functioned in practically all. sections of the head- quarters as clerks, typists, stenographers, and telephone operators. Eatings, except for those few authorized for detachment administration, were earned in each section in competition with the enlisted men. While enlisted women were not counted against the table of organization strength of the various sections and were carried as an authorized surplus^ there was no authority for surplus grades of ratings. Women in this detachment were very carefully classified according to their civilian training and experience, and proved highly efficient in their various assignments. At each location of the command post a quarters area was selected which was partially isolated from the rest of the installations yet close enough so that no inconvenience was experienced. All women quartered with the headquarters lived in this area. This included personnel of the American Red Cross and of the Army Nurse Corps. British enlisted women attached to the British Increment of the headquarters were further attached to the WAC detachment for administration and quarters. Although at times exposed to enemy air attack, no casualties occurred among WAC personnel. General health was good. During the rigors of the winter spent under field conditions in the Apennine Mountains no unusual sick rate was experienced. Morale was maintained at a high level at all times. Disciplinary problems did not exist. The method used to render reports on the status of personnel to Army G-l was developed and expanded by 7. 10 PERSONNEL experience throughout the campaign. It was based on * the information found to be necessary to keep the Army commander currently informed of the status of the personnel of the command. Daily reports were submitted by all units as of midnight to include all changes occurring during the preceding twenty- four hours. These reports were required to reach the G-l section of the army by 1200 hours. Reports were forwarded by the most expeditious means — telephone, radio, or messenger. The items reported in daily reports were as follows : a. Killed in action, died of wounds and injuries. b. Wounded and injured in action. c. Captured, missing in action, and interned. Personnel lost in' action during the day who could not be accounted for and who were not included in the effective strength were reported in this category. d. Personnel previously reported missing (DM) who returned to unit control. e. Non-battle casualties— personnel hospitalized by reason of illness or injuries received not in action. /. Battle and non-battle casualties returned to duty — all RTU's who were dropped from unit rolls as a result of hospitalization. Personnel who had been reported missing in action were not reported as RTU. g. Date for period ending 2359 hours. h. Assigned strength — all personnel carried on unit rolls as permanent members of the organization. i. Effective strength— the assigned strength less hospitalized personnel not dr6pped from rolls and MIA not dropped from unit rolls. Included were AWOLs, Confined, Temporary Duty in United States, personnel at Rest Centers and Rest Hotels, and on Detached Service. . Temporary Duty Personnel to Other Units were reported as effectives by parent units only. /. Battle and non-battle casualties returned to duty — k. Replacements received — only "new faces" assigned to reporting unit by a replacement depot were included. Former 11 PERSONNEL members of the unit were not included in this category, but in one of the other categories. It was recognized that these daily reports, because of time lag and the difficulty of securing accurate information during the confusion of battle, were an approximation of the true figures. However, inaccuracies were slight. Comparison with reports of hospital admissions, of clearing stationsj Tand subsequent strength reports showed a discrepancy of less than one per cent. In addition to the daily report, a weekly casualty report was submitted to Army by all units. This report totaled the battle casualties and non-battle casualties of the unit for the period covered by the report. Figures for infantry were shown as a separate item. Figures for all non-infantry were totaled separately. This report also showed the number of battle casualties and the number of non-battle casualties returned to the unit during the period. Infantry and non-infantry were again shown separately. Bi-monthly reports covered the periods 1st through 15th day of the month and the 16th to the end of the month. These reports showed the status of absentees for the period covered by the report and classified them as follows : a. Number of personnel AWOL as of 2359 hours on last day of period. b. Number of personnel dropped from rolls as AWOL during period. c. Number of , AWOLs returned to military control during period. d. Total number of cases of AWOL which occurred during the period. Those that went AWOL and returned to military control during period were included. e. Number of personnel ' in confinement on last day of period. All garrison prisoners, persons awaiting trial, and awaiting review of OCM were included. /. Number of personnel on Temporary Duty in United States on last day of period. g. Total number of personnel that departed for rest area, rest center, or rest hotel during period. 12 PERSONNEL ^or ^iirposls of coHtroI and -cheek, negative reports were' requited in all instances. 8. AG Casualty Division To expedite the handling of all casualty reports and the reporting of casualties to the War Department, the Army AG •Section required a casualty division, composed of two officers and twenty enlisted men. The use of both day and night shifts made it possible to complete the processing and clearing of casualty reports within 24 hours. This division processed and cleared all Battle Casualty Eeports (MTOUSA Form No. 6), Wounded Progress Reports and Burial Eeports (QMC Form No. 1-GRS) originating in the Army. It also checked all Letter Reports of Death, and kept a suspense file for following up all non-battle deaths to insure prompt forwarding of Service Records and Reports of Investi- gation (WD AGO . Form No. 51), where applicable. Service Records were checked in all eases of death, and for all cases of MIA more than 30 days old. Many MIA 's were found t©»be in Army hospital installations by a daily check against hospital- ization cards received from the Army Detachment of Patients. Letters of Inquiry and Condolence were checked before for- warding to next of kin of deceased personnel. A control over late Battle Casualty Reports was made possible by careful daily analyses. A daily breakdown by classification of casualty supplemented the monthly MRU report. An additional important function of the AG Casualty Division was to train organizations in the proper preparation of Battle Casualty Reports. 9. Rest Centers „ The establishment and use of rest and recreation centers for both officers and enlisted men demonstrated -the- value of 13 PERSONNEL • short periods of relaxation by the noted improvement %i morale and the reduction of non-battle casualties occasioned by f atigue, neurosis, and mental exhaustion. The better the facilities for sleeping, eating and recreation and the fewer military restric- tions and regulations imposed the greater were the benefits derived. Physical facilities available for rest centers necessarily Varied in various localities but certain minimums were found by experience to be essential. The facilities selected must be or must be made to be as nearly comparable to first class civilian accommodations as possible. A hotel or group of hotels is ideal but these are rarely available in sufficient number to accommodate the number of enlisted men it is desired to serve. Comfortable ' sleeping facilities are important. Where it was impossible or impracticable to secure real beds, mattresses of the proper size to fit* the regulation canvas cot were procured by local civilian manufacture. An adequate number of blankets or comforters was furnished by the Quartermaster. It was invariably necessary to make extraordinary arrangements for lighting and heating facilities. Electric generators were made available from military sources. In one instance, at the rest center established in Florence, heat was provided from the boiler of a locomotive placed adjacent to the buildings. In all instances the services of sanitation and bath units and of a complete clothing exchange unit were provided. This was found to be one of the most essential adjuncts to the rest centers. If the soldier was obliged to spend the time at the rest center without fresh clothes and adequate bathing facilities, much of the benefit of the rest was lost. The establishment of the rest center messes required a considerable amount of planning, thought, and experimentation. Messes were set up to approximate as nearly as possible the appointments and service of a first-class hotel dining room. Fresh linen, dishes, silverware and waiter service were beneficial changes from mess kits and chow lines. Messes were in operation from 0700 to 2200 to accommodate the convenience of the men. It was found desirable to establish eating facilities in addition 14 PERSONNEL ,to the regular messes run in conjunction with the rest center. This was done without cost to the government. Suitable civilian restaurants were selected and verbal agreements Entered into with the civilian management. After some experimentation a standard arrangement was arrived at which was satisfactory to all concerned. Lunch and supper were served. The soldier patronizing these restaurants was charged a service fee of ten cents per meal. This ten cents wa,s apportioned, seven and one half cents for the management and two and one half cents for a restaurant fund used as a reserve to bolster restaurant operation where necessary. The civilian management was responsible for the complete operation of the restaurant including the hiring of employees. In some instances it was found necessary to supplement the physical equipment of the restaurant with ranges and utensils from army sources. All such installations were closely supervised by the military. Pood was provided by daily requisition of the regular ration, based upon an actual head count. Recreational facilities were an important part of rest center operation. Motion picture theaters were a regular feature as were "live" shows providing TJ.S.O. or local talent. Libraries and small recreation rooms for table games as well as lounge rooms were provided at each center. The American Red Cross cooperated in all rest center activities which coincided with the services the Red Cross was prepared to render. Information booths were established. Conducted tours, visiting points of local or historical interest, were regularly scheduled. Transportation for these tours was furnished by the units participating. Red Cross snack barlPwere established in each center and provided light refreshments throughout the day. A wrapping service for packages was made available. Entertainers strolling about the lounges during the day added an informal note to the entertainment features. Reading and writing rooms ^vith stationery furnished by the R^d Cross were a regular feature, A music room with instruments furnished by special Service and operated under the supe^gpsion of the Red Cross was a popular addition. 15 PERSONNEL Welfare Service was provided by a Field Representative of, the Red Cross permanently assigned to the rest center. Dances were a major Red Cross activity. Each rest center provided complete Post Office facilities and also the services of an Army Finance Officer for partial payments. - In an effort to provide an opportunity to secure local wines and liquors at more reasonable prices and of a better quality than could be obtained elsewhere, bars catering exclusively to enlisted men were established in army rest centers. These were operated as a civilian concession. Prices were controlled by the military and the liquor served was tested for purity at the source and again at the bar. The results obtained. were good. Men were Well behaved and cases of drunkenness rare. In one instance a cabaret type night club was operated under civilian management with military control. The agreement provided for a dance orchestra and floor show each afternoon and evening- Liquor was served at controlled prices. No meals were attempted and the club was closed during the evening meal hours. The establishment and operation' of rest centers was under the direct charge of the Army Special Service Officer. Allotments for the use of the rest center were made by the Army G--1. It was determined that a period of four days at the rest center accomplished the desired physical and mental rehabili- tation. A complete four days' rest was provided with personnel away from their units five days in most instances. Admini- strative considerations and the necessity of employing all possible economies in the use of transportation dictated that personnel on rest status be changed all at one time. Under this procedure unit transportation bringing personnel to the rest centers returned those leaving. In January 1945 railroad facilities were such that a daily rest center train was inaugurated to take rest center personnel from Montecatini to Rome. Unitypiotas arrived at Montecatini in the morning, Were served by a jjath and clothing exchange unit, given lunch at a rest center restaurant, and loaded on the train for Rome; early in the afternoon. They arrived^ Rome the 16 PERSONNEL following morning. Box lunches and coffee was put aboard the train for the evening meal prior to departure. Midway of the seventeen-hour run a short stopover was made at Grosseto where coffee and doughnuts were served by the American Bed Cross. Additional coffee was placed on the train at this point. Quartermaster trucks met the train in Borne and transported the "restees" to the rest center, where breakfast awaited them. A train commander, a train quartermaster, and train surgeon were detailed by the army G-l for. each train. Officers' rest centers provided essentially the same facilities as those for enlisted men. In all instances it was possible 'to secure suitable hotel accommodations. A straight requisition of the property was made. There again the civilian management was retained under military supervision wherever possible. Bach officer was charged one dollar per day service fee. Twenty five cents of this went toward operating costs and the other seventy five cents was used to supplement the ration mess by local purchases. As and Whenever surplus funds accumulated additional services were added — free barber and manicure, free wine with dinner, etc. Personnel to operate these rest facilities was first taken on temporary duty from the units in the army. This was found to be unsatisfactory. It was too much of a drain on tactical units and was inefficient because of the rapid turnover. Becognizing the need, the Commanding General NATOTJSA authorized the organization of a special service company for this operation. Medical and dental officers and assistants at the rest centers were furnished by the Army Surgeon who detailed personnel to this duty. Units were required to furnish duty officers on the basis of one officer to each fifty men at the rest center. Military Police were furnished in each instance by the City Command. JO. Special Service Activities It was soon evident that there Were many unforeseen activities in which the Special Service sections at Army* Corps, 17 PERSONNEL and Division levels must become engaged if maximum service were to be rendered. Previous planning had contemplated that the Special Service Officer at these levels would function in a supervisory capacity only, and that the actual operations would be carried on in the lower units. It was quickly determined that this method of operation was not satisfactory. It was evident that the Special Service Section of higher headquarters must become actively engaged in the operation phases of the activities undertaken. Special Service warehouses were established by the Army and the several Corps to provide for the breakdown and distribution of Special Service supplies. Division sections in turn accomplished the breakdown and distribution of supplies to subordinate units. Film libraries for the rapid and controlled distribution of motion picture film and the allocation of projectors were established by Army and Corps. Augmentation of the personnel authorized under tables of organization for Special Service Sections of the Army and the Corps was necessary. Personnel from Special Service companies were placed on temporary duty as needed with the Special Service Section of Army, and the Section itself was increased to provide for 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Warrant Officer and 9 enlisted men. This increase was allocated from the Army Provisional Overhead Company. Special Service Sections of Corps were increased proportionately by personnel from Corps troops' placed on temporary duty with the Corps sections. Transportation for Special Service activities was provided from unit motor pools. To coordinate the Special Services for army units not attached to corps, an officer was detailed from each of the services to act as assistant to the Army Special Service Officer. Activities for army engineer units were coordinated through the engineer officer so detailed, for army ordnance units through the ordnance officer so detailed, and similarly for all army units. Transportation, housing, and feeding of U.S.O. shows and entertainers was undertaken by higher headquarters Special 18 PERSONNEL Service. Units lower than the divisions were not able to provide adequate facilities, and in some instances facilities could not be provided in any echelon lower than the army. The necessary facilities were usually provided by opening and operating hotels and rooming houses under the direction of Special Service Personnel. Complete chaplain coverage, especially for separate battalions having no authorized chaplain, was obtained only by cooperative efforts on the part of assigned chaplains. Service was rendered on an area coverage rather than on a strict organizational plan. "Without neglecting their responsibility to the unit to which they were assigned, chaplains served troops within reasonable distances. Such services were coordinated by the staff chaplains of Army, Corps, and Divisions, each within his own area. The necessity for providing prompt and complete religious solace to the sick and wounded was recognized. The table of organization for small evacuation hospitals provided only one chaplain. An additional chaplain was placed on duty with each of these hospitals so that both Protestant and Catholic patients received the ministrations of a chaplain of their own faith. ' The Army chaplain's section was augmented by three enlisted men from the Army Provisional Overhead Company. Two of these men were clerks. One was an interpreter. In' all occupied areas direct contact between local church officials and the Army chaplain was inevitable and greatly to be desired. The interpreter in the chaplain section was indispensable in facilitating this contact. A fund was established with the Purchasing and Con- tracting Quartermaster for the local purchase of expendable chaplain supplies such as flags, rosaries, communion wine, etc., which otherwise would have had to be shipped from the United States. An attempt was made to establish an Army pool of chap- 11. Activities 19 PERSONNEL lams for the purpose of quickly furnishing replacements for casualties and providing chaplain coverage for isolated units and separate battalions not authorized chaplains. Five per cent of the chaplain strength authorized for the entire Army, in proper proportion of faiths, was deemed desirable for this surplus. The plan was not successful because of the lack of available chaplains. The shortage of negro chaplains in the Fifth Army to serve non-divisional negro troops was met in part by chap- lains borrowed from the pool of chaplains maintained by MTOTJSA. . 12. Awards und Decorations The administrative processing of recommendations and the necessity of maintaining a uniform standard for the award of all decorations required' the establishment, of new methods and controls throughout all echelons of command from, the regiments to the army. An officer was added to the regimental adjutant's section as Awards and Decorations Officer. Through him were pro-, cessed all recommendations for awards. He checked them for administrative correctness and passed them on to an awards board. The composition of this board varied among units and changed within units' from time to time, but in most instances included the regimental executive officer, the adjutant, and a third officer selected for his experience and judgment. This board passed upon the suitability of the recommended award under the policies and standards established by Army Eegula- tions and directives from higher headquarters. The findings of the board were sent to the regimental commander for final approval or rejection of the recommendation. Similar controls were established in the headquarters of each division. Procedures in the various divisions varied only in detail. In some cases the. awards officer was established as a part of the G-l section. In others he functioned as a part of the Adjutant General's section. AH divisions found that an 20 PERSONNEL awards board was essential. The hoard varied somewhat in personnel but usually "the Chief of Staff, the G-l, and one other officer constituted the membership. In each case reeOmmenda^ tions were made by the board to the Commanding General who personally passed on each recommendation. The. procedures in corps headquarters were essentially the same as those in divisions. At the army level, an awards division was established as a part of the Adjutant General's section. The awards board was made up of representative Officers from various arms and services. This board met in actual session with the awards officer for discussion of each case. In lower echelons the boards seldom met together. The recommendations of each member were indicated by notations on a prepared cover sheet which was circulated with the pertinent papers in each case. In all headquarters it was found necessary to provide the awards officer with enlisted assistants to do the clerical work and to write or rewrite citations. Throughout the entire campaign the necessity for constantly urging combat commanders to make recommen- dations for awards was evident. There was a persistent tendency to delay the recognition of acts of heroism of merit until the unit had entered a period of rest. Unit commanders were constantly reminded of the morale value of a decoration promptly awarded. 13. Military Justice Previous conceptions of the methods and means necessary for administering military justice were found to be based on ah erroneous conception of the magnitude of the problem involved. Planning had been based on the expectation that each division normally would handle twelve to fifteen General Court " Martial cases in any one month. Judge Advocate sections in divisions, corps, and armies were organized accordingly. Early in the campaign it was found that the figure considered normal was far too low. Some divisions 21 PERSONNEL faced the necessity of disposing of ten times the number of cases expected. In order to handle this unexpected number of cases augmentation of JAG- sections was necessary. The Army Commander authorized an increase in the Judge Advocate General's Section of the army to provide for a Trial Judge Advocate and assistant and a Defense Counsel on a full-time basis. Divisions likewise added Trial Judge Advocates and Defense Counsels to their staff Judge Advocate's Sections. The problem as it applied to corps was not as acute, and cases were normally handled expeditiously without an increase in personnel. An additional burden was placed on the offices of Judge Advocates because of the lack of trained personnel in the subordinate units where charges originated. A large proportion of cases forwarded were legally insufficient. Many incomplete or legally worthless reports of investigations were received. The legal errors in trials required an immense amount of correction. The neM in all units down to and including the sepa- rate battalion for legally trained personnel familiar with the technicalities of Court procedure was demonstrated. It was difficult and impractical to train line officers adequately in the technicalities of Courts Martial. The necessity for using unqualified personnel made impossible the expeditious handling of the large volume of legal business. , Part of the large number of General Courts Martial cases was occasioned by the reluctance of unit commanders to use Special Courts. This reluctance, was the result of a general to less than six months, and the physical difficulty of providing a proper place for the confinement of garrison prisoners. In consequence many cases which could have been handled by a Special Court were referred to General Courts. Throughout the entire campaign the shortage of trained policy which discouraged the confinement of persons sentenced court stenographers was a continuing problem throughout all echelons exercising General Court Martial jurisdiction. This was occasioned by an actual shortage of trained personnel, and aggravated by the fact that other staff sections were 22 PERSONNEL authorized higher ratings than were provided in the Judge Advocates Sections. Officers were found reluctant to refuse to concur in the transfer of an enlisted man when the transfer offered a promotion. The practice of delaying the trial of General Court Martial cases pending a period of rest for the unit concerned was found to be impracticable. Witnesses had been killed or moved out of the practicable jurisdiction of the court, and the number of accumulated cases was beyond the ability of the court to handle during the time allotted. It was found necessary to withdraw interested persons from units actually in the line in order to expedite the disposal of court martial cases. The long distances involved required many personal contacts in the field by the Trial Judge Advocates and the Defense Counsels to prepare cases .properly. The normal practice of sending for witnesses by phone or letter prior to trial was found to be impracticable. 14. Mail 1. APO's The selection of locations for APO 's serving corps and Army was based upon considerations of ability to render maximum efficient service and convenience. APO's serving the Army and corps headquarters were located with the rear echelon of the headquarters to which they were assigned. A money order and stamp unit normally operated with the forward echelons. General assignment APO's serving Army and corps troops were located in areas where the maximum number of troops could be served. Frequently this was in the vicinity of the Class I supply dump. A location near a dump was not important, however. The pickup of mail by ration trucks was found to be undesirable and impracticable. Mail was picked up by units from the APO's as a separate function. Mail received by base post offices for delivery to troops in the Army area was forwarded to the Army Postal 23 PERSONNEL Regulating Section by truck or by air. The Army Postal Regulating Section, by means of truck transportation furnished by the Army, forwarded mail to truckhead~ APO 's for pickup by corps and division APO's. In some cases it was feasible for the Army Postal Regulating Section to deliver direct to the corps or division APO 's. This was done wherever practicable. Separate Army units were served by Army truckhead APO's. 2. Organization Personnel authorized the Army Postal Regulating Section (T/O & B 12-602, 28 Sept. 1944), proved to be inadequate. This section initially had to provide guards oh all vehicles delivering mail from the Postal Regulating Section. The assignment of, Army Military Police to the Regulating Section partially alleviated this condition. It was necessary, however, for one trained mail clerk to accompany the mail to each APO destination to handle registered mail. Additional personnel as required were placed on detached service with the Regulating Section by the Army. Tables of organization and equipment of postal regulating sections and large type army postal units had been drawn up with the expectation that the personnel of such units would always be attached to some other unit for rations. That procedure was found to be' impracticable. It restricted the location of the unit, prevented its free movement, and caused undesirable confusion because of the necessity of feeding a fluctuating number of drivers and mail guards. The Army authorized an augmentation of personnel and equipment to the Army Postal Regulating Section and to one Army postal unit (Type J) to make them self sustaining. 3. Hospital Delivery It was found desirable for morale purposes to deliver mail to patients in clearing companies, field hospitals, and eva- cuation hospitals. Mail was not delivered through normal APO channels to patients in such installations because they usually 24 PERSONNEL remained there only a few days. Divisions, however, attempted to get mail to these patients wherever practicable. Daily infor- mation was obtained from the division clearing company Admission and Disposition sheets to determine the medical installation in which members of the division were hospitalized. Personal delivery was then made daily by personnel of the division APO. Check was made with the registrar's files at each installation to verify the presence of the individual and to determine the ward in which he was housed,. If the patient had been evacuated to another Army medical installation, delivery was made to him there. If evacuated to a station or general hospital the mail was returned to the unit and forwarded through normal APO channels. About seventy-five per cent of the attempted deliveries were completed. This procedure normally required that two additional enlisted men and a 1/4 ton truck be assigned to the division APO. 15. Post Exchanges and Officers' Sales Stores Post exchange operations were organized within the army to bring post exchange service to the front lines, and to make the staple and luxury items offered available to the combat soldier at all times. All units of the army were served by a post exchange warehouse controlled by the Base Section and staffed by a Base Section Sales Platoon. Plans were made by the army to establish a post exchange warehouse under army control with a Sales Company assigned to the army. Non-availability of such a unit for assignment to army prevented the accomplishment of this plan. Close liaison and ' complete cooperation between the army post exchange officers and the Base Section were responsible for the satisfactory operation of the warehouse- Items available to unit post exchanges were issued from the warehouse on a ration basis to unit post exchange officers, so designated by unit commanders. This ration was 25: PERSONNEL established in accordance with War Department directives and , the availability of supplies, based on the strength of the unit, and covered a half -month period. Unit post exchange officers operated on a twenty-one day credit at the warehouse. Normally the post exchange officer for each major unit drew supplies for all subordinate units. The division post exchange officer drew supplies for the entire division. Within the division area these supplies were broken down for subordinate units, and issued to the unit post exchange officers who in turn broke them down for smaller Units until they reached the company or even the platoon level. Issues at the warehouse were not automatic but were based on orders submitted in advance by the unit post exchange officer. Post exchange officers ordered such items as met their requirements within the limits of the ration. In all instances a certification to the strength of the unit was required. The list of articles available from the United States was augmented by local purchases. Souvenirs and gifts were procured locally. By purchasing directly from the manufac- turers in quantity the post exchange was able to offer many such items to the soldier at a saving of approximately fifty per cent. Some items which were received from the United States in Very limited quantities were secured locally by arrangement for their manufacture. This usually required cooperation with the manufacturer to get his plant in order, efforts to secure eldctric power for him, and the release of raw materials ' frozen by AMG. Cigarette lighters were procured in this manner. Three officers ' sales stores were established in convenient locations, one in each corps area, one in Army area. These stores sold necessary items of clothing and equipment to officers and nurses. Their operation was under the direction of the army post exchange officer who delegated responsibility for individual stores in corps area to the corps post exchange officer. More stores would have been desirable but were impossible of establishment because of lack of operating personnel. 26 PER50KNI6. Personnel for the operation of the post exchange service within all nnits of the army were secured from units of the army. As required, enlisted men were placed on detached service with the army post exchange officer. This was undesirable because of the personnel drain on units and the frequent changes necessary. A captain and lieutenant were authorized the army from theater overhead as post exchange officer and assistant. 27 Chapter Two INTELLIGENCE 29 Chapter Two y INTELLIGENCE I . Fifth Army Interrogation Center The function of the Army Interrogation Center was (1) to receive and interrogate Prisoners of War, Allied Ex- Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees; (2) to make proper disposition of this personnel; and (3) to disseminate the infor- mation gathered from the interrogations. Prisoners of War were shipped by truck from Division Stockades to a Corps collecting point, then transported to the Army Stockade. Experience proved that primarily .the Army Stockade should be as close to the Corps collecting point as possible so that a maximum amount of time could be saved. Evacuation to the Base Stockade was of secondary importance. On occasion, both Army and Base Stockades were located in the same city. Vehicles for shipping were furnished by the Army Trans- portation Corps and the guarding of prisoners was done by an MP Escort Guard unit. However, the physical processing of the prisoners was done by the organic personnel of the Interrogation Center. When prisoners arrived, they were taken to the Receiving Room where they were registered. The prisoner's name, rank, age, unit, nativity, civil occupation, place of capture, date of capture, how long in unit, intelligence qualifications and preli- minary remarks were recorded on a Receiving Form. Officers and enlisted men were then impounded separately. At times, the large number of prisoners taken made it impossible to interrogate every individual, so a selection was made of those to be questioned. This selection was based upon the remarks and recommendations of Division and Corps interrogators which were transmitted to Army along with the prisoners, as well as upon information taken from the Receiv- ing Form. 31 INTELLIGENCE • Prisoner's rank was an important factor in selection, since an officer usually knew more of value than an enlisted man, and a non-commissioned officer had more to offer than the private. The prisoner's civil occupation revealed whether he was a good potential source of information; the former plumber was not as likely a source as was the hank teller. A great deal of reliance was placed on the prisoner's estimated intelligence classification as to whether he was a worthy prospect for interrogation. The intelligence classification was done by an officer in the receiving room. Prom a brief conversation with a prisoner, an experienced interrogator estimated the man's intelligence and classified him as : CI - cooperative and intelligent ■OA - cooperative and of average intelligence UI - uncooperative and intelligent XJA - uncooperative and of average intelligence CD - cooperative but dumb. The prisoners to be interrogated were selected by the coordinator of the interrogators, who a^so assigned an inter- rogator. The interrogator studied the Receiving Form and any documents' belonging to the prisoner prior to the inter- rogation. The questioning followed a non-routine pattern but sought the answers to a set of SOP questions similar to the ones found in FM 30-15. Tactical information was gathered from the prisoner and checked against other sources of information for accuracy and reliability. For example, a reported gun location was checked against an aerial photo. Strategic information was handled in the same way. Full use was made of maps, aerial photos and reports from other sources of information during the inter- rogation. A written report of the interrogation then went to the officer coordinator who checked- to see whether further inter- rogation was needed or wanted. If the prisoner was of no 32 INTELLIGENCE further use, he was put into the shipping- compound to await evacuation to the Base Stockade. The interrogation report then went to the editing section where an officefr-in-charge organized the mass of information into logical and readable form. After being edited it was prepared for final publica- tion and dissemination. The center devised a group of specialized rooms in which specialized interrogations could be performed: an Order of Battle Boom where detailed interrogation could be held with the use of up-to-date Order of Battle maps and charts ; a Reference Room where other sources of information were kept on file for use in interrogation ; and a Photo Intelligence Boom where the latest photo interpreted information was filed. These rooms were useful for highly detailed technical and specific interrogations. Normal interrogations, however, were not done in these rooms. Specialized interrogations were quickly arranged. When a prisoner came through who was likely to possess medical information, the Medical Intelligence Officer was contacted, and he together with the interrogator questioned the prisoner. The same was done for Quartermaster Intelligence, Engineer Intelligence, etc. If a prisoner had recently arrived from Germany, PWB was often interested in questioning Mm about conditions at home, and headquarters wanted to know the route he had travelled on and its condition. Particular situations arose where certain priority types of prisoners were desired for interrogation, and form letters were sent to Divi- sion interrogators, listing types desired. Prisoners with the requisite qualifications were screened at Division and expedited to the Interrogation Center. Our own Allied ex-prisoners of war were interrogated separately. There was no set of rules an interrogator could follow. Experience was the best teacher. An occasional conference between interrogators for the purpose of exchanging recent interrogation episodes was found useful. Interrogators had to know the native language of the enemy S3 INTELLIGENCE thoroughly and intimately. Knowledge of other languages proved useful. The interrogator had to be a good psychologist and able to get the "feel of a prisoner" as soon as he came in contact with him. This faculty came largely from experience. Once he determined the character of his prisoner, the interrogator could intelligently proceed with the interrogation. It was not often found necessary to "break" a prisoner, i.e. to force him to talk against his will. Most prisoners were willing to talk, contrary to common belief. When it was necessary to "break" a prisoner, the clever interrogator easily did so by means of good psychology, bluff, ruse or camouflage. An SS captain once refused to talk, but in two minutes the interrogator was taking , notes on valuable information. He found in the captain's documents an item to the effect that the prisoner had been at a concentration camp in Dachau, Germany, and that he had been ruthless there. The interrogator remarked that our rules (the interrogator pointed to some pamphlet that happened to be available) called for ' 'certain disposition" of such people. Then there was silence and waiting. In a moment the captain began to talk. When an interrogator was not an officer, he made full use of officer rank insignia during an interrogation. It was found that the German army was very servile to rank. An American "major" received more respect and cooperation than a staff sergeant when dealing with a German lieutenant, for example. Where possible interrogators should be officers. After full use had been made of the prisoner, he was evacuated to the Base Stockade accompanied by certain remarks and recommendations. Any documents needed for further interrogation accompanied the prisoner; otherwise they were sent to the Document Section of Army G-2 for further study and/or . disposition. Certain qualified prisoners were detained to work for PWB in writing leaflets or preparing other forms of propa- ganda. Others were detained to work for OSS in various capacities. 34 INTELLIGENCE Polish, French, Czech and Russian Missions were repre- sented at the Interrogation Center. Each of these handled and disposed of such of its nationals as , were processed and interrogated by the Center. Records were kept on every prisoner received by the Center. The interrogation report was filed as well as the prisoner's final disposition. A file on the prisoner's unit was kept as to strength and as to personalities in the unit. The latter item contained only the names of officers and non- commissioned officers since a more complete file proved to be unnecessary. It was found advisable to utilize large apartment buildings for the Interrogation Center and to divide the Center into three units : the stockade itself, the interrogation section, and the administration section. Bach unit was protected by barbed wire, as well as by the wire about the Center as a whole. The advantage of such an organization was that the. interrogators could have separate rooms, since quiet and the absence of all possible distractions greatly aided interrogation. Initially, interrogation was performed by a six-man team at divisional and corps levels. However, much valuable time was lost while prisoners were evacuated to division before they could be interrogated. It was also found that in such a system, much detailed information of tactical value to regiment and lower units was not exploited. An interrogator working for one regiment only, could certainly do a more detailed and accurate job on the tactical situation in his regimental sector than the division interrogator who handled prisoners from three and sometimes more regiments. To correct : these deficiencies, the following organization was established: one officer and two non-commissioned officers were detailed to interrogate at each regiment, and one or two officers with two Prisoners 35 INTELLIGENCE non-commissioned officers at the division cage. The inter- rogators at regiment worked solely for the regiment and were responsible to the S-2; those at division worked under the G-2V Some duplication of effort was found in this system, but it was felt that double checking was profitable. The information obtained at regiment was immediately disseminated, first to the battalion which captured the particular PW, then to the other battalions and to divisions. Usually, by the time the PWs arrived at division, the divisional interrogator had been informed of the information extracted at regiment. This helped him in his own interrogation for further information or details. Such a system worked well but required close collaboration between S-2s, S-3s, Gr-2, and the interrogators at regiments and division. In the beginning most interrogators worked with maps alone, but soon all types of aerial photos were used almost exclusively. It was much easier to orient a PW on a photo, especially an oblique. Close cooperation between the air. photo interpreter and the PW interrogator was necessary. Often- times a photo interpreter was present during ah interrogation to check information. Many profitable targets for the artillery and the air corps were obtained in this manner. It became a recognized- fact that the closest cooperation must exist between combat elements for whom information was obtained and the interrogators obtaining that information. To be of the most value the interrogator had to be well informed as to the tactical situation and had to have a good knowledge- of future plans. He had to secure information as speedily as possible and see that it was properly and promptly dissemi- nated. The sooner the PW got back to the interrogator, the faster information was extracted and disseminated. This was considered so important that lectures On this subject were included in every training program for troops. Close liaison was maintained betwe'en interrogators and the division Order of Battle officer. Most of the latter 's information came from interrogation of PWs, but at the same time he could supply the interrogator; with much infOr- 36 INTEU.IGSNCI mation oil which to base future interrogations. It was the interrogator's job to supply the missing links in the Order of Battle picture, and he could do so only when he knew what was missing. • ; Captured documents, too, were used to great advantage in interrogations. In fact so much information had been obtained from documents that all units were reminded, at every opportunity, to turn in every piece of paper found. Only trained interrogators should be permitted to inter- rogate PWs. In one instance a PW, interrogated at a battalion CP by a German speaking soldier, stated that he had heard that the Germans were expecting our attack at any moment. The soldier knew German but was not familiar with German military expressions and reported that the Germans were going to attack. Our own troops had meanwhile planned an attack (it was then about H-hour minus six) but it was called off on the strength of this information. When the same PW reached regiment, the interrogator there detected the mistake, notified higher headquarters of the facts, and plans for our attack were resumed. Much valuable time and effort could have been saved had this PW been immediately evacuated, as directed. Actual experience was the best method for developing interrogation technique. It was often found advantageous to have two interrogators work on one PW at the same time, the advantage being that it prevented the PW from deceiving the interrogators 5 he was kept too busy answering a flood of questions. Furthermore, two interrogators could do a more thorough job than one could. Another technique was to interrogate two or more PWs from the same unit at the same time. Information was obtained by this system because PWs often argued among themselves or tried to outwit each other. 3. Enemy Order of Battle A separate subsection called Order Or Battle (OB) was created by all G-2s and most S-2s. In higher headquarters this 37 INTELLIGENCE subsection was further subdivided into specializing depart- ments. The purpose of the OB section was to collate and dissem- inate all information concerning enemy land forces (their strength, organization and disposition) in. order to furnish a reliable basis for the assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions, both tactical and strategical. A study was made not only of enemy combat units but also of technical, service, labor, defense and quasi-military units. The chief sources of information included prisoners of war, captured documents, agents, partisans, civilians, escapees, ground observation by friendly troops, photo intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, enemy and neutral radio and press. In order to fulfil its purpose, \the subsection divided its studies into several specialized departments covering: a. Forward enemy areas (including the zone of operations and the immediate Lines of Communications). b. Bear enemy areas. c. Organization of Enemy Formations and Units. d. Personalities and Field Post Numbers (similar to APOs). e. Tactics. /. Miscellaneous. These departments are separately discussed in similarly lettered sub-paragraphs below. a. Forward Areas. .; This department was interested in the details of current operations, locations of troops and headquarters, movements and regional strengths. Most of the information of value was provided by PWs in the form of unit identifi- cations, statements by PWs, and documents captured with the PWs. Materiel from other sources, such as ground and air observation and agents not far removed from the enemy front lines, was largely supplementary to that gained from PWs. However, agents, civilians, and escapees often gave valuable 38 INTELLIGENCE clues regarding current moves and dispositions in the immediate Line of Communication area. Captured organizational docu- ments sometimes contained new identifications and invaluable details on unit organization. Information was recorded in periodic reports, in log books, or ion cards giving the identification, locations, moves, and general information. Important features of current intelligence were kept on a large-scale map of the area under observation. b. Bear Areas. Information dealt with here was similar to that used in the Forward Areas department. Although a certain amount of information about training and rest areas came from PWs, escapees, and civilians, the organization of the enemy rear areas was determined chiefly from the reports of Allied agents. These reports, however, usually contained only fragmentary information, and were often inaccurate . and at variance with one another. It was therefore seldom possible to gain a complete and detailed picture of any unit or locality from them jalone. Only through a lojng series of collations could a true picture be had. When properly placed, agents were able to give useful information on the movement of combat formations toward or away from the front, or from place to place in the Line of Communications. In this connection, air observation and aerial photography Were also of value. • Agents can be properly exploited only when they have been fully briefed. Their training in What to look for, what to report and how, must be thorough. Once they are in enemy territory it is essential that close contact be maintained between them and the OB section. To this end liaison officers were made available. The department kept its information on cards arranged according to subdivisions of the area studied arid according to units. Periodic summaries were produced and disseminated. 39 INTELLIGENCE c. Organisation. This department concerned itself with the orga- nization, composition and strength of enemy nnits both theoretical and actual. Since the organization of specific units in the theater of operations seldom corresponded exactly with that shown in our Field Manuals on enemy organization, and units varied in many respects from time to time, the necessity of studying the details of organization and composition of enemy units actually present was obvious. Close attention was paid to numbef and types of replacements, and to indica- tions of strength and casualties. All sources, on occasion afforded certain amounts of information, but the bulk of detailed and reliable intelligence came chiefly from the consensus of P!W opinion and secondly from captured documents. Intelligence in all stages of processing was recorded in loose-leaf notebooks, indexed according to unit designation. Complete collations on organization were published as frequently as there was a need for revision of former information. To facilitate the periodic assessment of enemy personnel strengths, it was convenient to keep all strength reports and indications together. For this purpose a separate card file or notebook was used. d. Personalities and Field Post Numbers (FPNs). Names of officers and Field Post Numbers associated with all units were collated to facilitate the identification of personnel and units in the field, and to assist in the interrogation of PWs. The pertinent information was kept oil; cards or in loose-leaf notebooks, on a cross-index system. All the names were listed alphabetically and the FPNs serially, and both were also listed under their proper unit headings. e. Tactics. ; ■ Information on enemy tactics was studied and disseminated. Such information came from friendly troops, PWs and captured documents. Other theaters of operations were also a good source of information on this subject. 40 INTELLIGENCE I. Miscellaneous. Tactical signs, unit insignia, morale, sattelite troops in enemy pay, and any special study that may have been required were also considered by the OB section. 4. Exploitation of Captured Documents The Army AC of S, G-2 had attached to him from AFHQ -a Documents Team, consisting of one officer and three enlisted men, to collect and examine captured documents. This team was capable of handling Italian and German documents. In an advancing situation, one member of the team remained at Army while the rest visited cities and towns where the enemy had maintained offices and command posts, searching for and exploiting documents which the enemy left behind. The team sent documents to its Army man only when they were of value in their entirety. Otherwise it merely extracted and forwarded important information, transmitting the documents to higher headquarters. Documents coming through the G-2 channels of Divisions and Corps were examined by this team at Army, and intelligence useful to the Army and its subordinate commands extracted. The team received many documents for examination from the Army Interrogation Center and from CIC. 5. S Force (G-2) It was found that a great amount of intelligence could be obtained by a systematic exploitation of buildings, factories, offices, etc., recently held by the enemy. This task meant the seizure and safeguarding of documents, technical data, equip- ment, records, and the arrest of enemy agents and suspects. A unit called S Force was organized to carry out such exploitation. Initial planning was done by AFHQ, coordination -and control was exercised by G-2, 15th Army Group, and the active exploitation in the field was the responsibility of G-2, 5th Army or GSI, 8th Army, depending on the territory of operation. 41 INTELLIGENCE An Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section (IOSS) of AFHQ compiled target lists and collected and collated detailed infor- mation on targets well within enemy territory. This unit : a. Made and received nominations of targets to be exploited. fe. Conducted research for detailed information on targets as to entries, floor plans, management, expected results. c. Pin-pointed targets. 3. Classified targets as to importance and type. e. Made initial preparation of target folders, each containing all known information about a specific target, together with instructions for attacking the target. S Force (G-2) at 15th Army Group maintained a connecting link between this agency (IOSS) and the operating Armies. It had the following functions : a. Liaison with the Armies to determine imminent needs, priorities and operational details for future planning. b. Liaison with IOSS to expedite planning. c. Processing collated target data received from IOSS into a form for immediate operational use, and completing target folders. (1. Passing target data on to Armies as required. e. Formulating and passing to Armies recommended plans of operations. /. Assisting and coordinating the activities of ex- ploiting agencies operating ' in the Army Group area, vother than those Operating directly under. Army. \ . g. Receiving from all exploiting agencies and conso- lidating the inventories, receipts, releases, and status reports on all intelligence targets, with reference to intelligence materiel removed or left in place, for the benefit of later and more detailed exploitation. h. Arranging for seizure of targets by Partisans prior to the arrival of our forces. 0 The Armies, through 01 or GSI (h), coordinated, super- vised and performed the actual target exploitation in the field within their areas. In carrying out the above; they : 42 INTELLIGENCE a. Provided and supervised troops who would seize and safeguard intelligence objectives in sufficient time to prevent damage to or dissipation of intelligence targets and materiel from the time such targets were in our hands until they were released to a responsible officer or abandoned as worthless. b. Arranged for the entry of interested agencies into the targets in time to accomplish their mission. c. Ensured the completion and collection of receipts, releases, status reports and inventories on targets and passed such data to 15th Army Group. d. Provided for the handling of targets discovered on "spot" information. e. Provided for the arrest, detention and disposition of security prisoners. Intelligence agencies which had any interest in the exploitation of targets assumed the following responsibilities: a. To nominate to IOSS their known objectives or targets in enemy territory, together with all their own available information about the targets^ b. To bring to the attention of IOSS or 15th Army Group any special targets on which they received information, whether of interest to themselves or other agencies. c. To contact Army for arrangements of movement, rendezvous and composition of the exploiting party well in advance of the operation itself. d. To render such special reports as were needed. 6. Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams (EEIST) To overcome the many problems encountered in processing and examining enemy equipment and materiel, the Intelligence Division of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, organized teams of specialists on enemy equipment and assigned, them to theater commanders who in turn attached them to the active armies and their service branches. The mission of these teams 43 INTELLIGENCE was to collect enemy equipment,* study it to determine new developments, disseminate the intelligence derived, and transmit the enemy equipment to the chiefs of their branches for further study. In addition to enemy equipment these teams collected other intelligence of value to the Army service chiefs. The following description of the operation of the Medical Intelligence Team is typical of the operation of all the teams. The Medical Intelligence Team maintained liaison (1) with Division medical units, briefed them on any new developments in equipment, and advised them to be especially watchful for certain items of equipment; (2) with photo reconnaissance units to determine the presence and location of enemy hospitals, since such intelligence was important in future planning and developments ; (3) with the Army Interrogation Center for questioning prisoners of war about the status of health and medicine in the enemy army; (4) with CIC, CSDIC, OSS and PWB for determining the .health and status of medicine among civilians in the immediate front line and enemy rear areas ; (5) with the Army Translation Section for the translation of documents pertaining to medicine and health. The study of captured enemy equipment improved or led to radical developments of our own equipment. Several examples are cited here : a. An automatic radio transmitter used as sea rescue equipment by our forces was copied from a German model. b. With certain important modifications in the fuzes used, the German "Butterfly" anti-personnel bomb Avas redesigned by the Ordnance Department and adopted for use by the Army Air Forces. c. As a result of a study of the German four meter base range finder, several of. its design features were incor- porated in a United States design. d. The 15 cm and 21 cm German rockets were designed to rotate axially in flight by means of off-center vents. Actual firing of these rockets showed that they were relatively accurate. Our Ordnance Department applied this principle of spin-stabilization in our rocket development. 44 INTELLIGENCE e. The Ordnance Department developed artillery and ammunition which was almost identical to the German 75 mm recoilless gun in basic design. " All echelons of troops should be constantly indoctrinated with the importance of captured enemy equipment and its proper disposal. "Souvenir hunting" must be curbed to preserve enemy equipment for research purposes. 7. The Translation Section, G-2 Fifth Army The fighting of a war upon foreign soil immediately presented foreign language problems. To overcome this diffi- culty, Fifth Army Headquarters organized a Translation Sec- tion under the jurisdiction of the assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. This section consisted of one officer and six enlisted men. It was capable of handling the following languages: Italian, German, French, Spanish, Greek, and Hungarian. This section translated all documents, within the language fields mentioned above, which were sent in by the various components of the Army Headquarters, excluding the Document Section, G-2, which had its own translation personnel. The bulk of the work was the translating of reports compiled by the Italian Liaison Section. The Counter Intel- ligence Corps had many reports to be translated for the benefit of G-2, such as confessions of enemy agents and testimonies of Italian Carabinieri and ^civilians. In addition to the trans- lation of documents, this section furnished oral interpreters. This section grew from one handling purely intelligence matters to one which translated and interpreted for other sections as "well. The ' Engineers received claim letters, the Provost Marshal received complaints about our military personnel who had committed crimes, and the Inspector General had documents relating to various investigations, all of which were translated by this section. The Adjutant General Depart- ment submitted to this section many foreign documents which, it could not distribute until they were translated. 45 INTELLIGENCE The problems that this section had to overcome included obtaining competent personnel, training this personnel, and procuring adequate dictionaries. 8. The Italian Liaison Section; G-2 Fifth Army- After the Armistice with Italy on September 8, 1943, and the following Declaration of Co-Belligerency by the Italian government on October 13, 1943, the Allied Armies in Italy agreed to accept the collaboration of the Italian Army in many fields. This included the utilizing of all that the Italian Military Intelligence Service (SIM) had to offer, namely a trained and organized intelligence agency and personnel who knew the native language and the country's terrain, people, culture and environment. The Italian Liaison Section was organized to coordinate SIM with Fifth Army Intelligence. Its mission was to collect intelligence concerning the enemy through its own channels and resources and transmit such information to the AC of S? G-2. Through an elaborate system of agents the following types of information were gathered and transmitted to allied intelligence channels. a. Enemy units — their location, strength, disposition and equipment. - b. Enemy defenses — locations of guns, minefields, trenchworks and strongpoints. c. Possible targets for aerial bombardment — lines of communication, industrial plants of military significance, and supply depots. d. The Italian Fascist Army— its locations, strength, personalities, and equipment. e. Reports of an engineer nature— the flooding of the Pontine Marshes, the flooding or draining of rivers and water basins. 46 INTELLIGENCE /. Reports on the results of allied air raids,, both material and psychological. g. Reports on public opinion in liberated and enemy occupied territories. h. Information concerning the economic situation of German occupied Italy. i. Reports on enemy agents, suspects and Fascists. j. Reports on enemy committed war crimes. . k. And finally, the answer to any specific question that may have been posed by allied intelligence. After collecting information and evaluating it«to some extent on the basis of other sources of information, the Italian Liaison Section then edited and published the information in .a daily Gr-2 Bulletin. Thig Bulletin contained only tactical or strategic information of high priority. Strategic information of a long range nature was published in book form. The first volumes were "A Synthesis of the Italian Economic Situation", published in November 1944, and "Situation in Enemy Occupied Italy", published in February 1945. The Italian Liaison Section also furnished Italian terrain guides for use by Fifth Army. These were especially helpful to small combat units which operated in mountainous terrain. In a moving situation these guides could give information on the best routes of advance, and in a static situation they accompanied our probing reconnaissance and combat patrols. They'also acted as interrogators of Italian civilians, returning Partisans, and deserters from the Italian Fascist Army. The selection of this personnel was entrusted to the Italian Liaison Section which, together with CIC, ' investigated them for loyalty, knowledge of the region they would operate in, know- ledge of the English language and physical, intellectual, and moral qualifications. After the Arno River crossing, the allied army was getting in closer contact with the Partisan bands which were operating against the enemy in northern Italy. The Italian Liaison 47 INTELLIGENCE Section took a major part in solving the problems of supplying, equipping, and employing the partisans. , . The Italian Liaison Section, together with OSS, exploited the help which the civil population and Partisans could . give as sources of intelligence and irregular operations. In the Eighth Army this same mission was accomplished by one unit called the Civil Liaison Branch, GSI Eighth Army. 9, Control Partisan Activities After the fall of Rome, it became apparent that the Partisans presented a major problem to be dealt with, if security, law and order were to be maintained in divisional areas. - Very little was known about them at that time. They were a zealous group, carrying various sorts of arms, and. without proper handling, would have been a menace to our security, communications and supply, as. well as a source of terror to civilians. 010 in liaison with AMG worked directly with the Partisans through G-2 and G-l: It was felt -that this arrangement would help maintain security, which was naturally a 010 function, and would assist in maintaining law and order among the civil population, which was an AMG function. The similarity of ground areas covered by AMG and OIC made this an ideal^ arrangement. As soon as a commune was taken by our infantry, a meeting was held with all remaining officials, professional men and other leading citizens of the commune, leaders 5f the Partisans and the OLN (Committee of National Liberation). Our missions were explained and their cooperation solicited. The Partisans were generally requested to lay down their arms. It was recognized, however, that in many instances Germans and Fascists were still hiding in the area, and, therefore, Partisans were allowed to retain their arms until the town was passed by division. Partisans were allowed to retain their arms when they collaborated with our troops. Aid given us by Partisans can be divided into two phases : 48 INTELLIGENCE (1) Civilian, and (2) Military. Under the civilian phase the Partisans, with the cooperation of CLN, maintained an internal police force. They made security arrests and reported known Fascists and suspects dangerous to our security. The Partisans and CLN maintained the public offices in towns where the regular officials were absent. They assisted with the evacuation of civilians, the distribution of supplies, and the resettlement of refugees. From the military standpoint the Partisans infiltrated into towns before our infantry to prepare the way for us. They went forward with our tactical units to act as scouts and guides. They maintained guerrilla units on missions to supplement divisional tactical missions. They were used as anti-sniper and mopping-up squads. Others were used as interrogators or interpreters. In addition to the above, important intelligence was obtained through : the contacts maintained by certain select Partisans with. Partisan groups in German occupied territory. 10. Aerial Photography A. GENERAL During the course of the Italian campaigns, the use of air photos in the field developed to an extent which revolu- tionized many branches of intelligence practive. The demand for the products of aerial photography, the development of fresh techniques in their utilization, constantly introduced new possibilities in bo£h the planning and the operational fields. The implications of these new possibilities Were always in process of being worked out in the field, andy nothing approaching a real standardization of practice^ was ever achieved. B. PLANNING AND PRODUCTION The covering of strategical areas, i.e. the enemy Army Group and Rear Army areas, was normally carried out on a semi-automatic program, governed by the growth of enemy 49 INTELLIGENCE defenses, changes in his general dispositions, and our own operational intentions. The flying of the Army tactical area was normally carried out in accordance with the requirements of Divisions, Corps and the Army. It was coordinated hy the Photo Reconnaissance staff at the Armies. As soon as semi-static conditions prevailed, however, it was frequently possible to formulate an Army program for flying fresh cover of the tactical area, which rendered unneces- sary daily demands- from lower units except for special requirements to be flown, e.g. at lower altitudes. Thus, for the winter 1944/1945, the Eighth .Army plan was to fly daily, conditions permitting, 36" vertical cover of the battle area to a certain depth, and to cover the enemy gun areas daily in a special sortie allotted to and controlled by each Corps. This latter practice was initiated in the autumn of 1944. Duplication with the general daily battle area sortie was accepted for the advantage of obtaining gun area cover early in the day for A/CBO to work on and subsequent action to be taken. During the same period, the Fifth Army, holding a much more extended, mountainous front, was covering the majority of this f ront on a daily program of mainly 24" cover, devoting 36" sorties to specific areas, e.g., gun areas, as requested by Corps. C. TYPES AND SCALES OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY It is emphasised that the volume and scale of air photos available during any period was always the result of the interplay of a number of factors : weather, availability of aircraft with cameras of different focal lengths, operational altitudes flown, the speed of ground operations, the accuracy with which operational developments, had been foreseen, and the, capacity for production of the photo laboratories, available. However, it was found that certain scales could be accepted as; normal for the production of vertical prints, on which: mo^t 50 INTELLIGENCE of the other types of photos were dependent. These are given below in tabulated form :— 7. Vertical Prints This was the basic form of air photo cover. Vertical print cover of the operational areas was carried out on as complete and exhaustive a scale as possible, a. 1/50,000 : not normally used for tactical purposes in the field, though produced for certain specialised uses, e.g., for map revision; in some cases the, originals of 6" focal length prints (giving approximately this scale) were used where a print covering a wide area was required, and the normal made-up mosaic was unsuitable, e.g., for artillery block plots. b. 1/20-25,000 : for general tactical use in mobile operations where larger scale cover was not available, since the area was so great that the bulk of larger scale cover was prohibitive (je.g. in the advance north from Rome), and also for laying down of mosaics; in that scale. c. 1/10-15,000: for routine interpretation of Army areas and for general distribution as basic cover, supplemented by larger-scale cover where practicable, and also for laying down normal scale mosaics. d. 1/7-8,000: for interpretation of the immediate battle area ; to supplement 1/10-15,000 scale photos ; for general tactical use and distribution in static and semi-static opera- tions; and for laying down special large-scale mosaics. 2. Mosaics (Bromide) These were considered valuable for a wide variety of tactical uses, especially where the requirement was for a large area on a single sheet , e.g., for OPs, both ground and air, and for close air support generally, for use in tanks, and ar a basis on which to: record information, a. 1/20-25,000: These were produced from time to time, but were considered' more useful for Army/Air pur- poses than for general tactical use in the field, except, for 51 INTELLIGENCE example, by armored units in mobile operations. As no larger scale mosaics were available, both armies made extensive issue,: of mosaics at 1/20-22,000 scale in the autumn of 1944 in anticipation of a breakthrough into the Po Valley. b. 1/10-15,000: These were produced for general ground use, the larger scale of 1/10-12,000 being considered more satisfactory. All mosaics produced were normally of the "uncontrolled" type. Mosaics of a suitable scale, e.g., 1/12500 or 1/25,000, were normally planned and laid down to correspond with existing map sheets. 3. Uthomosaics (Photomaps) This special form of mosaic was produced at different times by both Armies. Compared with the bromide mosaic they lost considerably in definition, though this factor depended on how fine a screen was used in the process of reproduction. They had the great advantage that, being produced by the Survey or Topographic Company, preparation and distribu- tion could be carried out much more rapidly and economically than the corresponding bromide. Thus, in February 1945, Fifth Army began production of a series of 75 semi-controlled sheets, scale 1/12,500, covering the central tactical area from the front lines to and including Bologna, and to a depth of about 10 miles. Some of these were contoured. Eighth Army inaugurated a similar program in March 1945 in preparation for the spring campaign. 4. Obliques These were normally taken from heights up to 5,000 feet. During the winter of 1943/1944, many oblique sorties and pinpoints were flown at "Zero" feet (i.e. 150-250 feet).; These missions were later discontinued as a regular program,.' though Tac/E aircraft would occasionally take steep low: obliques of guns, bridges, suspicious objects, etc., in the course-; of a normal visual sortie. The particular use of obliques was for studying all types of "linear" features, such as coastlines (for amphibious operations), hill features and ridges, river; 52 INTELLIGENCE lines and defense lines. They were particularly in demand by assaulting troops and artillery OPs, and for engineer planning. They were less useful as a basis for photo interpretation, though in moutainous country they provided valuable cross checks of certain features, e.gi, tracks. High obliques of mountainous areas were used extensively by the assault troops during the rapid advance of the French Expeditionary Corps over the Petrella massif in May 1944. 5. Photo Aids Various forms of visual aids connected more or less closely with aerial photography may be recorded under this heading: — a. Enlargements ("Blowups") : Suitable enlarged prints of cities were produced at 1/3-5,000 scale, and distri- buted generally for tactical use in street fighting. " They were also used for administrative planning. A further use was in the briefing of pilots by Air Liaison Officers for close support missions. Fifth Army allotted a regular monthly quota of enlargements to each Corps which could be requested by subordinate units. Areas chosen under these allotments included most of the important defended mountainous features. b. Models: These were normally produced for special areas (e.g., sections of the Gothic^ lines and of the Central Apennines) in 1/5-10,000 scale. Latterly they consisted of a plaster base, with an air photo skin. If required, topu graphical detail was modelled . from air photo detail, and superimposed. c. Map PJioto Prints : "Prints of maps or map, sections were produced with overprinted detail, normally by the use of acetates. Showing defense x or topographical information, they formed a valuable means of illustrating planning reports, before the issue of a standard defense or topographical overprint became feasible. A parallel produc- tion to the normal map print was the map print sortie plot, which was in effect a photograph of a map marked with the 53 INTELLIGENCE plot of a sortie. This was found clearer and more practical for use in the field than a normal overlay. D. PRODUCTION OF OVERPRINTED PHOTOS The overprinting of additional detail on all forms of air photos became standard practice for certain special purposes or occasions. The actual detail superimposed varied according to the type of photo and the requirements of prospective users. /. Types of Overprinting a. General "map" detail: this was primarily a grid, either arbitrary or an approximation of the map grid. Additional detail included place names, map references or pre- arranged reference points all designed to facilitate rapid orientation and handling by the general user. b. Topographical detail: Beyond the essential mini- mum requirements of ,"map" detail for general use, as described above, requirements of topographical detail showed too much divergence between different users for this to become standard practice^ and it was normally only carried out mi special demand. c. Defenses: These were occasionally shown on mosaics, seldom on single prints. 2, Overprinting of Vertical Prints A typical vertical gridded print production included an approximate map grid, prearranged artillery targets or reference points, and an approximate linear scale. An alternate form of overprinting included one map reference on each print for identification, together with the North point and scale. Single prints were not normally used for overprinting defenses for general issue. Single annotated prints were,, however, issued in planning stages to illustrate the development of enemy defenses. 3. Overprinting of Mosaics The superimposition of a map grid, even an approxi- mation, oh an uncontrolled mosaic, Was, for obvious reasons,. 54 INTELLIGENCE impossible. Thus the normal practice, when a grid was required, was to superimpose it in arbitrary form. In view of possible Confusion and duplication with the map grid, the arbitrary grid was never universally in favor. However, it was possible to plot map grid intersections, and this method was also occasion- ally adopted. Divisions of an arbitrary grid were normally arranged to correspond with a standard grid size on a normal map, so as to facilitate use of the grid reamer or grid scale in the reading of coordinates. Other detail frequently included on mosaics was as follows: place names, names of prominent features, spot heights, North point, scale. Occasionally a series of mosaics were produced to show overprinted defense detail for strongly defended areas. Thus 1/10,000 defense mosaics were issued for the central passes of the Gothic line (especially the Futa pass), and later a series at 1/15,000 showing the Bologna perimeter defenses. E. DISSEMINATION OF PHOTOS 1. Library Sets A distinction was made between library sets of current sorties printed immediately after flying and distributed oh a limited scale to interpreters, and sets Of basic cover, i.e. reprint sets issued oh a wide scale to all general users of photo cover. Of current sorties', normally three initial sets were produced for Army Photo Center, and Corps and Division Photo Intelligence Sections, so that each interpreting agency had bhe copy of the correct frontage. According to conditions, the practice was to follow these up, within a period of hours, With. 2-3 more sets, which enabled distribution to additional branches, such as G-2 at Army, Corps Artillery and/or En- gineers, and Division Artillery. 2. Basic Cover Because of a nuihber of factors it was seldom possible, 55 INTELLIGENCE or even desirable, to lay down standard scales of photo issue on an Army level. The policy consistently followed was to attempt to meet all reasonable demands, within the limits of the resources available, and future planning commitments. The factors referred to above included the following: — a. Variations in requirements between units, resulting from varying degrees of training and the type unit (infantry, armored, etc.). 6, Type of operations for which cover was required. c. Availability of alternate forms of cover, e.g., prints, mosaics, obliques, enlargements, etc. d. Eeliability of maps. However it may generally be stated that in both Armies a minimum of 30 sets of stereo-cover were provided for any division entering the line (assuming one set of stereo- cover as equivalent to two sets of non-overlapping cover). Subsequently, in a static or semi-static situation, this was increased to 70 stereo sets, and to 100-120 per Division for a Divisional or Corps attack. Preparatory to an Army attack, Eighth Army made a practice of preparing non-overlapping gridded print cover (36", 24" or 20"), for issue on a very wide scale, such as 500 non-overlapping sets per Corps. This was in addition to any cover which may have been issued before, and to any special requirements. 3. Reprints of Basic Cover Under normal circumstances, it was the practice to select, for bulk reproduction as basic cover, a good well-defined sortie, even though not of recent date. In fact, depending on the speed of advance, the larger the prospective requirements of basic cover for a certain area, the older the sortie would tend to be. This was normally no disadvantage to the general user, whose requirements were good scale and good definition. However, under certain circumstances, even the general aspect 56 INTELLIGENCE of the terrain in the battle area changed so considerably as to require supplementary limited issues of current sorties to users of basic cover. . Some of these circumstances were as follows : a. Effect of seasons in change of foliage and snow conditions. In mountainous areas, patches of snow were frequently used by patrols for orientation. b. Effect of operations, causing the development of trackage and other obvious signs of military activity in static positions; the effects of fire and major engineer demoli- tions in the forward area, especially on houses and built-up areas; cratering, clearing of fields of fire, etc. F. . DEFENSE INTERPRETATION 1. General Interpretation for defenses was the work of a few skilled personnel, with a few definite objects in view. There was a definite practice for the collection and collation of defense information and its recording on "defense overprints", for which both Fifth and Eighth Armies developed an SOP. This section deals with the general collation of the results of defense interpretation, while the special procedure for the production of defense overprints is dealt with in the section following. 2. Division of responsibility for defense interpretation Although Photo Intelligence Sections at all levels were responsible for collating and making available the defense picture to the unit to which they were attached, in practice the bulk of the work was divided between Armies and Divisions. General interpretation of all sorties was carried out at Army. Divisions were responsible for detailed interpreta- tion of their own front, especially with regard to minor defenses. The Division interpretation, being more closely in touch with local conditions and other sources of information 57 INTELLIGENCE with which cross checking was possible, was accepted by Army for record purposes to an agreed depth of front. The latter, during the static conditions of the winter 1944-1945, was some 3-5,000 yds. Outside this "Divisional belt" the Army .interpretation was accepted as authoritative, and, in addition, Armies reserved responsibility for major items of defense, such as guns, wherever they were located. Corps Photo Intelligence Sections occupied an intermediate position, coordinating and collating the results of Army and Divisional interpretation, and carrying out what additional work was necessary. In Fifth Army, they were responsible for the production, through Army resources, of all normal operational defense overprints, and exercised greater control of Divisional interpretation than in Eighth Army. It should be remembered that the counter-battery fire organization was largely centered at Corps level, though the actual counter-battery interpretation was, for practical reasons,, carried out by both Armies at their Army Photo Centers.. 3. Cbuht&r-BoiitetY iWteppretafrdfi This speeial aspect was centered at Army level. In Fifth Army, counter-battery officers from each Corps were at the Fifth Army Photo Intelligence Center {FAPIC) and Were responsible for selecting those parts of fresh sorties covering known gun areas for priority interpreta- tion by the photo interpreters. They themselves did not interpret, but maintained the up-to-date counter^baftery situa- tion marked on photos, and kept comparative cover of the main gun areas. In Eighth Army each Corps was represented at' Army Photo Center by an officer on the CBO Staff who himself interpreted all counter -battery information. This arrangement Was, of course, considerably facilitated by the practice, noted earlier, of flying Special daily gun area sorties. In both cases the results of counter-battery interpreta- tion were survey-plotted to 12 figures and telephoned or wirelessed to the Corps concerned. 58 INTELLIGENCE 4. Dissemination of information Army Photo Intelligence reports were drawn tip according to an SOP, with 8-figure map references and template ref ex-ences. All reports contained a general paragraph giving brief details of the outstanding features of the interpreta- tion, for staff use. Eighth Army also reproduced the results of interpretations separately in a "Photographic Intelligence Summary", distributed periodically to Army branches, G-2 at Corps and Divisions and to all photo interpreters. Divisional photo interpreters conformed less to a standard pattern. Normally items were reported in the form of 8-figure map references, but sometimes an overlay was issued. The former was recognized To be preferable for accuracy of transfer to a permanent record, and the latter more convenient for handling by forward units. Occasionally the results of Division interpretation were periodically shown in the form of an overprinted map photoprint, and there is no doubt that this was a near ideal solution, though not always available to a Division Photo Intelligence section. The template was a valuable adjunct in all reporting of interpretation in cases where precise indication of detail was required, and where it was impracticable to achieve this by dissemination of marked photos. Fifth Army specified that Divisions' reports should follow Army practice in giving both map and template references for all major defenses, while Eighth Army adopted the alternative method of reporting periodically on marked prints. The template was also commonly used for controlling artillery fire with the help of air photos, whether from ground OPs or observation planes. At lower levels, methods of reporting to fighting troops the results of defense interpretation varied from day to day, and use was made either of map and template references or overlays, or marked prints, according to practicability, the purpose to be served, and the tactical situation. 89 INTELLIGENCE G. DEFENSE OVERPRINTS 1. General The object of a defense overprint was to collate the enemy defenses, layout and sometimes general activity (such as military occupation, trackage), by means of conventional signs overprinted on a map of suitable . scale. 2. ' Production Scales^used for the production of defense overprints varied normally from 1/10,000 to 1/100,000. In Fifth Army, overprints for operational use were produced at Corps level in 1/25,000 (and occasionally in 1/50,000 scale) according to the density of defenses and the tactical situation. Army pro- duced overprints for staff and planning use in 1/100,000 scale, and was also responsible for special large-scale productions. In Eighth Army operational overprints were produced by Army in 1/25,000 scale. Discussion for and against the inclusion of information from sources other than air photos (especially civilians) on de- fense overprints was based on the relative . accuracy of the various sources. The characteristic of information, from the interpretation of air photos is its absolute preciseness, though not necessarily reliability. Thus a photo may indicate beyond a doubt that a weapon pit exists at a certain pinpoint, but cannot always show whether the enemy occupies it or will fight from it. On the other hand, a civilian report may be reliable in indicating that the enemy does definitely occupy a defensive position, but may not show precisely where it is. Infor- mation from sources other than air photos was shown, if at all, in a different color (thus purple on Fifth Army overprints, as distinct from red). Air photo information was always re- garded as confirming and superseding ground information. Eighth Army did not include ground reports on defense over- prints. 3. Collation It was found that an SOP for recording the results of 60 INTELLIGENCE defense interpretations as they were produced was essential for the smooth planning and production of overprints whenever required. Both Armies codified their practice in this respect during a semi-static period, and introduced a system designed to he practicable in all operations except the most mobile. In Fifth Army, Corps and Army collated on map overlays the results of interpretation at all levels, and coordin- ated this at regular intervals. Eighth Army used for this purpose sets of 36" basic cover, which were annotated by Di- vision Photo Intelligence Sections and forwarded together with overlays to Corps and Army. Thus, at all levels, it was possible to keep up both master-overlays and master-mosaics of the current interpretation of the defense system. All plot- ting from photos to maps for the final overprint production was centralized at Army. Both Armies found it necessary to have a Photo In- terpreter liaison officer, qualified to make decisions on the spot, whose special task it was to visit Corps and coordinate the collation of all photo interpretation for Army purposes. H. SUBSIDIARY FORMS OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY There was a certain number of subsidiary forms of aerial photography which supplemented in the field the normal standard forms of high altitude vertical and medium altitude oblique photos. They were of varying origin, and represented either purely Army developments (photography from light aircraft), or the adaptation of a strategic Air Force service for tactical Army requirements (night photography). 7. Photography from light alrcrpft This form of aerial photography originated in the ANZTO beachhead because of certain characteristic local con- ditions. These were : a. the type of country, which was flat, criss-crossed by deeply cut watercourses, where observation was very difficult, and the scarcity of natural OPs, b.. the distance from centers of planning, flying and processing, and g. a period of Weather conditions unfavorable for high altitude flying. 61 INTELLIGENCE The result was that VI U.S. Corps began experiment- ally the taking of low altitude tactical photos from artillery ob- servation planes, using for. this purpose the personnel and equipment of APS (Army Pictorial Service). The practice was continued and further developed by the Fifth and Eighth Armies, though on slightly different lines. The Fifth Army concentrated more on panoramic photography for commanders, and the Eighth Army more on close-range tac- tical photography. The Fifth Army utilized the services of the APS in this work, but there was no similar unit available in the Eighth Army. 2. Photography from light aircraft— Fifth Army Forward teams of the Signal Photo Company, working under the APS branch of Fifth Army were constantly em- ployed in tactical photography for commanders at all levels in the field. Some of this photography was carried out from the ground (from Arty OPs) and some from light aircraft. Artillery observation planes were normally available, but where possible, liaison planes were preferred for the purpose, as they allowed greater convenience and better view. Work was carried out np to an altitude of 6.000 ft. Most of the photography carried out was panoramic in type, and was used by commands down to battalion level for general planning and terrain appreciation. Photos were also used for PW interrogation, and in artillery OPs for the direc- tion of fire, and were: considered suitable for- general tactical distribution down to platoon commands. 3. Photography from light air crafts-Eighth Army This practice was developed in Eighth Army at Corps level, using artillery observation! planes?, with a local improvised- organization as regards' personnel, equipment and- processing. sance by providing a local source at short call. It was 62T INTELLIGENCE considered particularly valuable as light aircraft could operate in the forward areas at times when weather conditions rendered normal photo reconnaissance impossible. Photos, taken were of a tactical nature, and included short oblique line overlaps of enemy forward positions for the interpretation of local defense and track activity, and pinpoints of bridges, demolitions, enemy posts, etc. 4. Night Photography There were no facilities under Army control f or the flying of night photos. Sorties were occasionally flown on. request for both armies out of the very limited resources of MATAF. • It was hoped that certain aspects of the enemy's! activities not detectable by day could be recorded in this way, thus gun positions with camouflage removed, movement, etc. Those taken on the battle area were dissappointing, from the point of view of detailed study of defences. The main value of night photography from the Army point of view remained the detection of activity and movement in the stra- tegic and in the tactical areas. II. Photo Intelligence at Division Level In the early stages of the Italian campaign, there was a scarcity of trained ground force photo interpreters. For that; reason, interpreters were attached only to divisions. Two officers and two enlisted men were needed at division headquarters. Their duties included insuring that subordinate units had the proper photo coverage at all times. They provided such interpretation and studies as were required by any divisional unit which had no interpreters. Division artillery headquarters required such service when the counter- battery section of corps, for example, needed' confirmed or corrected enemy gun locations. Close liaison between the photo intierpreter and the Air OP had to, become SOP so that, visual targets and photo interpreted targets could be coordinated. 63 INTELLIGENCE Each, infantry regiment had a mail who was capable of doing recognition work, and making general terrain studies and mosaics. A trained photo interpreter was attached to division artillery headquarters during the operations at CASSINO. This innovation worked excellently from its inception and definitely proved the value of having a photo interpreter in physical contact with the units which could act with minimum delay on his interpretations. Areas made suspect by shellreps were referred at once to the photo interpreter for analysis and in some cases fire was brought to bear on an enemy battery before it had ceased firing. The interpreter was also of great value to the artillery S-2 in selecting areas for harassing mis- sions, in locating mortars, and in making terrain studies f of our own future positions. Air photos, both vertical and oblique, annotated by the interpreter provided an accurate and current medium for questioning patrols upon their return from a mission. More important was their value in briefing patrols on the best routes to approach their objectives and return from their missions. Such photos were valuable to commanders in planning future operations, giving excellent intelligence on the terrain they would have to cross and take "or defend. The battalion com- mander preferred the very low oblique which gave him an intimate and detailed picture of a small portion of the immediate terrain before him. The division or corps commander perf erred the high oblique which told him what the terrain was for many miles in advance. By tying vertical photos in with oblique photos, commanders had a complete intelligence picture of terrain. Six inch vertical photos enlarged to a scale of 1 : 25,000 and provided with an arbitrary grid were in great demand by the artillery. Such photos were very valuable as firing charts. G>4 used terrain studies made by the photo interpreter to determine best routes and means of supply and evacuation. PW interrogators obtained accurate information from photos which was useful in interrogations. 64 INTELLIGENCE 12. Target Section, Fifth Army G-2 A. GENERAL The major function of the G-2 Target Section was the collection, collation, and evaluation and dissemination of all information bearing on targets suitable for attack particularly by the Air Force supporting the Army in the field. Army artillery and the Navy were also kept fully informed of targets suited to their capabilities. The Army channel for requesting Air Force support was Air Support Control, to whom primarily all information was submitted. Eoutine materiel was disseminated widely, for information, to the supporting Air Force and to Army branches. British procedure in the Eighth Army was essentially the same as that of the Fifth Army. B. ■ COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 1. Sources All G-2. sources were consulted daily, the following being the most valuable : OSS and other agencies in enemy rear areas, photo reconnaissance, and PWs. As a later develop- ment, agents were provided by OSS specifically for the tasks of the Target Section, and their information sent by wireless link, soon became the fullest and most useful source. Linking up with partisan groups, they were often able to draw on infor- mation from a wide area. 2. Types of Targets a. Stationary targets: dumps, troop occupied areas, Headquarters and all kinds of installations. b. Opportunity targets : tank and troop concentra- tions, motor transport columns. c. Communications: bridges, vulnerable points on roads and railways. d. Targets to avoid: restricted zones, hospitals, camps of allied PWs, areas held by partisans. 65 INTELLIGENCE 3- Briefing All sources, especially interrogators and agents, were constantly supplied with detailed briefing notes, and urged to constant efforts to pinpoint targets and produce information in the form most suitable for utilization. Without this constant briefing of sources, many targets would not have been recorded at all. An important part of the process of stimulating the source was regular "thank you" letters, in which the action taken against targets reported was summarized, with a brief note of their value and importance. This information was passed back to all sources, including agents (by wireless); a similar function was fulfilled by Bomb Damage Assessment reports (BDA) passed back to the Air Force.. 4- Photo Interpreters Three officers were fully employed in the following tasks: a. Seeking photographic evidence for ground reports. It was found that about one out of three ground reports could be confirmed on air photos. b. ^Listing suitable targets from direct air photo interpretation. c. Preparing annotated photos of confirmed targets with written reports for Air Force use. d. Reviewing periodically all targets, and issuing target activity reports and BDA reports. C. COLLATION AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION All information, while in process of confirmation', was collated on a simple map-overlay, on which the location and all information bearing on a certain pin' point were recorded. When a target was confirmed, i.e. air photo evidence was found to bear out a ground report, it was transferred to a card index, and issued in the Section's routine "Target Report". 66 INTELLIGENCE From thence onwards its ease history was recorded, i.e. information from all sources showing its activity, details of attacks carried out, and BDA reports. All targets were graded, according to their importance, as A, B or C; in addition, however, priorities changed from time to time according to the Tactical Situation. Thus, just before an attack, assembly areas, bivouac areas and Head- quarters would receive highest priority. All targets were also cross-indexed as to type ; thus it was possible to present at short notice a selection of targets, either geographically or by type, for any particular program of air support. { Photos taken shortly after a bombing attack formed the basis for Bomb Damage Assessment reports, which, with annotated: prints, were forwarded to the Air Force for the information of the squadron which did the bombing. Routine photographic check-ups of all targets formed the basis of target activity reports, showing variations in the grading of a target as the result of air attack and the changing tactical situation. D. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 1. General Distribution was made in three forms: a. Daily submission of target programs to Air Support Control at Army. 6... Routine dissemination of target information to Air Force and Army branches. c. Presentation of special reports to' ASO and other Army branches. 2. Daily Submission of Targets During active periods, suitable targets for inclusion in the next day's air program were submitted at a joint con- ference at which Air Force, ASC> Gr-3, and other interested sections were represented/Selection was governed by the type 67 INTELLIGENCE of target to be given priority, and the nature and extent of air support available. 3. Routine Dissemination: The periodic "Target Report" This was the routine method for dissemination of all target information on the long-term support of the Army by the Air. The following typical information was given: 1. ' New Targets, including : a. PEU interpretation report, b. Ground source reports, if available, c. G-2 Comment, d. Copies of target photos attached. 2. Target Activity Eeport, i.e. a review of the behavior of a previously reported target, with indications of whether it was still active. 3. Bomb Damage Assessment, i.e. PEU inter- pretation report. 4. G-2 Discussion, i.e. general comment on the enemy's rear area situation, suggested priorities of targets,, etc. • Distribution was to supporting Air Force, branches of Army, higher, lower and flanking echelons. 4- ^Target Photos An essential function of the Target Section, in con- nection with the presentation of any new target, whether for the daily program or in the Target Eeport, was the prepara- tion of target photos for Air Force use. These were printed with the following standard annotations reproduced by acetates: target photo reference number delineation of target, description of target, coordinates, place name if any, North direction. Any number of these might be presented, from one for the daily program, to forty with the periodic Target Eeport to the Air Force, for distribution to all squadrons supporting the Army. 68 INTELLIGENCE 5. Special Reports By reason of its special organization, the_ Target Section was able, from time to time, to present special reports such as the following to branches : 1. To ASC when a build up had been confirmed over a period in a certain enemy rear area, suggesting a program of attack. 2. To PWB, suggesting suitable areas for activity, 3. To City Command Section, summarizing bomb damage in a certain area as affecting the selection of future accommodations and sites. E. CONCLUSION It was considered that the successful working of a Target Section was based on the careful briefing of ground sources, adequate resources for photo cover and interpretation, and good coordination and presentation by intelligence officers. 13. Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance in the Fifth Army Tactical aerial reconnaissance in the Italian campaign was handled in a somewhat different manner from that prescribed in the then current manuals and circulars. The system used proved highly effective. All tactical reconnaissance for Fifth Army, was centrally coordinated by the Fifth Army Gr-2 Section. Army requested an allotment of missions from the Tactical Air Command which held operational control of the squadrons being used. The number of missions made available varied with the Army frontage, the number of corps and divisions, the Tac/R requirements of the air forces, and the situation. All requests from units of the Army for visual recon- naissance, photo reconnaissance, artillery reconnaissance and naval gun fire spotting were submitted through the corps to the 69 INTELLIGENCE Army G-2 Air Officer. He coordinated and combined missions, allotted priorities, and then transmitted the missions direct to the various squadrons by telephone or teletype. These missions were also relayed to Tactical Air Command which reviewed them and issued a directive to the squadrons confirming the missions to be flown. When special missions were not requested, an SOP cover of the Army ar;ea was flown. This system had the advantage of close liaison and direct interchange of information between Army and the Tac/B squadrons. Keeping Army missions under the centralized control of Army G-2 had the advantages listed below : ■ o. Information from the many sources available to Army G-2 could be coordinated with Tac/E to avoid duplication of effort, or could be checked by Tac/B for confirmation or denial. For example, the G-2 Air Officer was in close contact with PRU Which was attached to G-2. Tac/E. photo requests were checked against PBU coverage for the day, thus prevent- ing duplication of photo missions. b. It avoided conflicting requests being submitted to the Tac/R squadrons or Air Command by the corps. Army G-2, with access to the complete Army situation, was in the best position to allot mission priorities to the corps. It provided a central agency at Army to apportion the artillery adjustment missions flown by the Tac/B squadrons. c. It enabled tactical reconnaissance missions to be closely coordinated with fighter bombing, armed reconnaissance and other air efforts of the Tactical Air Command. d. It, provided for the complete exchange of ground and air information between the intelligence and Air Liaison Officers of the Tac/E squadrons and the Army G-2. This system kept to an operating minimum the channels between the ground unit requesting the mission and the recon- naissance squadron performing it, thus obtaining quicker results. The method used in Pith Army was believed to be more direct and probably more effective than the alternate system under which requests for information originating with the ground force at corps of lower units were transmitted by tlm 70 'INTELLIGENCE nearest Ground Liaison Officer to Army Headquarters, where they were filtered in the Army Air Section and then transmitted to the Tactical Air Command and the Tactical Control Center. Apparently under this system it was intended that the Tactical Air Command submit the missions to the reconnaissance group which in turn would assign them to their Tac/B squadrons. Compared with the direct method employed in Italy, this system seemed unduly cumbersome. The communications system employed was very complete. Army had direct telephone or teletype communications with the squadrons by which it passed spot mission requests to the squadrons, and also kept the squadrons posted on the ground situation. The squadron in turn transmitted results of Tac/B, artillery adjustment and naval adjustment missions to Army. Bach squadron had an SCB-299 or SCB-188 radio over which reconnaissance results and spot photo interpretation reports were broadcast. The reconnaissance reports were broadcast immediately after the pilot was interrogated. Corps, divisions, or any other units could receive reports by monitoring the Tac/B frequency. There was also a radio link between each Tac/B squadron and the Army Air Support Control. Mission requests from Army G-2 could be transmitted and results received over the radio in case of a breakdown in wire communication. Air Liaison Officers at the squadrons .themselves played an important role in the results obtained by Tac/B. Their duties were: a. To inform the squadron of Army intentions, and to present to Army the Air Force side of any question. b. To keep the squadron informed of the ground situation. c. To. brief pilots for missions. d. To interrogate pilots after landing to obtain from them the maximum amount of accurate information. , e. To insure prompt dispatch of information and photos to the ground commander. 71 INTELLIGENCE /. To check the establishment and maintenance of communications between Army and the squadrons. g. To instruct pilots in Army Ground Force subjects. The aircraft performing tactical reconnaissance«operated in pairs. The head pilot observed ground activity and his "wing man" provided him protection against surprise attack by enemy aircraft. Because of the vulnerability to flak, the reconnaissance flights were made at altitudes from 3,000 to 10,000 feet, and usually at about 6,500 feet. 'Reconnaissance flights at lower altitudes proved uneconomical due to the added hazards. For this reason, Tac/B was often unable to obtain detailed information by visual reconnaissance. It could rarely locate vehicles parked near trees, properly camouflaged gun positions or deployed troops. Information obtained by Tac/B was thus limited to enemy movements of vehicles or trains over lines of communication to the enemy rear, or of conspicuous details such as road blocks, blown bridges and firing guns. The only practical way of obtaining more detailed information was by photographic coverage. Tac/B planes equipped with vertical cameras were utilized to obtain photos of small important areas when higher medium clouds prevented the high altitude PBU coverage. Vertical Tac/B photos were suitable Spr pinpoint photos of bridges, road blocks, etc., and for supplementing the pilot's visual reconnaissance of a suspected area. A few Tac/B planes were also equipped to take oblique photos. The purpose to which the oblique photos were to be put had to be considered when requesting this type coverage, and so the angle or "tilt" desired had to be specified. Bach Tac/B squadron had a photo interpreter who accomplished first phase photo interpretation and broadcast the results over the Tac/B net or called the results into Tactical Air Command and Army G-2 Air. Profitable targets located by Tac/B were called to the local air controller at Air Support Control who would, in turn, call the information to the fighter bombers in the area. The controller arranged an immediate rendezvous oyer a prominent 72 INTELLIGENCE landmark and the Tac/R planes would lead the fighter bombers to the. target. This system proved very effective. Staff officers should be acquainted with- the limitations and capabilities of aerial reconnaissance. This knowledge will assist in planning, eliminate misunderstanding, promote the maximum air-ground, cooperation, and produce the most effective results. Briefing and interrogation of pilots was the most important duty of the Air Liaison Officer with the tactical reconnaissance squadron. The information obtained from the Tac/R pilot was directly proportioned to the quality of briefing and interrogating. To fulfil his liaison duties, the ALO needed to gain the confidence and respect of every pilot. Without this respect, he could never obtain the best results. The ALO needed a thorough knowledge of the character and personality of every pilot. IJe had to know when the pilot's information was reliable, when to discredit information and when to send follow-up missions to check a weak report. The ALO had to decide what reliability was to be placed in a pilot's report. The following information was given in briefing a pilot on visual, photo and artillery missions as a whole: a. A clear picture of the ground situation including the location of forward troops or routes on which our troops were located. A general idea of the ground strategy helped the pilot understand the "why" of the mission. Care was taken not to reveal future ground intentions. 6. The latest Bomb Safety Line was impressed on the pilot and it was pointed out that observations must begin at our advanced tretops and not at the BSL. c. A complete report of all areas and-other aircraft flights, both friendly and enemy. n INTELLIGENCE d. Any necessary R/T call signs of air and ground units and the use of VHF channels. In addition to the general points common to. all missions the following was covered for the visual reconnaissance: a. The area to be covered. This had to be within the limitations of the aircraft and the pilot. b. If there was a specific request to be carried out on the mission, the pilot was^ given the complete details as well as hints which would help him fulfil the request. For example, if guns were looked for, logical gun 'areas were pointed out. c. All possible information on probable movements, suspicious areas, gun areas and other military installations were obtained from the Army G-2 and passed on to the pilot to aid in the mission. The pilot assigned a photo reconnaissance mission needed advice from the ALO on intervalometer settings, speed of plane and altitude to obtain the desired scale and overlap. Tac/R photo runs required excellent navigation and to aid the pilot in this he was shown "checkpoints" and when possible, was briefed on a photo mosaic covering the area. The amount of briefing required for an artillery adjustment mission depended upon the experience of the pilot. If the pilot had performed many successful adjustment missions, he needed only the details of his mission. If the pilot were new, he was given a brief review of procedure. The following details were common in briefing all pilots on an artillery adjustment mission : a. A complete description of the target was given. If a shoot was for targets of opportunity, the pilot needed to know what he might expect to find. All available photos of a target area were used. Target locations were marked on the pilot's map with the proper reference number and name; b. Our own gun locations were given to the pilot. c. The line of fire was pointed out with reference to north line, roads, streams and other landmarks. d. The time the pilot was to arrive over his target, and the length of time he was to remain in the target area if radio contact was not made with the firing battery at the 74 INTElLiGENCE appointed time. The time to remain over the area while actually adjusting depended on the completion of the mission, gas supply or previously laid down operational policy. e. The caliber of guns firing the mission was given because in most instances that determined the method of fire to be expected and gave the pilot an idea of what size of burst and what accuracy to expect. /. The time of flight of the projectile was given. It was important that the pilot know this so that he could position himself to observe the bursts after the guns fired. g. Channels and frequencies for the shoot were pre- arranged, and the ' pilot given the call signs of the aircraft and ground station together with those of any other stations that could be used as alternates. h. The method of fire was determined by the nature of the target or the desires of the artillery. The: pilot was briefed on the method to expect. All points of any particular request were cleared before the planes took off and not later by radio from plane to firing battery. i. Pilots were given a photo prepared with concentric 100 yards circles around the target and the line of fire marked. This assisted in judging the distance of the bursts from the target. If shoots were to be done from a map, at least a 1/50,000 scale was used. If photo mosaics were available, the target locations were pointed out on these with reference to terrain features. j. The artillery was prepared to furnish neutralizing fire on AA positions that hindered the mission and the pilot was briefed on how to call for this fire. Of equal importance with briefing was the interrogation after the mission. This was particularly true of visual recon- naissance where all the results of the mission had to be brought Out. The interrogation was conducted with only the two pilots who flew the mission and the interrogator present. All necessary maps, photos, and identification charts were available to aid the pilot in determining what he saw. All movement which the pilot observed was taken together 75 INTELLIGENCE with the direction of movement, time, and if possible, types of vehicles. For plotting movements the 1/250,000 scale map was sufficient. If movement was on secondary roads near the front lines, a larger scale map was used. If gun positions were seen to be occupied and active, the pilot was provided with a 1/50,000 scale map to give an accurate location. Other military installations were reported by six figure coordinates when possible. The interrogation of a photo mission required the extrac- tion of information necessary for the titling and plotting of the photo. This included : a. Coordinates of photo strip. b. Altitude flown. c. Course of aircraft during photo run. d. Time photo was taken. e. Weather conditions over target Even though the mission was out only for a photo, the interrogator was sure the pilot reported all visual observations madejuring the mission. The interrogation of an Arty/E. mission served as a means of assessing damage to targets brought under fire and for correcting the pilot's adjustment procedure. Particular atten- tion was given to 'the conditions of communications and the procedure used by the pilot. If there were faults in the pilot's manner of conducting the adjustment or confusion on his part as to what the battery did, he was corrected and informed immediately after the interrogation. All information from the interrogation was passed to the artillery and the artillery in turn furnished information which served to check the pilot's statements. The Arty/R mission also provided valuable intelligence information since the pilot had spent* approximately an hour over a very small sector and could furnish an accurate account of enemy activity there. 76 INTELLIGENCE 15. Patrol Operations Under Winter Conditions 1. General The winter operations of Divisions in Italy were confined to mountainous sectors where the enemy front lines were relatively close to our own lines and where the situation was static and relatively quiet. 2. Skis and Snowshoes Mention of winter patrols naturally suggests the use of skis but this was not practical for several reasons. First, unless a man was an expert oh either skis or snowshoes (and experts are not made overnight nor during a single winter season) this additional equipment was usually more of a handicap than a help ; second, the distances covered by patrols seldom were over a few thousand yards, eliminating the necessity for rapid long distance movements across country; third, with the terrain so cut up by deep draws and defended ridges, patrols had to Jollow routes which were quite unsuitable for the use of skis. During much of our winter operations the snow had melted leaving a great portion of the ground covered by sharp rocks and deep mud. 3. Areas to be Patrolled A general policy covering the type, strength, and frequency of patrolling was given to the regiments. The regiments determined which areas would be patrolled and the type and strength of patrol to be employed in each case, and submitted their daily intentions to Division Headquarters for. approval. Information obtained from front line units, prisoner interrogation, and artillery, ground and air OP 's was studied to determine the enemy occupied areas and the weak spots in his defenses; and together with large scale (1/12,500) maps and the latest aerial photos, suitable routes of approach were selected. 77 INTELLIGENCE Patrol leaders and their key personnel made an actual ground reconnaissance on at least one night before the opera- tion to confirm the depth of the snow> to select control points, assembly areas, recognition points, and routes of withdrawal. 4- Selection of Routes The terrain in "no man's land" was made up of woods, open fields, or ravines. In the woods the shelling of several months had broken the trees and littered the ground with branches and twigs. When the ground was frozen it was practically impossible to walk through- these areas quietly. The only satisfactory way to go through these areas was to crawl, the lead man clearing a path for the patrol to follow. Woods such as these provided little or no concealment and were avoided as much as possible. '. Open fields were also avoided except on the darkest of nights, and even then they were most difficult to cross because of the machine gun fire which the enemy used to keep them covered. On this account the deep ravines were usually selected as patrol routes. . The use of this rugged terrain with its steep and slippery banks called for double the usual exertion. Men tired quickly and, if not careful, lost their footing. The lack of suitable routes and room for maneuver sometimes required the repeated use of the same general routes. Trackage in the snow and mud was very noticeable and routes had to be altered, if at all .possible, to avoid ambush. By varying, the route by as little as 25 yards, ambushes often were successfully by-passed without detection. This7 was made possible by the: use of the: numerous smaller draws branching off from the larger ravines. - Smaller draws were favored because they provided defilade from the machine gun and mortar fire. which the enemy had accurately zeroed in on each of the; larger ravines. However, they confused patrols as to direction, distance, and interpretation of sounds. Once in a draw there were no short cuts. It was neces- 78 INTELLIGENCE sary to proceed to the end of it in order to secure the flanks. Except in emergencies, it was not practicable to climb to the top of the ridge and look to the flanks, as the banks were too steep and too mneh noise was caused by the falling of loose dirt. There was little chance to. fight back or avoid machine gun or'machine pistol fire in a draw. It was hard to disperse, except in depth. Snow seldom stuck to the steep banks of the draws though the bottoms Were well covered. This made it necessary to remove snowsuits to conform with the background. Patrols often changed into and out of snowsuits several times in one night. While working in winding draws with many tributaries, it was impossible to find prominent landmarks for guidance and check points. This was overcome by a prior study of the positions of searchlights which, when lit, were quick and accurate means of orientation. It was not hard to walk quietly on muddy ground if pools of water could be avoided. The only handicap mud gave was in its sticking to the boots, making them heavy, which caused the men to tire faster. The slippery conditions made tooting treacherous. The changing picture in terrain from night to night caused some trouble. As the snow melted it bared shellholes, trees, rocks, and trails that were not seen before. Recognizable landmarks would disappear. A patrol leader, though he had passed over the same route several times, sometimes would find such a changed picture of the terrain that he was easily confused as to his location. Crusty snow had to be broken carefully; Once' broken through it was possible for every man to follow in the same footsteps. The static winter situation gave the enemy ample time to lay minefields. Patrols had to be briefed from air photos about newly mined areas as well as reminded of old minefields. Mined areas were avoided by patrols, and when this was not possible, ' a mine lifting party accompanied the patrol. 79 INTELLIGENCE 5. Personnel The same qualities desirable for any patrol were desirable for winter patrols. In addition, men needed excep- tional endurance. Once the men became heated, coughing always followed. Patrol members carried half of a Codine tablet (the equivalent of a dose of cough syrup) which did well in tiding them over the coughing spell. In order to maintain efficiency and to meet combat emergencies during the return, patrols were seldom expected to lie in ambush or in observation longer than one hour after having become overheated and soaked by the rain, slush, and mud. 6. Clothing The British type snowsuit was preferred to our parka for several reasons: it is lighter; does not impair the hearing during the movement of the head ; furnishes cover for the dark legs which are otherwise sharply outlined against the snow; may be removed and easily carried when the color of the background changes; and fitting loosely obscures the outline of a man's body. It can be easily washed and rapidly dried. "Wrapping shoepacs in burlap sand bags to avoid slipping was also recommended. This proved much more satisfactory than the snow cleat, which did not fit the shoepac and which continually worked loose in the steep terrain. Suitable shoes and clothing must be worn if the tendency toward overheating during the strenuous movement and chilling during the "lying-in- wait" was to be overcome, The wool sweater and M 43 jacket without liner proved satisfactory. Clothing and shoes must not fit tightly as that impedes circulation during the long periods of lying inactive. 7. Equipment The selection of Weapons was important. Some 'regiments preferred the BAR, the sub machine gun, and the M-l rifle. Care was taken not to burden down the men with 80 INTELLIGENCE a lot of excessive ammunition or grenades. Keeping the weapons in working order was a problem. A small piece of cellophane was placed over the muzzle of a weapon to keep out snow and mud. A loose cloth over the working parts furnished protection in case a man slipped and fell in the mud or snow. Weapons were kept well oiled. 8- Communications During a raid, communication between the patrol and higher headquarters was maintained by the use of phones, assault wire (W-130), and a relay point. The wire was reeled out as the patrol moved towards its objective. From this point fire was adjusted and reports on the patrol's activities were sent. By a series of knots tied in the wire at 100 yard intervals, the patrol in going out could estimate its nearness to its objective, regardless of visibility. The wire also prevented the patrol from becoming lost in its reorganization and return to our lines. The relay point was selected as near the objective as practicable to afford observation of as much of the enemy position as possible. It was advisable to have an SCE-300 radio at the relay point in case the assault wire went out. However, radio was used only in emergencies. A code was used to inform higher headquarters of the routine progress of the patrol to its objective. A coded series of taps on the transmitter proved satisfactory.. As a means of communication, flares were used as a last resort. In firing them the location of the patrol was revealed to the enemy, and counterfiare activity on the part of the enemy afforded a chance of misunderstanding and confusion. " 9. Conclusions Patrolling under winter conditions requires special equipment, and great physical endurance. Difficult terrain, confusing surroundings and bad weather are all time- consuming obstacles which must be considered when planning 81 INTELLIGENCE a patrol action. Careful and detailed reconnaissances" and preparations are essential. 16. Dissemination of Information The dissemination of information by the G-2 report was SOP. The standard field manual form was used. Reports on the interrogation of PWs were attached to the G-2 Report. Reports were distributed by each unit to at least the two higher and lower echelons of its command as well as other interested parties. Army, for example, sent reports as low as division and as high as AFHQ. There were instances when a wider distribution was made. For example, it became SOP f or Corps to disseminate their reports as high up as AFHQ. This was essential for the intelligence research conducted by that headquarters. Specialized reports such as Counter Intelligence reports and Photo Interpretation summaries were disseminated mainly within and throughout their own channels. Reference to such dissemination is made in the articles on these specialized subjects. Periodic Isums (Intelligence • Summaries) became SOP. They were brief ' summaries giving a picture of activities, identifications of prisoners, and prisoner statements. They were telephoned to the next higher headquarters three times daily at set hours by each unit. The telephone message was followed up by a radio message to insure receipt of the information. Information of importance was passed on to the next higher headquarters as soon as it was received and evaluated. Later it was also included in the periodic Isum and G-2 Periodic Report. The dissemination of information laterally and downwards was the responsibility of every unit. It was SOP to inform that unit first which could obtain the most value from a piece of information. 82 INTCLLiGENCE 17. Psychological Warfare Branch A. MISSION The aims and objects of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) fell into the categories of (a) Operational propaganda to the enemy and to Partisan groups supporting the Allies in 'Me enemy's rear and (b) occupational propaganda to the population of liberated areas. ' . The first category included the dissemination of propaganda (a) to the enemy in order to subvert his morale and condition his thought to a desired state at a given time, and (b) to Partisans in order to obtain their support and encourage them in military operations. The second category included the following: a. Control and operation of the press and radio. b. Collaboration AvithAMGrand Allied Commissions. c. Collection of political and propaganda intel- ligence. d. Provision of an efficient news service to the Allied Command. 83^ INTELLIGENCE B. ORGANIZATION AND SUBSECTIONS PWB AFHQ PWB 15 Army Group PWB 5th Army Leaflets- — . ' Liaison with 22 TAG (Air dissemination) Intelligence Mobile Printing 5 Army Radio News and Monitoring Interrogations (At Army cage) At Corps Liaison At Division Cub Dissemination Loud-speaker Operations PWB 8th Army Leaflets Liaison with DAF (Air dis- semination) Intelligence Mobile Printing 8 Army Radio News and Monitoring At Corps Liaison Interrogations (At Corps Cage)? At Division Cub Dissemination Loud-speaker Operations At Regiment and Bn. At Brigade and Bn. Shell Dissemination Sbell Dissemination C. METHODS OF PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION 1. Leaflets Leaflets aimed at lowering the morale and will to resist of the enemy soldier were disseminated by means of 84 INTELLIGENCE artillery shells and aircraft. They fell into three main categories: a. Long Range strategical leaflets sneh as the bi-weekly news sheet in German, "Frontpost", which kept the •enemy informed of current events. "Frontpost" was written objectively with absolute accuracy of news but with a propaganda slant of presentation. Other general propaganda leaflets discussed the situation in Germany, e.g. News from Home, The Allied Aims, Post- War Europe and the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Strategical leaflets were aimed at: the subversion of morale by the psychological presentation of incontrovertible facts based on enemy and Allied actions and events. Any important event or piece of news hurtful to the enemy was brought to his notice by means of latest news slips which contained a clear factual summary of news. Materiel from the Italian Oombatte Eadio program formed the basis of a weekly leaflet "Italia Oombatte" (Italy Fights On) which was addressed to partisans and civilians in Northern Italy. It was disseminated by MAAF and also sent over with supply drops to the partisans. Special messages from the Army Group Commander also entered this category of leaflets. b. Tactical Leaflets designed to meet given tactical situations on Army, Corps, Divisional or lower forma- tion sectors of the front. Just before the liberation of Borne and Florence a leaflet was addressed to the civilian population of both these cities instructing them in the name of the Com- mander in Chief to protect their town against the wanton destruction of the retiring enemy. . . • a. Safe Conduct Passes. A psychological weapon to instil the idea of surrender in the minds of enemy soldiers. d. Dissemination. (1) Shell. Leaflets disseminated by 5th and 8th Army artillery were delivered from the presses to; Base 85 INTELLIGENCE Artillery Ammunition Supply Points where the leaflet rolls were inserted with a band slit into smoke shells Avhbse can- nisters had been removed. The shells were then transported to the gun positions by the Base Ordnance Service. Propa- ganda shells were fuzed to burst over the targets which had been selected. Many tests were carried out to determine range^ tables for more: accurate firing. These tests proved very successful and our artillery was able to disseminate leaflets on pin point targets. The number of leaflets contained in a shell varied with the size and weight of the paper. Two different kinds of shells were used : the British 25 pdr. and the American 105-mm. The/ 25 pdr. contained |135 leaflets size 8" x 10" and 440 size 5" x 8". The 105-mm contained 230 leaflets size 8" x 10" and 750 size 5" x 8". (2) Air. The majority of leaflets disseminated by the fighters, fighter bombers, and light and medium bombers of MATAF were dropped in packets, though a small propor- tion were dropped by means of T.l (M-26) bombs and from converted long-range fuel tanks. Packet leafletting was also carried out by cub planes (AOPs) and by heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force. Dissemination by bombs proved to be a most desirable method because of its accuracy. A special weekly mission of 12 B-25 air- craft, carrying T.l leaflet bombs, was allotted to 15 Army Group. This was a regular allotment of aircraft for use^on targets selected by G-2, HQ 15th Army Group, and the mission carried the same priority as any bombing mission. Leaflets in packets or in rolls for bombs were delivered to operational airfields by truck or transport aircraft. If the leaflet was addressed to some particular enemy unit, target areas were allotted by G-2 HQ 15th Army Group and passed to A-3 HQ MATAF who included the targets in Mis field orders. 86 INTELLIGENCE During the period 11th Feb. to. 10 March 45 the following dissemination was effected : 5th Army by shell, cub plane and XXII TAG 8th Army by shell, cub plane and D AF 57th Bomb Wing 2- Radio a. Italia Combatte. 7 Italia Combatte Radio Program was the opera- tional medium of disseminating propaganda to partisans and to the civilian population in enemy occupied territory. Italia Combatte was designed to work in conformity with the Allied operational program, and was broadcast daily. It included the operational instructions to partisans sent out in the name of the Commander, 15th Army Group, the daily patriot communique and special features and stories often written by the patriots themselves. This program proved to be of great value throughout liberated Italy. It was transmitted simultaneo.usly by all civilian radio stations and cabled to London whence parts of it were rebroadeast by the Italian Service of the BBC. Eeports confirmed that Italia Combatte Eadio was widely listened to on both sides of the line. Partisans reported that they followed carefully the instructions conveyed to them by this means. Another value of this program was the positive enemy- reaction to the broadcast instructions. Even though it was not always possible for the Italian partisan to carry out all instructions given, the enemy frequently reacted as desired, in answer to a specific broadcast. b. The Army Radios. PW interrogations revealed that the Allied Eadio had a growing audience among German soldiers. Besides radio stations at BAEI, PALEEMO, EOME, and FLOEENCE, both 15,520,725 19,526,600 13*699,350 87 INTELLIGENCE Armies had their own Radio stations; Radio Fifth Army and the PWB Eighth Army Radio, both 1 kilowatt mobile trans- mitting plants. News, commentaries and mnsic were broadcast to the enemy. World news Was sent to the radio stations from the PWB Central News and Monitoring Agency in Rome, while local news came either from Gr-2 at Army or from PWB cor- respondents in the field. PWB Army Radio^Stations operated not only for enemy troops but also for partisans. Recorded talks by par- tisans were used extensively and Army Radios conveyed instructions to civilians and partisans about given tactical situations, such as the course of action to be adopted on the liberation of a town, etc. As Allied troops were about to enter Rome, the Fifth Army Radio relayed instructions to the civilian population which responded by carrying out the Allied instruc- tions. Besides broadcasting to the enemy, Radio Fifth" Army brought programs to our troops at Anzio by re-broadcasts when other broadcasts were riot reaching them. 3. Frontline Broadcasting Loudspeaker units and equipment fitted to jeeps were used for this type of propaganda activity. News, propa- ganda items and recorded talks by PWs calling upon their comrades to follow them across the lines were broadcast to the enemy. Music was used as a preliminary to broadcasts to attract the attention of the enemy. On one particular occasion, on the 22nd Novem- ber, 1944, on the 92rid Division front, loudspeakers were set up 200 yards from an enemy stronghold. While instructions were broadcast both in Polish and German, the battalion com- monder held his fire and then laid a smoke screen which lasted some 10 minutes and through which 6 PWs immediately de- serted. A total of 25 deserters came in as a result of this particular loudspeaker broadcast during the next few hours. Incidents of this description occurred frequently on both Army fronts. Although great numbers of deserters did 88 INTILLIGINCI not come over as a direct result of front-line broadcasts, it is .interesting to note that, whereas in the early days of loud- speaker broadcasts the enemy opened fire on our loudspeaker positions, later, fire was not brought to bear until the broad- casts were completed. 4. Basic News and Monitoring "Basic News" was a summary of the latest news gathered from news agencies all over the world, and was dis- tributed each morning to Army Group, Army, Corps and Divisional headquarters as well as to isolated units. It was produced at Army Group and at both Armies. The news con- tained was received in Morse Code overnight from the United Nations News Service in Rome. . A Monitoring Report of Allied and enemy broad- easts was also produced daily but its circulation was limited to those branches concerned with the materiel it contained. 5. Interrogation of PWs As PWs came into the Army Cage, they were ■first interrogated by Army Interrogators on tactical matters and were then passed on to PWB interrogators, among others. The PWB interrogator was concerned mainly with : a. The evaluation of the enemy's morale in the unit to which the PW belonged. (This information was. co-related in periodical reports reviewing apparent changes in the enemy's morale.1 It was distributed outside the theater and compared with the evaluations made by SHAEF). b. The assessment of the enemy's reactions to Allied Propaganda. It was important to know how many PWs saw Allied leaflets, what effect a leaflet had on their company or platoon, and whether or not these leaflets were read or passed on; and in case of deserters, whether or not their decision to come over to the Allied lines was motivated by a leaflet or an Allied broadcast. PWs were asked where they picked up parti- cular leaflets dropped by aircraft, and PWB 15th Army Group then compared this information with the " nickeling " report 89 INTELLIGENCE received from MATAF. In many cases, interrogation provided useful information on the accuracy of leaflet bombSj the effect of wind drift, and dropping techniques. c. The collection of materiel for use in leaflets and broadcasts as well as general background and political informa- tion which was later passed on to AFHQ, other PWB Units, to the Foreign Office and the State Department; 6- Interrogation of Italian Civilians and Partisans This was carried out by the Italian Intelligence Sections with PWB at Armies. Eefugees and partisans were questioned after they crossed the lines. Political information on the towns that lay ahead of the Armies provided PWB with valuable targets such as radio stations, printing presses, loca- tion of German units, etc.,. and paved the way for the selection of suitable Italian personnel once the town had been liberated. Interrogation of Italian civilians also provided evidence of German atrocities which were passed on to AFHQ, and in certain cases made good stories for propaganda purposes in liberated areas. Partisans were also interrogated on their reac'tion to our propaganda and in particular to the " Italia Combatte " program. 7. Propaganda in Newly Liberated Areas a. Sound Trucks or Public Address Vans. Many loudspeaker trucks were used to tour the Army areas broadcasting the news and AMG announcements. Bef ore broadcasting in any particular place the team contacted the local civil affairs officer for any special announcements he wanted made. In newly liberated places the teams worked elosely both with AMjG, with responsible army units in the area, and with the Provost Marshal. They acquainted the population with safeguards recommended by AMG, traffic regulations, curfew notices, etc. and brought the news-hungry populace up to date with world events. Later these loudspeaker units attempted to educate the population on such matters as 90 INTELLIGENCE public health. In all cases they tried to establish a personal relationship. Seven loudspeaker^ vans operated with, the 5th Army and three with the 8th Army. Programs started with the hymn ' ' Piave ' '. Banned by the Germans, this hymn often brdught tears of Joy to the. large crowds which gathered round the trucks. In the interim period between the liberation of a town or village and the time when a newspaper could be esta- blished or received in sufficient quantities from a neighboring city, these loudspeaker vans provided the news and thereby, to a certain extent, controlled the sentiment of the population and counteracted the rumors and despondency often spread by enemy agents. b. Press and Publications. On the occupation of a liberated city or town all local newspapers were closed by PWB on behalf of the Allied Publications Board. In the interim stage PWB published its own paper and wall news bulletins, which were followed later by autho- ' rized civilian publications. . • PWB maintained control of newsprint and pro- vided the news services for all papers in AMG territory. In the 8th Army Area a bi-weekly Italian language newspaper the "Corriere Alleato" was produced from Feb., 1944. Its circulation varied between 6,000 and 20,000 copies per issue according to printing facilities. c. Propaganda Shops. Information centres were opened in the major towns. Photographs and maps of the various war fronts were exhibited from which the public could follow the daily develop- ment of the war. These propaganda shops were also the main distribution center's for American and British publications -such as "Victory", "II Mese", "II Mondo Libero", etc. * d. Films. Films were distributed within the 15th Army Q-roup 91 INTELLIGENCE Area by PWB. In areas of troop concentration where theaters were requisitioned for the entertainment of troops, efforts were made to reserve at least one theater for civilians in order to maintain their morale. A Weekly United Nations newsreel, prepared in London especially for. Italy, was distributed to Italian theater owners. American and British films, either Italian spoken or with Italian sub-titles,, were also distributed. In the Army Group area, shots of important events were taken by PWB cameramen for inclusion in newsreels, D. FUNCTIONS PWB at 15th Army Group operated as one unit respon- sible to PWB, AFHQ. PWB Combat Teams were attached to Fifth and Eighth Armies. A small Combat Team, PWB "F" Force, was established in the South of France for propaganda infiltration operations directed at Northwestern Italy. 1. Functions of PWB at Army Group ~ The main function of PWB at HQ 15th Army Group Vas that of Staff Liaison. Political and propaganda * directives jointly produced by Political Warfare Executive and the Office of War Information were passed on to the Chief of Staff and heads of G-2, G-3, and G-5 for information. PWB was at the disposal of the Army Group Commander and his Staff for any tactical or strategical propaganda that was re- quired. Liaison was kept with G-3 and G-5 regarding future operations in which PWB was to take part. The Army Group Staff was also kept informed of all PWB operations in the field and of their results. .2. Functions of PWB at Army a. Leaflets. Tactical Leaflets were written by the Combat Teams attached to Army. The information and intelligence necessary for the writing of such leaflets was gathered by the Combat Team liaison Officers. The leaflet was worked out by 92 INTELLIGENCE PWB who submitted it to G-2 and to the Chief of Staff for approval. Once approved, the leaflets were printed, rolled up and transported to the Base Artillery Ammunition Supply Point for loading and delivery to the gun positions. It was also the function of PWB at Army to orga- nize distribution of leaflets by cub pilots. This method however, Was largely dependent on the weather. When the German Headquarters were at MONTELANICO, cub pilots at a height of 6,000 feet calculated wind drift and dropped leaflets on the town. When the Germans were pushed out three days later, thousands of leaflets were found in the main street. A new method of carrying leaflets by means of a converted airplane fuel tank attached to the bomb racks of fighter planes was devised by an officer of the Fifth Army Combat Team. During the period, September 1943 to March 1945, the Fifth Army Combat Team printed over 250 leaflets in German. During the months of November and December, 1944, over 10,000 pro- paganda shells were fired on the Fifth Army front each week as against 300 shells a month in the early days of the campaign. b. Printing. PWB Combat Teams were equipped with portable printing presses. During the drive up Italy the portable press proved invaluable in producing small late news leaflets for distribution by artillery observation planes on retreating German columns when artillery couid not reach enemy locations by shellfire. c. News and Monitoring. As at Army Group, enemy and Allied news was monitored at Army and distributed at Army HQ and in the forward areas -where "Basic News " was often the only newspaper received. PWB correspondents had the task of getting to the Italian public news of general propaganda value and other news of interest to them which they would not nor- mally get on account of the absence of Italian correspondents in the Army Areas. : 93 INTELLIGENCE 3- PWB Functions at Corps and Divisional Level It was important that the commander of the battery which fired propaganda shells fully appreciated the operational value of particular leaflets. Therefore, PWB maintained liaison with all concerned from the Army level to the men who fired the shells. Corps Liaison Officers working in closest collabora- tion with G-2 were responsible for all PWB activities at Corps. 18. Counter-intelligence 1. Introduction - In general, the Italian Campaign, bore out the soundness and "efficacy of the principles of security and counter- intelligence laid down in military field manuals, and, with only a few exceptions, they proved to be comprehensive and to cover the subject adequately. Certain gaps, divergencies, develop- ments and particular applications of these principles are noted below, covering the following: o. Control of Civilian Movement. b. Arrests and Internments. c. Special Counter-intelligence (SCI) Units. d. Handling of Arrested Enemy Agents. e. Relations wrth Civil Affairs. f. Role of CIC/FSS. g. Dissemination of CI Information. The agencies which performed the counter-intelligence role were the American Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC) and the British Field Security Survey (FSS). These agencies were controlled and administered by the American Counter-intelli- gence headquarters (CI) and the British Counterpart called 1(b). 2. Control of Civilian Movement Very great attention was paid to the security control 94 INTELLIGENCE of civilian movement) this proved to be the most important and valuable security measure applied by Counterintelligence. The first and most vital task -was to insure that all refugees crossing the front line from enemy territory were screened. For this purpose Refugee Interrogation Posts (EIPs) were established at each Army PW cage. Persons crossing the lines were collected and sent back under escort (through PW channels) to the RIP, where they were subjected to a CI interro- gation and search. They were disposed of through AMG refugee channels, or were detained, according to the result of the screening. The system was based on the co-operation of the forward troops, backed by a series of road check posts manned by Italian police and supervised by CIC/FSS. All refugees arriving by sea and landing at ports or on the intervening coast-line were similarly screened. ■ Civilian movement within Allied occupied ITALY as a whole was also subject to. control and restrictions. Liberated ITALY was divided into three zones for purposes of movement regulation. The forward zone corresponded approximately to the Army areas. Within this zone a civilian could not travel more than ten kilometers from his domicile without a pass. Similarly no civilian could enter this zone from -the rear without a pass. This restriction was enforced by means of numerous " snap " road-check posts, operated 24 hours a day, along the rear boun- dary of the zone. These were largely manned by civil police and supervised by CIC/FSS. In rear of this forward or 'Army Zone" was the second or "Restricted Zone. " Within this zone, movement was free within each province, but a pass was required for inter-province travels. Similarly, a pass was required for entry into this zone from the rear. This restriction was enforced by means of ' 'snap ' ' check posts established at varying points throughout the zone, normally where roads crossed province boundaries. In rear of the "Restricted Zone" was the "Free Zone", within which travel Was unrestricted and no passes required; 95 INTELLIGENCE The above restrictions were laid down by AMG proclamations. The passes were issued by AMG, (assisted by the civil police in the case of the Free Zone). Passes were normally issued at the poinl of departure. In the case of persons wishing to enter the Army Zone from the rear, their passes had to be obtained from the AMG authorities of the Army concerned, through the local AMG officer at the point of departure. Passes to enter the Army area were issued only to those persons whose journey was of direct benefit to the Allied war effort. Passes to enter into or to travel within the Restricted Zones were issued to any person who could show good and genuine business or domestic reasons for such travel. The names of applicants for passes were submitted to the nearest CIC/FSS for a check against the latter 's records. The above system worked well in ITALY. Though it was impossible to enforce the restrictions 100 per cent, it was possible to enforce them sufficiently to lead to the detection or discouragement of many enemy agents. 3. Arrests and Internments Considerable confusion occurred at the beginning of the Italian campaign because adequate instructions regarding the disposal of persons arrested on security grounds or the establishment of civil internment camps were not included in our texts or initial plans. By the end of the Sicilian campaign, several hundred civilians were confined in "various prisons throughout SICILY and in various P"W camps both in SICILY and NORTH AFRICA. In a great many cases such persons were unaccompanied by any document showing why they had been arrested or who had arrested them, nor was there any central record showing the location of the persons who had been arrested. Before the invasion of the Italian mainland, a fuller policy concerning the disposal of persons arrested for security reasons was formulated. The instructions clearly defined three different categories of persons liable to arrest on security 96 INTELLIGENCE grounds; and the recording procedure to be followed on their arrests. ; ... The three categories were : a. Those who committed or were alleged to have committed, in the territory occupied by our forces, a security offence tinder international Maw or the provisions; of AMGr proclamations. These were placed in the nearest civil prison, charged with the offence as soon as possible, and tried by an AMGr court. b. Those who were not chargeable with a security offence, but who appeared on reasonable evidence to constitute „ a threat to the security of our military forces, operations, or military government, by virtue of their position, personality, sentiments or record. These were interned, i.e., treated as civil prisoners of war. As such, they were placed in the nearest PW cage and evacuated through PW channels to a PW Base Camp. (Note: no arrangement had yet been made for a special civil internment camp.) o. Those against whom there was insufficient evidence to charge with an offence or to intern, but whom it was desirable, in the interests of security, to detain pending further investigation. These were placed temporarily in the nearest civil prison, and the security agency responsible for the arrest pursued the case and disposed of the detained person as quickly as possible either by release, internment or trial, for a security offence. In every case, a record of the arrest was made out by the arresting agency. This record or brief report contained information on the individual -arrested* date and place of arrest, by whom arrested, reason for the arrest, and the category or classification (i.e., for offence, for internment, or for temporary detention). One copy of this arrest report accompanied the prisoner at all times and was handed over to the authority in charge of the prison or cage in which be was confined. One copy was sent through channels to Army Headquarters. The latter forwarded consolidated lists of such records bi-weekly to Army Group and to the appropriate AMG HQ. 97 INTELLIGENCE In the case of internments, CIC/FSS was empowered to make arrests with a view to internment, but Army Head- quarters was made responsible for officially authorizing such internments. If the Headquarters concerned did not approve the internment, it ordered the release of the person arrested. The above-mentioned instructions clarified the pro- cedure, which then worked smoothly. One serious weakness, however, s%ill remained. The internees were located in various Base PW Camps in ITALY, SICILY and NORTH AFRICA, and this made it very difficult to arrange for the review of internment cases and for the release of those no longer deemed a danger to security. This Weakness was overcome in February 1944, when a civil internment camp Was established in ITALY. From that date, all internees were evacuated to this camp, which enabled records to be centralized and reviews to be started. The administration of the internees was accepted G-l/A Branch responsibility, whereas the policy as to who Would be interned and who released remained a G-2/G-SI respon- sibility. Review and release procedures were "generally as follows. The interning authority (Army Headquarters) either authorized that the person concerned be interned for the duration of the War, or recommended that his internment be subject to review after a certain period, e.g., six months. In the latter event, the case was reviewed at the appropriate time by a board consisting of the commandant of the Internment Camp, lah officer of the Allied Commission Security Branch, and a CI/I(b) officer. In the light of this review, the commandant was empowered either to release the internee or to have him continue in internment, Without reference to the' interning or higher authority. The cases of those interned for the duration of the War could be brought up for review at any time at the discretion of fhe commandant (Or at the request of any other competent authority), but the internee could not be released without the approval Of higher authority. To assist the reviewing officers in their task, all 98 INTELLIGENCE available information on the internees was forwarded to the commandant of the P"W camp for his files. This included not only the brief arrest reports referred to above and the bi-weekly consolidated lists of approved internments submitted by the Army Headquarters, but also any other reports, dossiers, flies, etc., in possession of the interning authority. 4. SCI (Special Counter-intelligence) Units SCI units were not covered by our military manuals, but they played an important part in the Italian campaign. There were four SCI units in Italy, three British units of MI-6 officers, and one American unit consisting of OSS(X2) personnel. They were under the command of AFHQ, but they maintained close liaison with Army Group and Army Headquarters, and Avorked in conjunction with CIC/FSS. The duties of these SCI units were limited to matters directly affecting the enemy intelligence services and activities. They were responsible for undertaking the penetration of the enemy intelligence services, and, when- occasion arose, for the special exploitation of captured enemy agents. They were not concerned with the enforcement or supervision of routine mili- tary and civil security measures. In short, they constituted a specialist counter-espionage service. As a basis for their operations, these units maintained records containing more complete information concerning the enemy intelligence services, their organization and personali- ties, than those held by other Counter Intelligence offices or agencies. ' - When an enemy agent was captured, the nearest SCI officer was notified at once. The latter checked the agent's particulars against SCI records, questioned him (if circum- stances permitted and interrogation was advisable), considered whether the agent could be exploited to our positive advantage, and advised Army Group as to his relative importance and proper disposition. 5. "Handling of Arrested <Enenfy Agents The procedure for handling captured enemy agents 99 INTELLIGENCE was constantly adjusted and developed from the beginning of the campaign. Such agents were arrested on a scale hardly envisaged in the military manuals or in the planning phase. In the earlier stages the numbers involved were suffi- ciently limited to enable each captured agent to be dealt with as an individual and special case which could be handled almost "entirely by the counter-espionage specialists, namely the SCI units. r In the later sstages of the campaign, however, the enemy's espionage effort increased to such an extent that the average monthly total of captured agents rose to over fifty. In these circumstances, the handling and interrogation of agents could no longer be dealt with by specialist 01 agencies, and it became part of the normal work of CIO/FSS. The following procedure was evolved.. If an individual was detected or suspected as an enemy agent by personnel other than CIC/FSS, e.g., by our forward troops or by the civil police, he was immediately turned over to the nearest 010 Petachmeht/FSS Section. The latter then gave him a prelimi- nary interrogation, in order to extract from him the 01 infor- mation of immediate interest, such as his mission, contacts,, knowledge of other agents, etc. At the same time the nearest SCI unit was informed of the arrest. After, this preliminary interrogation, the agent was lodged in a suitable jail, and a short report submitted by CIC/FSS to Army Group Headquar- ters, with a copy to the nearest SCI unit. The latter checked the agent's particulars against its special and extensive records. Normally an SCI officer then visited the agent, questioned him further, and considered whether the case was to be handled in any special manner. He then submitted a. supplementary report, containing - all additional information obtained, an approbation of the significance of the case, and a recommenda- tion as to the agent's disposal. If the agent appeared, on preliminary interrogation, to be of no particular interest or importance, the supplementary interrogation was sometimes carried out by CIO/FSS. - If a full and detailed interrogation, conducted with the assistance of special devices^ was required^ 100 INTELLIGENCE the agent j was dispatched to Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Center (OSDIC), a subsection of 01. The final disposal of the agent was decided by Army droup? If the agent required specialized treatment due to Ms importance, he was turned over -to SCI. Otherwise he was -brought to trial, if sufficient evidence was available to afford a reasonable chance of securing a conviction; if not, he was interned. ^ " Two special difficulties were occasioned by the large number of agents who fell into our hands. The first concerned accommodation and segregation. It was impossible to segregate •every captured agent properly during the period when he was being interrogated and awaiting trial. Although various special jails or sections thereof were taken over for security prisoners, it -was seldom possible to obtain sufficient accommoda- tion to allow for one cell per agent. Even when this was practicable, it was usually possible for prisoners in adjoining or opposite cells to talk to each other. This was highly undesirable from the point of view of enabling agents to concoct and confirm the same false story. In view of the numbers involved, this difficulty could not be overcome, and only very important agents could be properly segregated. The second difficulty concerned the preparation of cases for trial. The intelligence aspect of a case differs considerable from the legal aspect. For example, the former is concerned primarily with what the agent knows, whereas the latter is concerned more with what he has done or how lie has acted. From the intelligence point of view it was most important to interrogate the agent himself, whereas from the legal point of view it was important to question and to take statements from other persons by whom he was seen or who took part in his arrest. Moreover, CIC/FSS as a whole had little training in legal-police principles. It was necessary, therefore, for Security/CI agencies to accustom themselves gradually to the task of following up the intelligence and police or legal aspects of a case concurrently. It was found desirable to attach to each Army CI/T (b) staff an officer from the Allied 101 INTELLIGENCE Commission Security Branch, with long police experience, to take care of the final preparation of trial cases for presentation to the AM& legal authorities. These officers were assisted by a small team of CIC/FSS personnel selected for their legal or police background. .... 6- Relations with Civil Affairs It was laid down in the planning phase of the campaign that the: military CI/I (b) staffs should be responsible for policy concerning all matters affecting the security of our military operations, forces and materiel. This included civil as well as military measures. This ruling was upheld throughout the campaign. The Allied Commission had a small Security Branch, but it was concerned rather with politico-security matters, e.g., the political: integrity of officials, and with security within the Allied Commission organization. The actual issue of security orders and regulations to the civil? population, as required by CI/I (b), was carried out through the Allied Commission. AMG was responsible; for enforcing such regulations by means of the Italian police under their^control. Offenders were tried in AMQ? courts. CIC/FSS supervised and advised on this enforcement under the direction of CI/I (b) staffs. There tended to be a natural clash of interest between AMGf "and the security authorities. The main task of ! the former was to restore civil life to normalcy as rapidly,-as possible, whereas that of the latter was to maintain a strict security control of the civil population. Sometimes there was difficulty over the internment of key officials. In practice, however, no insuperable difficulties in , this direction were encountered. Although the requirements of military security were always accepted as paramount, those of AMG were given careful consideration. It was usually possible to reach a compromise acceptable to both. An essential condition of - satisfactory cooperation was that security agencies could not arrest civil ' 102 INTELLIGENCE oj®gials, except in emergency, without itest consulting A]$:@ or giving the latter due warning. 7, Role of C/C/FSS ■ The role of CIO/FSS turned out in practice to be liajthe? more operative, than advisory or supervisory!,/ as was visualized in the manuals. . This was particularly so, in the case of FSS, who were required to work through the local police as far as possible, rather than with them. In ITALY both QIC and FSS operated to a large extent independently of the civil police. Actual arrests, investigations, interrogations, searches, "vetting" (processing) of applicants for (ravel per- mits and for work with Allied units, examination of hotel registers, participation in, movement checks were all part of the routine work of the CIC/FSS, and formed the main bulk of their work. This change in function was necessitated by the mediocre quality of the civil police organizations. : It should be noted that, compared^with the CIC, the FSS were not so well fitted by their original training to undertake such executive work, particularly in the. sphere of investigation. They did, however, adapt themselves satisfac- torily to this role. In this connection, it should be added that there was no essential difference between the CIC and the FSS. They both operated on the same general principles and in a similar manner. CI/I (b) instructions concerning the work of security agencies were issued by Army Group Headquarters in identical terms to both Fifth and Eighth Armies. There was one major difference in organization, in that CIC Detachments were graded in size according to whether they were assigned to a Division, Corps or Army, whereas FSS Sections were all of the same size. The former is considered the better alter- native. 8. Dissemination of CI information It was convenient and practical to disseminate in the form of a standard bulletin all information concerning known or suspected enemy agents likely to be encountered in Allied 103 INTELLIGENCE occupied ITALY. These bulletins were compiled at Army Group Headquarters and sufficient copies were issued for distribution -down to CIC Sections and FSS Detachments. Bulletins were issued approximately every day, arid the infor- mation contained therein was extracted mainly from interroga- tion reports on captured agents. They provided the following data: (a) Serial number ; (b) Name and aliases; (e) Physical description ; (d) Photo, if available ; (e) "When and where last seen; (f) Bemarks. In addition, a 01 List, giving the name of all such known suspected agents was compiled at Army Group Head- quarters printed in pocket book form, and distributed on the scale of one for every CIC agent/FSS Non-commissioned officer. The List contained only names and references to the CI Bulletin from which further particulars; could be obtained. This List could be carried at all times and was very useful in checking names at road blocks, refugee centers, hotels, etc. Lists of important CI targets in enemy occupied ITALY, which required immediate attention as soon as the area was overrun by our forces, were compiled at Army Group Headquarters. Both personality and building targets were included. The lists were issued shortly before the town or area concerned was likely to be reached by our advance. 104' Chapter Three OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 105 Chapter Three AND TRAINING I . Combined Staffs in the Italian Campaign 1. General a. From the very start of the Italian Campaign the Allied Forces in Italy were comprised of a variety of national ities which, as the campaign progressed, became more varied. To meet the natural tendency of each to follow its own style of staff procedure, it became necessary to develop a combined staff procedure. The complexity of the prqblems introduced by the differences in composition of the Allied Forces under control of the various headquarters necessitated the adoption of expedients designed to meet each general type of compo- sition. b. From its inception in 1943, the 15th Army Group Headquarters (known for a time as Headquarters Central Mediterranean Force and later as Headquarters Allied Armies in Italy) operated as a combined staff. Originally this head- quarters, under a British commander, was both an operational and an administrative headquarters upon the British side> but only an operational headquarters on the U.S. side. British administrative procedure was utilized. In mid -December 1944, the Army Group was placed under an American commander, and its functions changed essentially to those of an operational headquarters only. As such, it exercised operational control over both the British Eighth and the U.S. Fifth Armies. A modified British internal administrative procedure was instituted. c. The British Eighth Army, with command at various times over such dissimilar units as Polish, Greek, Italian and 107 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING Palestinian formations, as well as British troops, had a wealth of experience in adapting its staff procedure to fit the opera- tional and administrative needs of so complex a fighting force. Similarly the U.S. Fifth Army; controlled Brazilians, French Colonials, Italians, British Empire forces (such as South Africans, New Zealanders and Indians) and troops from the British Isles, as well as .various types of American units. d. Combined staffs had to be organized on Corps and Divisional levels. The U.S. VI Corps at the AnziO beachhead, the U.S. IV Corps during winter operations in the Gothic line, and the British 13 Corps at the battle of Cassino had extensive experience in operating with combined "Staffs. 2. Basic conceptions a. Combined staffs during the Italian campaign were organized generally in four different ways : (1) An integrated staff (e.g., the G-3 (G-Ops) Section of 15th Army Group Headquarters). (2) An incremented staff (e.g., the Br. increment of Fifth Army Headquarters). > . (3) A mission attached to a staff (e.g., the Fr. Mission with Fifth Army Headquarters). : (4) A liaison unit with a staff (e.g., the .Br. Liaison Units with Italian Gruppi). b. The method employed was determined by several factors: relative similarity in administrative and supply procedures ; relative size and composition of staffs of subordi- nate units of respective nationalities; language similarities or dissimilarities ; duration of operation requiring combined staffs; nationality of unit commander. 3. Integrated staff* Completely integrated staff s are the most efficient -and. economical of time, personnel and equipment, provided:, a. The staffs speak a' commonly-understood lan gnage; : 108 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ■ b. The staff is substantially an operational: staff (such as an Army Group or a Corps) rather than a staff which is also charged with supply and administrative matters (such as an Army or Division staff). c. The war aims of the several nations are in complete accord; d. The staffs are to function together for a suf- ficiently long time (say one year for the staff of a larger headquarters) to warrant integration, and, e. The immediately subordinate unit troop lists are to remain substantially constant over a long period of time. In the case of Allied forces other than British, when- ever supplies come largely from United States sources, with the exception of*minor specific national items which are sup- plied by the nation concerned, the integrated type of staff has been found practical. Examples of this type were the French Gr-4 and other special staff section members of the French Mission who were integrated and worked within, and as part of, their corresponding U.S. staff section. This was also true of the Italian officers who were integrated in the Fifth Army Staff Sections. 4. Increments — a. A staff with an increment of another nationality is more flexible and more workable when the size and compo- sition of the lower units under command are apt to vary con- siderably from month to month or from phase to phase of the campaign, and when the administrative and supply procedures are sufficiently diverse to require separate treatment of G-l and G-4 matters. b. "Where the supply source is entirely separate, as in the case of British formations operating under an American Army or Divisional headquarters^ the utilization of an incre- ment was found to be sound. The British Increment in the cage of Fifth Army Headquarters always had personnel 109 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING sufficient to cover all branches, thereby making it an entity in itself. The various British staff members coordinated all m'atters with the U.S. opposite staff member, with policy mat- ters being approved by the U.S. staff section chief concerned. 5. Missions A mission attached to a staff is desirable when the foreign troops involved are relatively few in comparison-with the overall troop strength, when there are language differences, and when the duration of the troop assignment or attachment might be short or undecided. In one instance a mission was retained even after withdrawal of all troops from command of the headquarters to which it was attached. Its purpose was primarily to handle all matters pertaining to nationals of its own country who resided or were found in apeas taken during military operations by Allied Forces. In brief , it may be stated that the purpose of a mission is to furnish liaison between the headquarters to which attached and the nation fi<om which de- tailed, and to attend to such affairs as are of no direct concern to the headquarters to which the mission is attached. 6. Liaison Units A liaison unit attached to a staff is useful in cases of language differences, and when the size of the staff is relatively small, e.g., a British liaison Unit with an Italian • Gruppi. Members of these Liaison Units are charged with coordinating the implementation of orders or instructions from the higher headquarters. Another example was the Allied Liaison Section with the Brazilian: Expeditionary Force Headquarters. 2. Liaison The standard system for providing liaison between units was used. However, it was noted that liaison officers were often selected for this duty from among those most conveniently available, rather than chosen from among those best"qualified for the duty. As a result they were unfamiliar with the 110 OPiRATlONS AND TRAINING importance and responsibilities of a liaison officer ^ and became merely messengers. It was proved advantageous to organize within the division a short school and to hold subsequent periodic conferences for the purpose of training efficient liaison officers. In static situations, the liaison officer was often forgotten because the communication network was' usually adequate. Liaison With non-English speaking allies was not difficult above battalion level, for sufficient personnel could be found who could speak a common language. In lower levels, however, there were often difficulties, and, as a rule, such liaison was maintained only between flank contact parties. 3. Command Reconnaissance The necessity for early, adequate, and continuous reconnais- sance was amply demonstrated throughout the Italian campaigns. Division and assistant division commanders and regimental commanders habitually spent the greater part of their time with their front line units during offensive opera- tions. Commanders of the higher echelons, divisions and corps, used the L 5 observation plane to familiarize themselves with their sectors, and supplemented this reconnaissance by map and aerial photograph study and by ground observation. Artillery observation planes were usually available to regimental and battalion commanders for reconnaissance of their own and adjacent sectors. Battalion commanders maintained an OP from which they could see their forward companies and the enemy positions, vln most places reconnaissance forward of lines of departure was possible only at night since enemy observation was usually so well established that any movement in forward areas during daylight brought down effective enemy fire. In lower units command reconnaissance for an attack was generally carried out from the front lines of troops on position. When the troops oh the position were to make an attack there was normally ample opportunity for all leaders to study the ground, their objectives, and the routes thereto. ■ When the 111 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING units making the attack were to pass through, troops on-position, the leaders of the attacking units, down to and including squads, frequently spent two or three days and nights ; with the unit on position. In daylight and at night they studied the lay of the land, marked all critical points, and noted all important facts that might bear upon the intended operation. In defensive situations, commanders accomplished their- ground reconnaissance by using the OPs of lower units. Most division commanders visited their regimental and some of their battalion commanders daily ; regimental and battalion com- manders usually visited their company commanders as frequently; and company officers toured the squad and platoon positions continuously whenever enemy observation permitted. 4. Air Cooperation 1., General Normal direct air support for ground troops was coor- dinated by G-3 Army, A-3 Tactical Air Command, and the Army Gr-3 Air section. A meeting of representatives of these sections was held daily at which the intentions of the ground forces and their target requests for the following day were given to the Tactical Air Command. The Tactical Air Command made the final decision as to the targets which would be attacked and in what strength. They informed Army of the targets selected, and the time and type of attack, and Army in turn informed the subordinate units which had originated the requests. The normal channel for air requests not included in the daily air meeting was through Army G--3 Air to the Tactical Air Com- mand. This normal procedure provided adequately for the attack of all targets during static situations and of some of the targets during offensive operations. A more expeditious system was used> however, for attacking "close-in" targets of an emergency or fleeting nature whose attack could not be prearranged as discussed above. This system was known as Rover Joe. 112 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 2. Air-Ground Coordination The close air-ground coordination effected by Rover Joe permitted targets to be attacked with great speed and with little danger to friendly troops. The rapid production of photo maps enabled the pilots to carry photos of prearranged targets or mosaic photos of the target area with the bomb safety line drawn in with colored pencil. This safety line was designated by the infantry regiment. Front line troops did not use ground strips to indicate their front lines. Small units did not carry them as their infrequent need and doubtful value did not justify the added weight. Large permanent land mark letters were laid out on the ground as far forward as possible as an extra navigational aid. Successful experiments were made with red and yellow fluorescent panels. Artillery , smoke was used successfully in marking targets that were otherwise difficult to locate. To defeat the enemy's use of deceptive smoke, a system of patterns and colors was used. With his air request, the originator stated whether or not he could mark the target with smoke, and indicated the pattern and color combination peculiar to his artillery unit. The pilot, already briefed by Rover Joe as to the general target area, was called immediately before the smoke was due to fall and given the combination of pattern and color being used. Artillery smoke was sometimes used to mark the bomb safety line for extra close missions. Vehicle markings were considered of doubtful value. The most reliable safety factor was the controller at Rover Joe who could either see both the planes and the front lines, or could be immediately contacted by jeep radio teams with the forward elements, to stop or divert attacks when necessary. 3. Air Blitz Air Blitz consisted of a concentrated air bombardment of a strongly fortified objective by fighter bombers prior to its attack by ground forces. It was an attack in which all the air forces available combined to produce the greatest possible des- 113 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING traction in a given area for the sole purpose of aiding the advance on the ground. The objective was attacked with HE bombs, Fuel Tank Incendiary Bombs (FTlBs), and by strafing for a pre-arranged period after which concentrated artillery fire was put down to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the position while our forces moved in. FTIBs were long range jettisonable fighter bomber gasoline tanks fitted to the bomb racks of P-47s. They were equipped with impact igniters and -filled with gasoline and other inflammable materials which produced a sticky semi- - liquid mixture. Troops were forced out of buildings, dug-outs and foxholes, which normally afforded protection against fragments and blasts from HE, by the burning mixture which flowed into them. The combination of FTIBs, HE, and strafing was very effective and had great demoralizing as well as casualty effect. Wooded areas were considered particularly good targets for this type of attack. 5. Combat Patrols Infantry officers and enlisted men believe combat patrolling to be more hazardous than general attack. In view of this, it is increasingly important that the incurring of needless casual- ties be eliminated by the proper training, briefing, and equipping of patrols. Combat patrols were used to enter the enemy lines to gain information, take prisoners, or take ground which our line failed to deny the enemy. Daylight patrols were used with success, but night patrolling was more, common. Patrols consisted of a patrol leader and from four to thirty men. Too often, patrols were larger than the mission dictated. Officers led all important patrols. All members of combat patrols were usually selected from the same rifle platoon or squad. This method of selection was favored over picking individuals from several units of the company or battalion. A typical combat patrol consisted of : 1 Officer or NCO - Patrol leader - Carbine or SMG. 114 OPiRATfONS AND THAI N I NG 1 NCO - kind in command - Carbine or SMG. 1 or more other NCO 's - Carbine or SMG. 12 privates, armed with 4 SMG's; 2 BAR'sp6 M-l's. All men carried two or more hand grenades ; two of the men had grenade launchers with four grenades. Bazookas were often carried for use against houses. Some units preferred more automatic weapons. One sixteen (16) man patrol was armed with ten BAR'S and four SMG's. Patrols that were briefed by officers back at the battalion CP were seldom successful. Patrol leaders were sometimes confused after the battalion CO, battalion S-2, and Rifle Company Commander each gave his instructions on what was to be done. The Battalion S-2 should himself be a successful patrol leader. He should compile all information possible and present it to the patrol leader in a clear and concise manner. In static situations much of his time should be spent working with patrols. He must see the patrol; he must talk with the patrol leader in person and not depend on a telephone convers- ation. Each man in a patrol should be given an opportunity to see the ground and objective beforehand if possible. Reconnaissance patrols by members of the combat patrol should precede all combat missions. Initial briefing of a patrol should be made from 24-48 hours before its H-hour. When possible, a patrol should be given one day and night in the rear to prepare for its mission and conduct actual ' 'mock-up ' ' practice where each individual is trained for his part in the combat mission. Battalion staff officers must arrange for supporting fires and notify all front line troops of the exact location and time of the patrol's departure and return. On its return,. the Batta- lion S-2 or another staff officer should systematically interrogate each patrol and record all information. ' 'Professional ' ' patrols were used with varying degrees of success. In static situations they were employed more often and with greater success. The most successful ''professional" patrols were made up of volunteers. Some regiments used 115 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING about two officers and forty men for this purpose, The Officers and NCO's lived with and cared for their men, trained, instructed, and kept them in condition. Good food, a place to rest in the rear, and some special privileges were usually given this group. These patrols were not usually sent out on ordinary missions! Some units reported that their "professional'* patrols had never failed to accomplish their mission. The action on the Italian winter line 1944-45 was dominated by numerous patrols. Most Infantry Commanders believed that greater attention should be given to the training of combat patrols and to the planning of their operations. 6. Combat in Cities and Towns The larger towns and cities were not usually anchors or even important points in any of the strongly defended lines established by the Germans throughout Italy. Cassino, a notable exception, taught several lessons concerning the value of air and artillery bombardment in attacking such places. It was proved conclusively that a determined defender cannot be driven from a town or city constructed of stone by artillery or aerial bombardment alone. There was little actual house-to-house fighting during the Italian campaign, and no city of any considerable size was captured by a house-to-house and street by street advance.. Most of the divisions taking part in the offensive action in Italy captured many small towns and a considerable -number of medium sized cities by first by-passing them, threatening their lines of supply and communication, and then occupying and mopping them up, after the enemy had withdrawn under the threat of encirclement. During his delaying" actions, and in some of his main defensive lines, the enemy occupied and stubbornly defended isolated houses, groups of buildings, and villages. As all Italian houses were constructed of stone or masonry and had walla from 12 to 30 inches thick, each building was in effect a natural fort. They afforded almost complete protection against 116 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING small arms fire and from shell fragments from mortar or artillery. All infantry units taking a part in the Allied advance between Salerno and the Gothic Line were often faced with the problem of capturing or overcoming- resistance from such places. The methods they used were substantially those advo- cated by our manuals or some adaptation of those methods. The actions involved in capturing a group of houses or a village usually followed a quite definite sequence and pattern. First, smoke was used to deny the enemy observation, and artillery employed to neutralize his defensive fires. Under this protective fire, the attackers maneuvered into positions permitting them to establish a base of fire with their automatic weapons and other small arms. Then, while their rifles, auto- matic rifles, and machine guns were firing directly into all exposed doors, windows and firing slits, bazooka teams and men with rifle grenades advanced and concentrated their fire on the windows and doors. When enemy resistance was suffi- ciently reduced the houses were assaulted individually by small groups, usually squads or half squads, who usually forced the enemy to surrender by throwing fragmentation grenades through the shattered windows and doors. Houses in a group were sometimes taken one by one and at other times assaulted simultaneously, depending upon the situation, size of the attack- ing force, and the nature of the resistance offered. When they were available, tanks and tank destroyers were used to assist in the capture of groups of houses by placing direct fire upon them. Ordinarily when a house or group of houses was subjected to such direct, high velocity fire, the enemy either withdrew or surrendered. 7. Assault of an Isolated Hill Ail the methods advocated by our field manuals dealing with offensive combat were used successfully in attacking isolated hill masses in Italy. Night attacks were used most often, and on the whole proved most successful. Both single and double envelopments were tried successfully on some 117 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING objectives. Daylight frontal attacks were attempted only when necessitated by action coordinated with other units. Frontal attack proved most costly and was the least successful method tried. Unsuccessful daylight attacks were on many occasions followed by successful night operations. Infantry commanders learned that in attacking an isolated hill mass it was almost always best to do it the "hard way". The Germans always covered by fire all natural or easy routes to assault positions. Draws, ravines, roads or trails leading into their defensive positions were usually mined, wired with trip flares, and covered by registered fires of all supporting weapons. Our troops learned by costly experience that it was best to use the most difficult routes, to climb the steepest cliffs, or to move along narrow ridges, rather than to take the easy natural routes. Daylight attacks proved successful against lightly defended objectives, and against strongly defended hill masses when adequately supported by tanks and artillery. The tendency of some of our troops to stop, take cover, and dig in, when fired upon by small arms proved to be costly,; and it required strong efforts by all commissioned and non- commissioned leaders to prevent the practice. 8. Night Attacks In Italy, night attacks were launched against practically every type of objective. Infantry commanders generally preferred to make limited objective attacks at night as they usually received less mortar and artillery fire. The limited trails and difficult approaches made night attacks difficult in mountains. Mine fields and steep cliffs added further difficulties to night attacks. Control and maintenance of direction were the greatest factors in night operations. If there was to be a change in direction, care had to be taken to see that all troops were warned. Support and reserve units had to know where the attackers were at all times. Close liaison between reserve units and front 118 OPERATIONS AND TRAIN INS lines had to be maintained, as instances occurred where infantry reserve companies were committed at night and never reached the line of departure. - Intense artillery and mortar preparations alerted the enemy for the attacking infantry. Some units were able to slip into the enemy lines at night without the use of preparatory fires. Fire preparations were sometimes kept on call, and if needed, after the enemy was alerted, were fired as preparatory fires. Night attacks were organized as simply as possible. Difficult maneuvers were avoided. However, regardless of the simplicity of the maneuver, plans were made in as complete detail as time permitted. Eeconnaissance by as many leaders as possible was an invaluable aid. Lack of coordination caused failures in night attacks. Adequate communication is imperative and alternate means must be provided. All units must know what is taking place, especially within the advance elements. The time chosen to launch night attacks varied with the weather, length of approach, conduct of the enemy, size of the objective, hostile strength in men and armament, and other variable factors. The usual aim was to gain the objective and be ready for counterattack by daylight. 9. Rolling Barrages Under good and aggressive leadership, well trained infantry followed 105mm rolling barrages at about 150 yards. However the usual distance was from 200-300 yards. The Germans often fired mortar and artillery concentrations on our troops during our rolling barrages in order to make it appear that our own artillery was falling short and thereby create confusion among our troops. At first some of our front line leaders requested that the barrage be lifted, thereby temporarily stopping the advance. This enemy trick was soon learned by all, and its demoralizing effect was considerably reduced. Due to the nature of the terrain the number of rolling barrages used on the Italian front were few. In some instances 119 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING it was found difficult to control a rolling barrage on steep slopes, and short rounds landed amongst our troops. Our troops often moved up to a ' 'Lane of Departure ' ' as close as 200 yards to the impact area of our artillery concen- tratigns. This involved the same principle as following a rolling barrage, except that the infantry assaulted the enemy position as soon as the- concentration was lifted. The British followed rolling barrages of 25 pounder shells as close as 150 yards since the back-spray and the concussion effect were not as great as those of 105mm shells. 10. Employment of Tanks with Infantry Tank units used with infantry were either attached to or in direct support of infantry regiments and battalions. The principle lesson learned from these infantry-tank operations was that considerable training in the joint operation of tanks and infantry troops is essential for smooth, efficient operation. Throughout' the campaign, there were numerous instances where lack of coordinated action, confusion, and general lack of teamwork either caused the failure of the operation or prevented the fullest exploitation of advantages gained. In a few instances where one tank unit was teamed with the same infantry regiment over a considerable period of time, both in training areas and in actual operation against the enemy, much better results were experienced. The infantry officers and non-commissioned officers became acquainted with and learned to appreciate the problems of the tank officers and men. Tank personnel likewise learned the problems of the infantry. SOPs were developed and various types of infantry- tank teamwork were devised. In their combined operations against the enemy there was little or no confusion, and no lack of coordination. The tanks knocked out enemy machine guns and overran defensive positions permitting the infantry to advance to objectives. The infantry in turn, lifted mines, out- flanked enemy AT guns, and pointed out suitable targets for the tanks. When proper coordination was achieved, . the 120 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING infantry-tank team was a powerful and effective striking force. The advantages of keeping the same tank battalion with one infantry division, and of having a particular tank company work habitually with each regiment^was realized by all commanders of higher echelons. However, available tank units had to be used where they were most needed and where the terrain favored their use. Permanent attachment of tank battalions to divisions was therefore impossible. ' Lack of means of communication between the infantry and f tank units, or the failure of existing means of communication \ to work properly was the most important factor contributing | to any lack of coordinated action. Although tanks units could ! usually maintain communications among themselves, they had no radio set capable of maintaining similar communication , with the infantry unit they supported. 11. Employment of Mechanized Reconnaissance Units The rapid advance to the Arno Eiver after the capture of Borne presented a fast moving situation in which division reconnaissance troops played an important role. During those six weeks/"reconnaissance elements were employed to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. However, reconnaissance troops were not employed in their normal roles when the situa- tion became more or less static in the mountains. The follow- ing are some of the tasks for which reconnaissance troops were used under these conditions : a. Defending a sector >of the front line to relieve infantry. b. Installing, and covering road blocks, c. Dismounted patrolling. Reconnaissance patrols were usually attached to front line infantry battalions. Some troops conducted motorized patrols with limited success. ; d. Operating a battery of 50 caliber maohin© guns for indirect firing. 121 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING e. Operating division CPs and radio relay stations. /. Clearing mined areas and maintaining roads. g. Mobile reserve. Some divisions did not commit their reconnaissance troops, but held them as a division reserve when all three regiments were committed. 12. Support of Mechanized Reconnaissance Units The support of reconnaissance squadrons by engineers, artillery, and medical personnel became ' standard procedure during the pursuit phase of the campaign. The mountainous nature of the Italian terrain; together with the inadequacy of the road net and the ever present demolitions, made engineer support necessary, and one platoon of engineers was attached to each squadron. To increase their striking power the squadrons were also supported by a battery of armored field artillery. Ambulances with their drivers were furnished by division medical battalions, and attached to the squadron to provide adeqate evacuation of casualitie's. Support by attached infantry or signal personnel was not considered necessary. 13. Defense of a Bald Hill The positions which the front line infantry held at the end of offensive actions usually became the main line of resistance during static or defensive operations. These positions did not always have the characteristics of good defensive positions but were held because future offensive action would necessitate retaking them. It was necessary at times to take up positions on hills devoid of any vegetation and affording no natural cover or concealment to our troops. The enemy usually had excellent observation over these positions. Normal entrenchments were prepared to defend these bald hills and their defence did not differ from that of other features. However, the nature of enemy activities permitted our infantry 122 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING commanders great freedom in the disposition of their troops. It became the usual practice when defending such features, to man the positions very lightly during daylight, having OPs covering all approaches, and only skeleton crews manning the crew served weapons. The remainder of the troops prepared positions on the reverse slope of the hill, out of hostile observa- tion. These positions were prepared primarily to decrease the number of troops exposed to enemy mortar and artillery fire placed on the observed forward slopes. They also afforded the troops relatively comfortable living quarters. Eotation systems were used to permit all troops to spend part of their time in these rear positions. Most of the eating, sleeping, and care of weapons was done in these reverse slope positions. At night, or when observation was limited by the weather, the forward positions were fully manned and work carried on to improve the foxhole or position of each soldier and weapon. When enemy activity increased, indicating a possible daylight attack, more forward positions were manned during the day, and if the attack materialized, the hill was defended from the forward slope. The positions organized on the reverse slope normally were not prepared for the defense of the hill. The use of reverse slope positions for defense was uncommon in this theater when the forward slope of the same feature was held by our troops. 14. Preparation of Defensive Fires Infantry commanders realized the importance of preparing defensive fires for each objective prior to attacking it, in order to be completely prepared for the almost inevitable counter- attack. This was done even if the objective was not a limited one. The Infantry Battalion and Eegimental Commanders indi- cated the fires they desired to have prepared to defend the objective, and then all weapons were assigned defensive fires. Artillery defensive fires were planned in time for the fire direction center to prepare data. Upon reaching the objective, or before if possible, these prepared defensive fires were checked 123 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING by registration. These corrections were then recorded for the defensive fire data. It is very important that registration Of defensive fires he made at the earliest opportunity. 15. Coordination of Antitank Defense The mountainous terrain over which most of the operations in the Italian campaign were conducted made the extensive use of armor impractical -and in many areas impossible. For this reason there was little or no coordination of antitank weapons provided or planned at division level during offensive opera- tions. In defensive situations, most divisions in their SOP made Division Artillery responsible for the coordination of all anti- tank defenses within the division: In most divisions the Division Artillery Executive Officer was the Antitank Officer, and was directly responsible for AT defenses. In other divisions the CG-, Division Artillery was responsible, but in practically all cases the actual coordination was effected by the Artillery Executive Officer. In some cases this coordination was initiated by the division AT officer who estimated the requirements and placed his tank destroyers and tanks to cover the principal tank threats, after which the regimental and battalion anti-tank guns were used to supplement the TD's and tanks placed by division. It was far more common for the regiments to set up their own AT defense, submitting overlays of their positions to the division antitank officer, who then effected coordination by adjustment and by supplementing the defense with his TD's and tanks. At regimental level coordination of all means of AT defense was effected through the Regimental Antitank Officer who was commanding officer of the antitank company. In general, in offensive operations where the nature of the terrain prevented the use of hostile armor, no coordination was considered neces- sary and none was effected. Occasionally AT guns Were used successfully in initial stages of offensive actions, as assault guns, to penetrate stone houses, reduce pill boxes or bunkers, or 124 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING to thicken artillery preparations. More often in offensive action, AT5 guns were not used, and supporting TDs and tanks were used as assault weapons. In defensive situations, coordina- tion of all AT weapons, organic or attached, was the responsi- bility of the AT officer and was accomplished in the manner prescribed by our manuals. Battalion AT guns were usually placed well forward to protect front line troops. Begimental guns were occasionally used with the outpost, but were usually placed in rear of battalion guns to give greater depth to the AT defense. 16. Fox Holes The size, shape, and method of construction of the" "fighting hole" varied from the standard prescribed in manuals to suit the existing tactical and terrain conditions. Provision was usually made to prevent surface water from draining into the holes. A sump hole in one corner was dug to collect water that did get in. Sandbags were of great value in stable positions. Within reasonable limits the individual soldier was allowed to exercise his own ingenuity in the preparation of his fighting hole. ' Often a combination "fighting and sleeping hole" was constructed by enlarging the hole and covering a portion of it with earth and available supporting materiels. In defensive situations the two-man fox hole was used extensively: It was preferred to the one man fox hole for the following reasons : a. It was. more easily prepared. One man was able to protect the other while he was working. b. It afforded relief and rest for the occupants. Men would take turns at being on the alert while the other slept or rested. Positions were effectively manned for longer periods of time. c. If one soldier became a casualty the position was still occupied and did not cause a gap in the line. It also made possible the immediate application of first aid. d. The psychological effect of the "buddy" system. 125 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING Under pressure, two men together encouraging each other would remain in position longer than one man alone. e. It afforded greater comfort especially in cold weather. Soldiers doubled-up on blankets and shelterhalves for extra warmth. Various types of two man positions were used depending on the terrain. In mountainous or terraced terrain, digging laterally into the hillsides was used most often. On flat terrain the standard two man fox hole was prepared, and overhead cover provided whenever possible. J 7. Digging in Flat Water-Logged Country Experience of British troops operating in the Po Valley showed that digging in the usual sense in flat water-logged country is not feasible. No method was evolved to prevent fox holes and gun pits from filling with waiter in such circum- stances, and a man who had stood some hours waist-deep in water became a liability rather than an asset. Methods adopted to overcome this difficulty were : a. The use of river flood banks and any other banks or higher ground for the siting of slit trenches, fox holes, etc. b. The building up of defensive works above the ground level. This had the disadvantage of giving away defensive positions to the enemy and was only used where absolutely necessary. c. The formation of defensive strong points in houses which were strengthened for the purpose, and the construction round the houses of very shallow outpost positions which were occupied by night only. 28. Passive Air Defense 1. General After the first stages of the operations in Italy, the Allies maintained complete superiority in the air. Enemy aircraft operated infrequently and then only in small numbers. Enemy air activity consisted for the most part of small raids 126 OPERATIONS AND, TRAINING and reconnaissance sorties. Under these conditions our troops became careless in practicing the basic principles of passive air defense. This was especially true in rear areas. However, since forward positions were often subject to ground observation as well as air observation, the principles of passive air defense were more carefully applied there. 2. Enemy Practices Our constant use of observation, fighter, and bomber planes made it necessary for the enemy to become masters of camouflage and concealment. A great deal was learned from their methods and practices, which were based on the principle that passive air defense was a responsibility of the individual soldier. Individuals' were equipped with sniper and snow suits, ungarnished nets, helmet nets and occasionally paint. Indivi- duals were trained to use special care in hiding litter such as tin cans and bits of paper, to provide camouflaged overhead cover for individual emplacements, and to remove excess earth from emplacements to concealed places. Excellent use was made of materials at hand in camouflaging installations from the view of aerial observers. Movement was not allowed during daylight but was made only at night or on days which did not afford observation. German infantrymen were punished if they moved outside their holes during daylight. Night movements from camouflaged areas were made in small groups. Whenever possible, halts or rests were made only in areas of natural cover. At bridges, vehicles 'were detained in camouflaged areas and dispatched intermittently so as to avoid congestion. Eailway flatcars loaded with military equipment or personnel were often fur- nished with square canvas covered frames so as to appear as boxcars. Various ruses, such as the preparation of false bridge crossing sites and the spacing of partly dimmed lights along roads to draw hostile aircraft away from movements in other sectors, were used in attempts to deceive our observers. The defense against Allied strafing of enemy road traffic consisted of the following measures; 127 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING a. A guard was placed on the outside of each vehicle to warn of approaching aircraft ; b. At intervals of one kilometer along highways there were posted air-raid warning stations (Fliegerwarn- posten) to signal approaching aircraft to motor vehicles ; c. At intervals of one hundred meters along impor- tant highways there were air-raid shelter trenches (Deckenloe- cher) in the shape of an "L" or a "V" for personnel traveling in vehicles. These were usually marked so as to be easily and quickly located ; d. Vehicle shelters 17 feet long with walls 6 feet thick and a camouflage roofing were constructed. In defensive works the utmost use was made of natural camouflage which blended with the texture and color of the Italian landscape. Buildings were used to house pillboxes, and pillboxes were made to appear as houses, barns or outhouses. Much use was made of shrubbery and natural growth found in the vicinity, so that pillboxes and fortifications were often invisible or appeared to be stone walls on the hillside. Manure piles were known to have been used as camouflage for auto- matic weapon pits. Firing positions for artillery were usually located near roads or trails. Firing was withheld when Allied aircraft were in the vicinity so as not to reveal the gun posi- tions. Much attention was paid to track discipline, although this was one of the enemy's weaker points. Emergency roads were sited close to ditches, the edges of fields, and the banks of lakes, rivers and creeks. Dummy emplacements were constructed and tracks made leading to them. Supply dumps were rarely more than one mile from a main road and under •natural or improvised concealment. Vehicles were kept disper- sed and allowed in supply areas only at night.. Battered buildings were often used and vehicles and supplies dispersed among the ruins. Maximum use was made of shade for congealing- weapons positions, tanks, vehicles, and supplies. 128 OPERATIONS AND; TRAINING 3, Allied Practices Our artificial camouflage materiels Were found both suitable and : sufficient in kind and. quantity. During the winter months many units painted artillery pieces and weapons white to blend with the snow. Engineers, by use of cloth, made large oil storage tanks appear as houses. Natural materiels found on hand were considered best for camouflaging and were put to maximum use. The basic principles of the enemy passive air defense and ours were similar. The enemy, however, through necessity practised them more thoroughly, and pains- takingly. It was. found best to keep command post installations away from large villas and sizable towns because these were usually the most suspected areas. Small farm houses proved most -satisfactory for CP installations of regiments and lower units because of the existing trail net. Effective passive air defense was gained only by proper training and supervision. It had to be constantly checked and improved. One of the best methods found for checking camouflage was the use of the cub plane by comman- ders to inspect their areas from the enemy observer^ view- point. Too much faith was placed in the concealment afforded by darkness. Night observation by aircraft, especially when the observer was familiar with the terrain^ was very effective. Our use of artificial moonlight was an aid to their night observers. Even though darkness does assist in restrict- ing observation, the principles of passive air defense should still be. adhered to. . Kadar warning systems were extensive and active on the entire front. Hear Installations received sufficient warning of approaching ; enemy aircraft. However, due to the speed of aircraft and to radar range limitations, front line units seldom received prior warning of approaching aircraft by means other than visual observation. In order to coordinate the efforts of both military and civilian organizations and the use of all resources, a 129 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING Passive Air Defense project was established. This project, known as PAD, was primarily intended for large areas of concentrated personnel and materiel such, as base ports or areas in the communication zones. Its operation proved suc- cessful in reducing losses. Most divisions, regiments and battalions appointed one officer as PAD officer. His duties were to coordinate all passive air defense measures. He checked camouflage, warning systems and dispersion in bivouac areas, and air guards on vehicles during motor movements, and worked in conjunction with S-2 on training in aircraft identification. Light lines, at first kept well to the rear, were moved as far forward as effective enemy artillery range. It was found that the reduction of accidents and the speeding up of supplies and equipment justified the limited additional hazard of hostile air action. 19. Artificial Moonlight After studies made of the British Eighth- Army 's experience with the use of anti-aircraft searchlights for night illumination, the Fifth Army made use of this development. Standard anti-aircraft searchlights were installed in selected positions so as to provide beams of light over the front lines. The illumination of an area thus lighted was similar to that of a full moon, particularly if the beams were reflected from and dispersed by a cloud layer. Some of the advantages derived from the use of search- lights to produce artificial moonlight were the following : a. Infantry night attacks were assisted by the better control facilitated by the light, and by the concealment pro- vided by the shadows. Forward sides of buildings and brush being in the shadows could be utilized, as observation of troops in such locations was denied the enemy. b. Keeping of direction was aided. c. Enemy counter-attacks were spotted more easily. d. Forward OPs were afforded better visibility. 130 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING e. Field artillery unit operations were facilitated particularly in servicing of the piece and in displacing to new positions. /. Aid was afforded wire crews in laying and repairing lines. g. Considerable assistance was afforded in the evacua tipn of casualties, and the fatigue of medical personnel was reduced. h. Engineer operations, such as road maintenance and the building of bridges, were speeded up. i. Movement of mule trains and troops was materially aided. Infantry reliefs were expedited and completed with less hazard. Traffic on supply routes forward of the light line was speeded up to double that normally possible on dark nights. Many driving hazards were eliminated. Jc. The supply rate of ammunition, gas, water, rations, etc., was stepped up because of the increased speed of traffic. I. The fatigue of truck and tank drivers was reduced, and mechanics were aided considerably in motor maintenance. to. Morale of troops was raised on cloudy rainy nights. Following are some of the disadvantages and, difficulties' encountered, many of which were eliminated by changing beam directions or light positions. a. In mountainous terrain, it was difficult to obtain light of fairly even intensity on all sections of roads. This proved to be a distinct disadvantage, in that drivers had par- ticular difficulty: along dark sections after having driven over a section of the road which was dimly lighted. This difficulty can of course be. partially eliminated by using a greater number of lights if available. b. The illumination adequate for an infantry attack was insufficient for extensive night tank operations in rugged terrain. ... c. Some assistance was given the enemy in detecting our attacks and in withdrawal. However, the use of light was 131 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING controlled to give maximum advantage to our troops with a minimum of aid to the enemy. s d. It was not always possible to provide sufficient illumination to give the desired assistance to every operation being carried on in a combat sector forward of the light line. Fulfilling a request to aid one mission may interfere with another, and careful control was required to ensure maximum effective use of the lights available. Army interrogators obtained expressions from PWs on our use of lights to ascertain the amount of assistance afforded the enemy and the operational interference created. These interrogations indicated that our use of artificial moonlight: a. Facilitated movement of his troops on reverse slopes. b. Restricted his movement on forward slopes, keeping troops pinned down, resulting in demoralization. c. Facilitated his withdrawals in the face of attack. d. Aided him in digging foxholes. e. Permitted observation of our troops at greater distances. /. Discouraged night desertions. g. Restricted his motor movements. h. Lowered his morale because it created a feeling that we were contemptuous of his capabilities. i. Deprived front line troops of freedom of movement without observation on dark nights. They felt that they were seen, whether they actually were or not. Three examples of the use of artificial moonlight in- infantry operations are given below. a. During a daylight attack an infantry battalion occupied a hill, and prepared for its defense for the night. At 0030 the next morning an enemy counter-attack was driven off, only to be followed by another and stronger counter-attack, which was, also repelled, but with much difficulty, at 0145. As observation of the enemy's movements was very difficult, due to darkness, the battalion commander requested artificial 132 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING moonlight. In ten minutes time, a total of five beams- provided sufficient light to. enable the defenders to use their weapons adyantageously and to follow; the enemy infiltration, attempts. At 0330 the enemy made a last desperate counte^-aittack which wag. - also repelled: The .visibility afforded by- the artificial moonlight was a decisive factor in the successful defense of this hill. b. Two infantry regiments had the mission of cap- turing a mountain height. Enemy resistance was stubborn, and the objective had hot been; gained by dark: (1800, hours). One regimental commander requested indirect illumination of the crest and the town situated there. In a short time searchlight beams illuminated the area, and with the aid of this added visibility, the attack was pushed and the first elements were able to occupy the crest and the town; at 1900 hours. , Although preparations were made to repel any enemy counter-attacks, none were attempted either that night or thereafter. Continued use of indirect illumination greatly assisted OPs and sentries guarding against the approach of enemy patrols.. c. A large hill mass was the objective for a. well planned night attack. From the line of departure , two sharp but smaller ridges obscured the view of the objective; on a dark night. A British battalion Was ordered to make the. attack on the night of October 28th. El hour was at 2230 hours. The moon set at 2315 hours, at^which time it was planned to utilize artificial moonlight. The night was; clear, no clouds obscured the moon, and full advantage was taken , of . this during the approach to the line of departure. , At about 23Q0 hours the moon sank below" a hill and the objective was completely obscured. A very great difference was immediately noticed, as one of the smaller ridges appeared to be the objective, it being the only feature visible immediately in front of the assault companies. On reaching the top of this smaller ridge, another similar ridge appeared immediately in front. This produced a bewildering effect as it was very difficult for units to deter- mine their own location or the; .location of the: objective. When the searchlights were switched on the objective was again clearly 133 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING visible and no further trouble was experienced by the battalion during the remainder of the operation. During the actual mopping up operations the artificial moonlight was also of considerable help as the assaulting troops were able to see the enemy trying to escape to the rear and fire was quickly brought to bear on them. In this operation the battalion took 59 prisoners, and suffered only 5 casualties. 20. Direct Illumination of Targets It was found that for artillery observation at night a target •could be successfully lighted by direct searchlight illu- mination. The following illustrates an example of its use. A house in enemy territory was known to be fortified, and was suspected of being a forward ammunition dump and distributing point. It was desired to place an observed con- centration on this locality using direct light for observation about two hours after dark when the greatest number of enemy personnel would likely be present in the target area. A search- light and generator were temporarily mounted in a 2V2-ton truck. The distance from searchlight to target was five kilometers. The light was ordered into action at 2030 hours and out of action at 2050 hours. The objective was perfectly lighted and there was no need to adjust- the searchlight beam. The objective was bracketed with two rounds, then immediately hit by a group concentration. The success of the fire was due to : a. The careful preparation made during the day ; the officer of the searchlight company was taken to the Group OP and identified the target to be illuminated. b. Excellent communications between firing unit and searchlight unit. c. Good weather conditions (fogless night). d. Efficient operation of firing unit and searchlight crew. 134 OPERATIONS ANO TRAINING 21. Indoctrination of New Units Cadres of new units should be attached to units engaged with the enemy for battle experience. Duration of the attach- ment would depend upon the type, of action , taking place. In the defense from five to seven days should be sufficient. Members of one cadre during a defensive situation who spent fifteen days in the line felt that it was too long a period and that very little was learned after the first week. The duration of attachments made during the offensive must depend upon the rapidity and character of the action. Three or four days may be sufficient in a rapidly progressing, situation. In general, however, ten to fifteen days in most offensive situations should be satisfactory. Cadres should not be attached to units which have been in the line for too long a period of time immediately prior to the attachment ; otherwise the poor technique, the lack of aggressiveness, the desire to ' 'get out ' ', and the lowered disciplinary standards which become prevalent in tired troops will be picked up by the new cadre as ' 'the way they do it in combat ". A cadre, if not too large, does not add an appreciable burden to the front line unit. In fact it can be of assistance in staff work and patrolling. A battalion cadre consisting of the following proved to be appropriate for attachment from the viewpoint of both units : Battalion Hq: Bn. Commander or Bn. Executive Officer. Bn. S-3. Communications Officer or Sgt. Wire Chief. A & P Plat Ldr or Sgt; S-l or Sgt Major. Each Bifle Company: Company Commander or Co. Executive Officer. One platoon leader or platoon sgt. The Heavy Weapons Company: Company Commander or Co. Executive Officer 135 OPERATIONS AMD TRAINING One MG platoon leader or platoon1 Sgt.; Platoon leader and one section leader of 8lBam mortar platoon. 22. Infantry Unit Training Centers There is a definite need for theater infantry training cen- ters designed for infantry units returning from the front lines, and for new units before entry into combat. The object in so far as old units are concerned, would be to rebuild, train and refresh the small infantry units, with emphasis on perfection of team work; to amalgamate replacements into these units ; and to develop and practise new ideas and lessons learned. New units arriving in the theater Would profit greatly by undergoing a course of training in such an Infantry Unit Training Center, prior to their first combat engagement. These new units might well undergo this training during the period when their cadres are receiving battle indoctrination with front line units. Due to the short period probably available, the training effort should be concentrated on the use of weapons and on the technique of the small unit. Schedules should be ' made flexible enough to include training in weaknesses found in recent engagements. Training programs should include the following : a. Weapons. (1) Zeroing of all weapons. (2) Nomenclature, functioning of and familiari- zation firing with all infantry weapons (excluding the 37 mm and 57mm AT guns) for all personnel. (3) Use of fire power—weapons capabilities. ■ b. Technique. (I) Basic; Intermediate ' and Attack Battle Drill (progressive). •* (2) Night Operations — Patrolling' and attack. 136 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING (3) Problems— to consist larely of actual firing problems to stress technique,, empbasizing the following !: (a) Determination of target locations by sound. (Grack and thump)! (b) Fire superiority— use of fire power and fire control. (c) Small unit attacks- — Squad and Platoon day and night attacks, fire and movement. (d) Attack of a fortified strong-point (or area). • ■■ (e) Street fighting. During time spent. on problems not^pplicable to specialist personnel, training should be conducted in wire, SCB 300, etc., for communication personnel, mine training for A & P platoons and AT Co mine platoon, 50 cal. MG functioning and indirect fire for personnel using 50 cal. MGs, etc. Instruction should include adjustment of artillery fire, infantry-tank teamwork, sniping, and the use of special equipment. The advantages of such ■• an Infantry Training Center include the following : a. New material and lessons learned by others would be presented. Some platoon leaders felt that they had, through time, acquired the habit of thinking only along certain set lines, and that they and their platoons would Welcome new viewpoints and suggestions. ' b. The training centers would be equipped with ranges ready |or use and equipped with suitable targets, markers, pits, etc. Available training time would be used to best advantage. g. The previous planning, detailed schedules, problems and prepared areas set up and organized by the center would greatly aid battalion and regimental staffs and allow ;them some relief. Staff duties in rear areas were often more pressing and time absorbing than front line duty, consequently a member of a staff seldom had any relief; d. Training would not; lose team participation. The 137 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING training of the entire squad and platoon teams in the same principles and technique is imperative. e. Training would benefit by the presence of expert instructors, especially trained in subjects such as mines, street fighting, assault of pill boxes, sniping, etc. At least 75% of the instructors should be battle-experienced. The use of some instructors without battle experience is believed helpful in order that basic principles and theory not be forgotten. It often happens that battle experienced instructors say, "We didn't do it that way, so the theory is wrong. " 23. Training in Rest Areas All units coming out of the lines for a rest period par- ticipated in some form of training program. Although much time and work was expended by the units, many felt that very little was actually accomplished. Some units started a training program immediately upon closing in the rest area, while others had several days of com- plete rest and relaxation prior to starting their training. Both soldiers and officers undertook their, training with much more enthusiasm when the latter method was followed. Training consisted largely of range firing, small unit problems, combat firing, and drill and technical training on crew served weapons. Field training was unsatisfactory due to insufficient and unsuitable firing ranges and problem areas,, and to a lack of training aids. Planning for rest area training must be given a great deal of attention at higher headquarters. Liaison between higher headquarters and the training unit must be continuous, with a view to assisting to the maximum the training unit. 24. Infantry Conversion Training The manpower shortage was first felt in Italy during the summer of 1944 when insufficient infantry replacements Were received to maintain the strength of infantry units fighting 138 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING there. To meet this situation, the Infantry Conversion Train- ing Center was established to train as infantry replacements, soldiers of other branches and services who were fit for combat duty. The jobs of the men selected for training as infantry replacements were filled where necessary by limited assignment personnel available in the theater. The ICTC began operating in October 1944, and the first class of replacements was given eight weeks of training. After the graduation of this first class the period of training was extended to twelve weeks. Men selected for conversion training were from all arms and services, and came from MTOUSA headquarters, PBS, Replacement Command headquarters, Air .Corps service units, andthe AdriaticBase Command. They were of all enlisted grades. The ICTC was established along the lines of a Replace- ment Training Center in the Zone of the Interior, but was superimposed upon a standard Replacement Depot. It operated a number of companies of 300 men each. The training parti- cularly emphasized weapons and tactics. Every trainee fired all the infantry weapons, including the crew served weapons, light and heavy machine guns, 60mm and 81mm mortars, and Bazookas. Every man participated in problems for squad, platoon, and company, usually taking a part commensurate with his grade. At about the same time another conversion training problem was solved in another manner. During the summer of 1944, enemy air activity decreased to such an extent that not all the AAA units available were required for air defense. Some of these battalions were used as infantry during the Arno oper- ations when they were grouped into various task .forces. Later, after the situation became static, they were converted to infantry through a process of training conducted by Fifth Army. Selected company grade officers and non-commissioned officers were given infantry training at a Fifth Army training center. Upon completion of the training of these leaders, Army withdrew the battalions to training areas and gave them time to train as infantry units under their own officers, assisted by officers drawn from Other infantry units; 139 OPERATIONS AMD TRAINING Upon completion of their training, ; these battalions were grouped into, and activated as, an infantry regiment. 25. Schools Most schools in the Italian: theater were operated by the Beplacement and Training Command, MTQUSA. They were designed principally for the: specialist training of replacements and of personnel converted from one branch of the, service to another; Vacancies existing after meeting these requirements were allotted by quotas to combat unit personnel for additional training and refreshing. : It was generally considered that the number of schools operated was sufficient. However, some units indicated their desire for a Driver and Maintenance School to which they could send selected individuals for training. The only school of this nature was operated for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Some units mentioned the need for a school to train potential 1st Sergeants. In combat, due to casualties among the best qualified NCQs, it was difficult to find replacements with sufficient technical knowledge to assume the duties of a 1st Sergeant. Some commanders; expressed a need for a Scout- ing and Patrolling School, equipped to train an entire patrol as a group. In the absence of such a theater school, divisions operated their own scouting and patrolling schools when they considered it necessary. Schools of a technical nature had need for. only a limited number of battle; experienced instructors. Schools that instructed in tactical subjects such as the Mountain Mobility School and the Leadership and Battle Training School required a majority of battle-experienced instructors. ' ■. ■ The following were the most important, schools maintained : a. The Officers Training School established early in 1945 trained enlisted men selected from Infantry and other units, : to prepare them for duty as infantry platoon leaders. Upon ■ graduation after satisfactory completion of ; the course, students were commissioned second lieutenants and ' assigned 140 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING to infantry units. The course consisted of twelve weeks jf infantry technique and tactics. Three classes of 100 men each were run concurrently, a new class arriving every four weeks. b. The Leadership and Battle Training School was established to condition and train replacement officers, officers converted from other branches to infantry, and senior NCOs in battle conditions as found in this theater. A regular course of thr^e weeks training was provided for company grade replacement officers. An additional three weeks' course was provided for company grade officers converted from other branches to Infantry. A three week combat appointment course prepared proven combat NCOs for responsibilities as officers, and senior replacement NCOs to perform their duties in combat. As they desired, newly arrived and newly organized combat units were allotted vacancies for company grade officers at this school. c. The Armored School was designed for the refresher training of replacements and personnel converted from other branches to the Armored Force. It included three weeks' courses for crewmen of light and medium tanks and tank destroyers; six weeks' courses for crewmen of medium and light tanks and tank destroyers; and a three weeks' course for tank officers. Courses were scheduled as conditions warranted. d. The Photo Interpretation School conducted individual specialized training in photo interpretation, parti- cularly suited to fit the needs of division and higher unit, and artillery intelligence personnel. e. The Intelligence Training Center was a development of the Photo Interpretation School, to fill the need for basic intelligence instruction for officers and NCOs from Infantry regiments and battalions. f. A -Mountain Mobility School ;was operated during the fall and winter months of 1944. This was a combined Anglo-American school. British equipment and instructors were used. Many students stated that the school was a good conditioning course, and that much was learned in the use of special mountain equipment. However, it was felt that the 141 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING course was not too practical because the specialized equipment used was not available in their respective units, and the nature of the front line terrain did not require this high degree of mountain schooling. g. The Engineer School, organized to train individual specialists, was divided into two parts : (1) The Bailey Bridge Course was designed for the training of Engineer replacements and Engineer unit personnel, both officers and EM. The twelve day course covered the use and construction of fixed and floating Bailey Bridges. . . / : (2) The Mine Warfare and Demolition Course of twelve days duration was designed for unit and replacement officers and enlisted men on the basis of 40% infantry, 40% engineers, and 20% other branches. The length of the course and its scope were adequate. The school was neither large enough to allow all personnel of the infantry A and P platoons and AT company platoons to complete the course, nor to provide the desired number of mine trained specialists in artillery battalions. h. The Signal School, primarily designed for replace mentSj was divided into courses covering message center procedure, radio operation and maintenance, teletypewriter operation and maintenance, telephone and telegraph, and a signal officers refresher course. The courses varied in time length, but were very complete in their scope ; and instruction. Because communication personnel were specially trained and difficulty was experienced in replacing them, commanders often felt unable to spare them from their duties to attend schools. This was especially true when units were in combat. 26. Traveling Training Teams Traveling training teams were organized to meet specific needs or for specific purposes. For example, due to language difficulties, Portugese speaking personnel were used as, teams to instruct the troops of the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces. 142 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING These training teams provided a satisfactory means for training limited groups of personnel in specialized subjects where only a general working knowledge was sufficient. In all cases the teams were organized from selected personnel of experienced units. They had the advantage of being versed in the newest developments, procedures, and lessons learned in their particular subjects. The teams were limited in size due to the lack of available instructors, and were therefore confined in their activities to lecture and demonstration methods. They were too small to conduct practical work with large numbers of troops. Training teams were not considered practicable for subjects that involved team work such as tac- tical problems for small units, because subjects of this nature require closely supervised practical work. A training team instructing in mountain warfare operated in Division rest areas and later visited a few of the forward reserve units. Two engineer mine training teams were made available upon request to units desiring their assistance. Instruction on combined infantry-tank operations was confined to joint infantry-tank staff and commander meetings. Training team instruction on this subject was considered im- practicable, due to the large amount of closely supervised practical work necessary. Demonstrations and instruction on the use and wearing of special winter clothing were excellent and offered many suggestions and methods that were put to immediate use. The training teams on mine warfare proved very success- ful in instructing infantry units in a general knowledge of this subject. This training did not replace schools for personnel who needed specialized training in mines, such as battalion A & P platoons and AT Company mine platoons. Additional subjects, such as personal hygiene, first aid, standardized procedures and expedients in Battalion and Regimental staff work, foreign weapons, and unit orientation could well be taught: by traveling training teams. ; 143 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 27. Desirability of Training all "■Combat Infantry Men in use of all Infantry Weapons It was found in combat operations that men lacked sufficient knowledge of .weapons other than the one with which they were armed. In particular, a general lack of familiarity with the Bazooka, rifle grenade and BAR was prevalent. On occasions squads were without a BAB due to casualties and the lack of ability of other members of the squad to take over and man the weapon. Some unit commanders felt that in a rifle company, the men of a platoon should be trained only in the weapons (both crew served and individual) of that particular type of platoon. Their argument was based on- their experience that rarely did they transfer personel from a weapons platoon to a rifle platoon and vice versa. Others felt that all personnel in a rifle company should receive training in all weapons of the company. In their experience, due to numerous casualties in their weapons platoons, it was necessary at times to use rifle platoon person- nel to man crew-served weapons. Inasmuch as this personnel had not been trained on crew-served weapons they could be used in the weapons platoon only as ammunition carriers. AH agreed that transfers from the weapons platoon to rifle platoons were rare. The majority stated that the men of Heavy. Weapons Com- panies should be trained in all weapons of the company, based on experienced needs for transferring personnel between the company platoons. Some added that training should include the LMG- as this weapon was often used in place of. the HMO by Heavy Weapons Companies in difficult moutainous terrain. The most generally expressed opinion was that all infan- trymen should be given a suitable familiarization course in all infantry weapons with the exception of the 37 and 57mm AT guns. The familiarization courses fired during, their training 144 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING period by units serving in this theater, were considered gene- rally unsatisfactory. Courses should include functioning, assembly, disassembly, and^sufficient firing to insure that the individual can satisfactorily fire any infantry weapon when the necessity arises. Due to the similarity between light and heavy machine guns and between 60mm and 81mm mortars, familiarization with the light weapons should be sufficient for rifle company personnel. 28. Marksmanship Courses Most officers and non-commissioned officers were satisfied that the training in marksmanship which our troops received was sound and practical. It made good shots of average sol- diers and provided a sound foundation for firing on the tran- sition range and for combat firing. They felt that this basic training in marksmanship was essential to give the soldier confidence in his rifle and in his own ability. Opinion was unanimous that more time and emphasis must be given to firing at field targets. It was also pointed out that although our training had made soldiers proficient at hitting targets that they could see, it had not emphasized the importance of, or the necessity for picking out and firing at probable targets in areas from which they were receiving enemy fire. They felt that more field firing conducted under conditions approxi- mating as closely as possible actual battle situations was essential, and that, if necessary some, time might well be taken from that allotted to preliminary marksmanship and known distance range firing to provide the increase in time for combat firing. Most of them felt that the combat reaction -or close combat courses afforded valuable training but that hip and snap shooting should be further stressed because of their value particularly in patrolling. It was agreed that the rifle marks- manship course should be completed by all infantry soldiers before they started training in other weapons. Detailed comments on the marksmanship training for different weapons follow: 145 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING a. Rifle. Few suggestions were offered as improvements for the course in rifle marksmanship and no great number concurred in any of the suggestions. A few thought that train- ing in the standing position was a waste of time, since this position was seldom used in combat, while others pointed out that particularly in patrolling our soldiers frequently had to use the off-hand position. Some said that our training should be conducted without the use of the sling since it was seldom used in battle. Others said that the use of the sling in marks- manship training helped make the soldier a better shot and thus increased his confidence both in his rifle and in his own ability. They thought that the sling should be used in known distance firing and that training on the transition range and in combat firing should be conducted both with and without the use of the sling. b. BAR. All agreed that the marksmanship course for the Browning automatic rifle was excellent. All of the positions taught were used habitually in combat. A few thought that more training in assault fire or marching fire should be in- cluded in the BAR training. It was agreed that all infantry soldiers should be thoroughly trained in the use of this im- portant weapon. c. Machine Gun. Marksmanship training in this weapon was be- lieved to be sound and generally satisfactory; Many thought that 1000 inch firing should be repeated frequently during training periods of combat troops. Training in assembly and disassembly should be initially thorough and should be re- peated often enough during the training period to ensure complete familiarity with this important phase of MG- instruc- tion. The inclusion of Field Firing in MG- marksmanship courses Corrected the only deficiency noted^by combat infantry- men. Training Circular Number 6, published 8 February 146 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 1945 added instruction in firing at field targets and record firing at targets spaced irregularly in width and depth at ranges varying from 400 to 800 yards. 29. Partisan Activities Even before the invasion of the Italian Penisula, the Allied Armies knew that they could expect considerable assistance from civilians behind the enemy lines. The Partisan movement was an expression of Anti-Fascist and Anti-German opinion. The strength of the movement stemmed from the existence of bands of ex-Italian Army personnel, and of political organi- zations that had developed underground during the Fascist regime. These bands and groups were united neither in poli- tical philosophy nor in their post war aims, but were drawn together by their intense desire to see the complete collapse of Fascism and the route of all German forces from their country. How to utilize this force and develop it into a valuable military asset was the problem confronting the Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy. Little was known during the winter of 1943/1944 of the number, the location, or the activi- ties of partisan groups, but some information did come in to headquarters of the Allied Armies in Italy confirming their existence and some of their accomplishments. The Partisans had developed two separate types of organization. In the mountains surrounding the flat lands of the Po Valley, numerous bands, principally former soldiers of the ex-Italian army but augmented considerably by young men anxious to avoid forced labor in Germany and led by former officers or non-commissioned officers of the Italian Army, gathered together in remote districts where they seized control and operated more or less openly. These groups were fre- quently joined by deserters from the German Army, Eussians, Poles, Czechs, Slavs, and Alsatians, and by Amei,ican airmen, British, Indian, South African, Canadian, New Zealand, and French officers and men Who had escaped from Italian prison camps. By the end of 1944 most of the mountainous districts 147 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING of Northern Italy were controlled by such bands and the Germans controlled only the principal routes of supply and communication in these regions. In the Po Valley, the Parti- sans, being unable to operate openly, formed clandestine groups in an underground movement. Frequently these individuals worked for the Germans during the day while planning and executing various acts of sabotage during the night. Many railway and factory workers were of this type. The Italian Partisans never had an effective central head- quarters dictating their military actions and policies. A central committee known as the CLNAI was organized at the top of a pyramidal structure consisting of regional, provincial, and city committees, but confined its activities to managing finance, coordinating intelligence matters and appointing certain leaders. The efforts of the individual bands were coordinated directly through the special operations branch of 15th Army Group. When the Partisan movement emerged as a fighting force, the Allies began to supply them with arms and equipment, principally by air. Started late in 1943, this supply was in- creased throughout 1944 during which time many thousands of tons of various classes of military supplies were received by Partisans bands. Shortages in supplies and lack of means of communication were the chief factors limiting the activities of the guerillas. Allied missions consisting at first only of Italian personnel were placed with the Partisans as early as January 1944, and in the spring Allied personnel, both British and American, were sent not only to carry them operation instructions and radio sets, but to train and work with them in carrying out assigned tasks. These missions were sent out regularly during the latter part of 1944. They were successful in establishing communication with and giving directions and training to many of the larger bands of partisans. Some missions were in reality task forces, consisting of two officers and from ten to thirty men. They were heavily armed groups of particularly adventurous soldiers from any of the allied armies who para- 148 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ehuted into enemy territory and there, either with some partisan organization or alone, carried out some vital act of demolition or sabotage. Upon the completion of their principal mission, these men joined or continued to work with the Partisans. The number of persons engaged in subversive work, sabo- tage, or in actual fighting was always difficult to estimate. Up to the close of 1943 it probably was only a few thousand. With the increasing allied assistance provided during 1944, the existing bands grew in numbers and new groups were organized. The number reached its maximum in the fall of 1944 when it was estimated that there were 120,000 active armed men. During the winter of 1944-45 the number was probably reduced by half, since winter weather did not permit our large scale air supply activities to continue. Many bands reduced their size and others disbanded altogether. With the advent of spring in 1945, large scale air supply and an increase in the number of Allied Missions again caused an increase in the number of Partisans. The value of Partisan activities to the Allies can only be estimated, and an accurate report of their results will never be possible. They, nevertheless, accomplished a great deal concerning which we received accurate information, some of it confirmed by prisoners of war and by the reports of our agents. It is certain' that the accomplishments of Partisans formed a vital contribution toward the success of the Italian Campaign. Their achievements included: a. Casualties caused the enemy. Accurate confirmed reports listed several thousand enemy soldiers killed, wounded, and captured. b. Sabotage. Trains were derailed and many loco- motives destroyed. Motor convoys were destroyed or captured, railroads were cut, bridges blown, highways obstructed by demolition, factories demolished and many tons of military supplies destroyed. g. Diversion of enemy effort and effect on morale. The presence of the powerful Partisan groups behind the enemy lines certainly diverted a considerable portion of the enemy 's 149 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING attention and effort from his principal task of dealing with the allied armies on his front. d. Value to Allied Intelligence. Allied agents behind the enemy lines took advantage of much information collected by Partisans. In addition these groups furnished safe refuge to our agents from which they could conduct their work. e. Help to Allied Ex-PW and grounded airmen. Although we cannot determine the figures, we do know that, through the assistance of Partisans, a great many grounded air crews and escaped PWs returned to Allied territory. /. Stimulus given to Enemy Desertion. It was determined by the interrogation of large numbers of enemy deserters that Partisans actively encouraged and organized desertion. This activity was most effective among Italian and Volksdeutch troops but to some extent also brought about German desertions. g. Cooperation with forward troops. All troop units fighting in Northern Italy vouched for the assistance rendered them by the Partisans, who furnished them guides during offensive operations, collected information concerning mine- fields and troop dispositions, and on occasions prevented exten- sive demolitions by the enemy. During the April 1945 drive across the Po Valley their contributions were enormous. In a period of less than ten days they captured before the arrival of our troops, a large number of cities, among which were Massa and Genoa on the west coast, Parma, Bergamo, Milan,, and Venice in the Po Valley. During these operations they captured over 25,000 enemy troops and assisted our advancing forces in capturing as many more. The speed and success with which the conquest of Northern Italy was accomplished was aided materielly by the assistance of the patriots working generally behind the enemy 's lines. h. In every city captured by the Partisans the CLN took over the civil administration, decreed curfewsr controlled food distribution, prevented rioting and looting, and in gene- ral preserved order until AMG officials arrived to take over a city government already well established. 150 OPERATIONS AMD TRAINING 30. Task Forces Task forces were organized during the Italian campaigns to accomplish two general missions: to assist in the exploita- tion and pursuit of the enemy after his main line of defense was broken ; and to relieve infantry units which were needed for more important tasks. In the transition from normal offensive action to pursuit operations, a number of pursuit task forces were organized and committed. These generally consisted of small, flexible, mobile, and hard hitting forces composed of the several ground force arms. They were usually self-contained and self- sustaining. The composition and formation of these forces varied with the mission to be performed, the terrain over which they operated, the units available for employment, and with the nature of the enemy action in the sector where they were used. In some instances they Were used for reconnais- sances in force, to locate the enemy retreating forces after contact had been broken. In others they were organized to destroy enemy delaying forces and to bring pressure on the main withdrawing force. In still other cases they were dispatched to cut off and destroy elements of the enemy seeking to escape. In all situations, speed, mobility, and fire power to meet the existing situations were the main considerations in the composition and use of these pursuit task forces. Pursuit forces generally consisted of elements of mechanized recon- naissance, engineers, tanks, tank destroyers and mobile in- fantry. " The proportions naturally varied with the mission and the terrain. One successful combination consisted of the following : Eeconnaissance platoon Light tank company Medium tank company Infantry company Engineer platoon Tank destroyer platoon 151 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING Excellent results were obtained by employing two of these small forces on each road or avenue of advance. Some units found that the inclusion of a section of engineers equipped with mine detectors and a bulldozer in a pursuit task force was of material assistance. Task Force "H" was organized as a pursuit force on several occasions to pursue the enemy with strong mobile forces. On one occasion the force comprised the following: Headquarters of an armored regiment Two Battalions of armored infantry Battalion of infantry' Battalion of tank destroyers Battalion of armored field artillery Company of armored engineers The commanders of pursuit task forces were chosen for their aggressiveness and knowledge of the immediate situa- tion. It was learned that the use of an already functioning staff which could be used solely for the task force greatly assisted the commander in the employment of the various units of his force. An important factor in the employment of these pursuit forces was the proper internal organization to permit imme- diate- deployment and flanking movement when resistance and delaying forces were met. It was essential that a part of the unit be prepared to enter into a firelight as soon as 'fired upon. By keeping a fully organized force prepared to pass through a leading force which had deployed, the advance was maintained at a steady, unbroken rate. The occasion for organizing another type of task force developed from a shortage of infantry units. There were * available a number of units of other arms capable of being grouped into fighting forces. These units were organized into combat groups and were employed successfully during offensive actions and during static operations in place of infantry units. Typical forces of this type were Task ForceJ'R" and Task Force 45. Task Force. "R" was organized several times during 15&' OPERATIONS AND TRAINING offensive operations to take over sectors that ordinarily would have been assigned to infantry units. This force was formed primarily from armored units with a minimum of infantry included. The size and composition of the task force changed from time to time because of the necessary regrouping of units. At one time it contained the following: Headquarters, armored group Reconnaissance battalion Armored field artillery battalion Armored engineer company Tank destroyer company Infantry battalion It was employed several times to fill a wide lateral gap between the American forces and the French. On one occasion its mission was to advance in its sector on the right flank of its Corps, pro- tecting the flank, and maintaining contact with the French forces. Task Force 45 was organized to relieve infantry units which were in contact with the enemy in a static situation. The in- fantry units needed rest and training for future operations, and other organic infantry troops were not available to relieve them. There were present in the theater several Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) battalions which were not needed for their anti-aircraft role, since enemy air iactivity had practically ceased. With a minimum of training in the basic infantry weapons, these AAA battalions were formed with other troops into a task force which relieved organic infantry. Since the work laid out for this task force was that of ordinary infantry, the AAA battalions were formed into small combat units similar to squads and platoons of infantry. Three batteries were reorganized as rifle companies; The fourth battery in the battalion became a heavy weapons company. The rifle companies had four platoons each made up of two former 15-man gun sections, Training was directed by exper- ienced infantry officers attached for that purpose. Initial training before relieving the regular infantry units was as short as two days in some cases, but training in the basic infantry fundamentals was continued on the front lines. 153 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 31. Rotation of Units and Individuals on Front Line Duty In the winter of 1944-1945 defensive positions were maintained high in the Apennine mountains, in snow, rain and mud. Units were subjected for long periods to the hazards of both weather and enemy action. It was necessary that everything possible be done to provide for the physical and mental comfort of the front line soldier. Constant attention was given to the improvement of all positions. Waterproofing, heating, overhead cover and sand- bagging were accomplished as much as possible. In many cases it was possible to establish positions on reverse slopes and to maintain the forward positions by using only skeleton forces during the daylight hours. Reverse slope positions usually consisted of bunkers housing approximately six to eight men in each. This allowed rest and some relaxation during the day. Personnel of the skeleton force was changed from day to day. Due to long periods on the line, hard rations became very tiresome. Wherever possible kitchens were broken down into separate stove units and "B" rations fed to front line platoons. Where this was not possible rations were varied from day to day between the new type C and the 10 in 1. These were also supplemented with bread, coffee, cream and sugar. In some cases fresh fruit and jams were taken from rear area troops using "B" rations and sent to front line soldiers. Units found it difficult to maintain a suitable supply of squad burners so canned heat also had to be used. Many battalions established facilities in their rear areas where men were fed hot "B" rations, given showers, clean clothes, books to read, writing material and post exchange rations. When possible, front line individuals or small units were rotated, to enable all to take advantage of these facilities about every ten days. As the tactical situation permitted, front line individuals were sent to division and Army rest centers 154 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING for four to six day periods. The front line fox hole soldier was given priority in this rest center policy. Many units established laundry facilities so that indivi- duals periodically were able to obtain clean clothes and socks. Tactical operations seldom imposed equal hazards and hardships on all platoons or all companies alike. Consequently, it was general practice to rotate platoons each three to five, days and companies each seven to ten days. The average change over time for battalions was between fifteen and twenty- five days providing all battalions of a regiment were not committed. On particularly hazardous duties such as patrolling, indivi- duals were constantly rotated, so that a man seldom went on more than one or two patrols a month. Many regiments and divisions established reception and rehabilitation centers. These were principally designed for the medical supervision and rehabilitation of men returning from hospitals. 32. Desirability of Organic Armored Battalions in the Infantry Division Conferences of appropriate commanders were held to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of making armor an organic part of the infantry division. Combat commanders could not reach any general agreement concerning the matter. Some of them wanted tanks and tank destroyers included in the division, others desired only organic tank destroyer battalions, while still others wished to continue the standard practice of attaching all armor. Those who favored making- armor an organic part of the infantry division cited the fact that combined training of armor and infantry was essential to successful operations. Such training would be facilitated if tank and tank destroyer battalions were organically included in the infantry divisions instead of their being attached as separate battalions, as it had been rarely possible to provide combined training with 155 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING separate units. Infantry commanders on regimental and battalion levels would be provided a greater opportunity for the study and use of the armored weapons, and therefore could more easily take advantage of their capabilities. Difficulties in inf-antry-armor teamwork which resulted from misunder- standings between infantry and armor commanders would be eliminated by the intimate personal contacts gained through training and living together. The close cooperation achieved in the infantry-artillery teams could be attained within the infantry-armor teams if both elements were comprised in the same organization. Communications and administration as well as supervision, training, and employment would be greatly facilitated if the infantry divisions contained organic armored battalions. Those who opposed making armor a part of the infantry division contended that a more economical disposition of armor could be attained under the system of attaching all armor, since at times some divisions operated over terrain unsuitable for armor while others were in sectors where armor could be employed. The separate battalions were attached to divisions operating in sectors where they were needed, which at times resulted in grouping several battalions with one division while others operated without armor. In considering only tank destroyer battalions, their need as anti-tank weapons was dictated by the tank threat, which in turn was influenced by the terrain. Certain conditions of terrain and the absence of tank threats created periods in which TD battalions were Useless in their" primary role and could be utilized only as supporting artillery. This condition favored maintaining the practice of having separate TD battalions which could be attached to a division whenever the tank threat warranted. : Including armor as a part of the infantry division would greatly aggravate the problems of mechanical maintenance within the division and would necessitate the augmentation of division ordnance. In considering changes in the size and composition of the infantry division, additions other than armor were considered more important. The inclusion of armor in the division in 156: OPERATIONS AND TRAINING addition to these might tend to make the division too large and unwieldy, due to the increased problems of supply and administration. Since the disadvantages connected with the making of armor an organic part of the division seemed to outweigh the advantages to be gained, recommendations from Fifth Army and from Fifteenth Army Group were that tanks and TD's be not included in the T/O and T/E of the infantry division. 33. The Infantry Supporting Weapon — Cannon Company and the Assault Gun 1- General The Infantry Cannon Company equipped with the 105- mm M3 howitzer was originally intended to be an assault unit with the mission of closely supporting the battalions' of the infantry regiment, by direct fire. Due to the great difficulty of concealing the M3 howitzer in forward areas, the vulnerability of the howitzer and crew to hostile fire when exposed, and the difficulty of and the time required for its displacement, the- cannon company was not used in its intended role in this theater. It was extensively used as additional supporting artillery for the infantry regiment. It fulfilled this role with excellent results and was considered indispensable by many infantry com- manders. Although the cannon company was entirely satisfactory in the role in which it was used, there still remained the need for a close-support assault weapon, which could advance with the infantry. 2. Employment of the Cannon Company In some units the cannon company was attached to the light artillery battalion which Was in direct support of the infantry regiment, and employed as another battery of field artillery. ■ '. The most general employment of the cannon company was under the control of the infantry regimental commander. 157 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING When employed in this manner the regimental commander always had the fire of six 105-mm howitzers at his disposal, a prerogative of which he was extremely jealous. The cannon company gave very close support to the infantry battalions, and was capable of firing closer to friendly troops than the "no fire line ' ' permitted the artillery to fire. On a few occasions cannon companies were split into two three-gun platoons, with each platoon in direct support of an assault battalion. However, the cannon company usually fired as a six-gun battery. Cannon companies were habitually tied in by wire, and/or radio with the direct support artillery battalion. The survey control and metro messages were always made available to the cannon companies. In all instances there .was active cooperation between cannon companies and the direct support artillery battalions. At times the cannon company fired missions for the artillery, and the artillery fired missions for the cannon company. Artillery observers adjusted fire for the cannon company, and cannon observers adjusted fire for the artillery. 3. Assault Gun Most infantry commanders believed the ideal weapon for this purpose should have the follpwing characteristics: minimum caliber 3 in., high muzzle velocity, flat trajectory, high rate of fire, mounted in a full track vehicle of good mobility, low silhouette, with heavy armor for protection of gun and crew, and equipped with good two-way radio. A weapon with such characteristics would be able to provide the desired close support of infantry for which the infantry cannon was unsuited. It was the unanimous opinion of division commanders and staff officers that the use of trucks and trailers for division forward command posts was preferable to the use of tents However, there was no need for division rear installations to be made more mobile, since rear echelons moved less f requently, 34. Mobile Command 158 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING and had the opportunity to select suitable locations usually in small towns or villages. Fifth Army issued three command post trucks per division for general officers, which were used as private offices and living quarters. Most divisions used additional trailers and trucks of various types and in various numbers for their forward CPs. Experience proved their use both advantageous and satis- factory. Division command posts moved along routes suitable for the movement of trucks and trailers and were seldom subjected to concentrated artillery fire. Without van-type trucks and trailers, moving a division command post proved a "difficult time-consuming task. It required considerable packing and loading, and then unloading and unpacking, during which period effective staff operation was seriously affected. Mobile command posts allowed practically continuous operation during a change of location. In rapid moving operations it was possible for the division installation to be constantly well forward, thereby shortening the lines of communications. Mobile command posts were able to change location on short notice with a limited amount of effort. Their use facilitated the vacating of areas subjected to hostile* artillery, and also increased security by making more frequent moves practicable. Operations sections should have van-type trucks instead of trailers, since they are more easily moved, are more maneuver- able, and have more interior space. "With their use it would not be necessary to "freeze" QM trucks for the move, and time would be saved. It was felt that the minimum allotment of vehicles provided should be as follows: 1 truck - Commanding General - Private office and living quarters. 1 truck - Asst. Division Commander. 1 truck - Division Artillery Commander. 1 truck - Chief of Staff - Operations with 1 ton trailer. 1 truck - G-3 Operations, with 1 ton trailer. 1 truck - G--2 Operations, with 1 ton trailer. 159 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 1 truck - War Room. 1 truck - G-l Operations, with 1 ton trailer. 1 truck - G-4 Operations, with 1 ton trailer. In situations where the division surgeon, chaplain or traffic control officer were at the forward command post, there would be sufficient space in the G-l or G-4 trucks for their small installations. The one ton (van type) trailers listed, would be used as private offices or conference rooms and as living quarters for chiefs of sections. Regiments found it necessary to acquire considerable equipment above T/B in order for their headquarters to operate properly. This improvised equipment was burdensome, bulky, and difficult to move. Difficulty was also encountered in provid- ing proper lighting facilities, as candles and battery lamps were not suitable nor sufficient in number. Improvised equipment was easily broken. Much time was consumed in the preparation of equipment for moving and then preparing it for re-use. Command post tents were found inadequate for the following reasons : (a) bulkiness ; excessive time and labor required in preparation for use; (e) insufficient space; (d) vulnerability to artillery fire; and (e) difficulty of blacking out. As trans- portation in excess of T/E was not authorized, there was very little experience with mobile regimental command posts. However, it was the opinion of most regimental commanders and staff officers, that, though the use of mobile command posts would solve many of the above difficulties, their use would not prove practical. Regimental command posts were usually well forward and subjected to considerable artillery fire. Large van-type trucks in forward positions would identify them as command posts to ground and air observation. Whenever possible concrete and stone buildings were used for regimental command posts, British units on the other hand found mobile CPs to be very satisfactory and they recom- mended and used a minimum of three command trucks per brigade (comparable to U.S. regiment) headquarters. One U.S. regimental commander stated that he had found a halftrack truck very useful as a command post. Although it 160 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING did not mobilize his entire command post, it was large enough to accommodate his operation group and radios. It greatly aided him in moves, and the armored sides afforded protection against small arms fire and shell fragments. 35. Location of Command Posts During mountain attacks, commanders wanted to keep close to the front. Observation Posts served as OP and CP in many cases. The characteristics of the SCR 300 necessitated locating it on high ground. This often caused company and battalion CP's to be placed on hills. Wire communication was used with difficulty during mountain attacks and many units made little use of it. When the situation became stable, commanders relied more on wire communication since it was then more easily established and maintained. CP's were located farther from the front lines. This permitted better accessibility, more comfort, more freedom from small arms fire, and good communications. CP's were located almost habitually in houses. This was not always good practise for platoons and companies, because houses offered good targets to enemy guns. However, the thick walls and underground cellars usually provided safe shelter. The Infantry Battalion CP group presented a problem because of the large numbers of personnel. Many battalion commanders used a minimum of personnel at the forward CP, the remainder functioning at the rear CP. The forward CP was mostly concerned with operations. Supply and administration was carried on at the rear CP. The forward CP often contained only the following: Battalion commander and two runners. Four company runners. S-3 and Operation Sergeant. S-2 and Intelligence Sergeant. Communication officer and One communication sergeant. 161 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING One message Center Code Clerk. Radiomen, wiremen and switchboard operators. The Battalion Executive Officer usually functioned at both CP's. When room was available at the forward CP, more of the Battalion rear installations were moved forward. 36. Transportation Required to Move an Infantry Battalion The mountainous terrain and the inadequacy of the road net in Italy often made it necessary for infantry "units to move considerable distances without any of their transportation. At other times it was necessary to limit the number of vehicles used to a bare minimum. Infantry battalions learned to load and move all their weapons, ammunition and necessary equip- ment on about eleven 1/4 ton trucks and trailers. When they moved with this amount of transportation they generally distri- buted the vehicles among units of the battalion as follows. The three rifle companies were each given one truck and trailer upon which they loaded their 60mm mortars, their light machine guns, and the ammunition for both, together with any necessary communication equipment. The heavy weapons company was allotted five trucks and trailers, two of which went to the MG platoons and three to the mortar platoon with one truck for each 81mm mortar section. The other three truck's were allotted to the Bn. Hqs. Co. to transport radio, communication, wire, and command post equipment. One of these vehicles was often the battalion commander's truck which, after the CP was set up, was used for reconnaissance or liaison. At times other combinations of vehicles were used, but in general they followed the pattern enumerated above, 37. Rations for Front Line Units The extensive use of newly developed types of rations, "C", "K", "10 in 1", and in extraordinary emergencies "D", 162 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING simplified somewhat the problem of supplying front line units in Italy. Only in rapidly moving situations, during offensive operations did our troops fail to receive at least two hot meals daily. Under such conditions the soldiers in the frOrit lines subsisted principally upon "C" or "K" rations, which they sometimes were able to heat, but which -they generally consumed cold. The long supply lines, over mountainous terrain which was of necessity travelled by mule pack train, made attempts to supply front line troops with hot food at night extremely difficult, and a great deal of the time impossible. Hot food when it did arrive at front line positions was usually received so late in the night that troops would not get up to eat it. The laek of food containers suitable for mule pack transport was a serious handicap. Hot coffee, carried in water cans wrapped in blankets, was often carried forward with rations. Bread was also used at times to supplement the emergency rations. During periods of little movement or while in defensive situations, front line troops adopted their feeding plans to their individual situations. Some front line troops defended and lived in substantial stone houses equipped with native stoves and fireplaces. Their rations, usually of the 10 in 1 variety, were taken up to the platoon and squad positions at night. It was cooked on the native stoves or on the squad cookers which were issued. Most of the front line troops preferred the 10 in 1 ration to either "C " or "K" and many liked it better than even the B ration issued to troops feeding in rear areas. Some companies when practicable brought up their kitchen equipment and installed it in a convenient building. There the food was prepared and carried in marmite containers to platoon and squad positions. This method of feeding was not common, for most units preferred to prepare their rations at their squad or platoon locations, since movement outside of houses was usually restricted during daylight hours. , In some areas houses wer.e not available and front line troops prepared dugouts and various types of shelters in which they cooked their 10 in 1 or 0 rations over their squad cookers. These little stoves were greatly appreciated by the front line 163 OPERATIONS AMD TRAINING soldiers. They operated on gasoline, which was easily supplied,, and required but little attention. The rations could be easily prepared into satisfactory meals by the average soldier who> generally required no special instruction in cooking. 38. War Dogs: 1. Scouts Scout dogs used with infantry patrols proved of great value because they could detect the presence of the enemy long before the patrol itself had any indication thereof. This gave the patrol a greater sense of security, even though entire respon- sibility for detection could not be placed on the dog. The reactions of the dog were read by the handler and communicated by him to the patrol leader. In patrolling, dogs were of parti- cular advantage in determining whether or not houses were occupied. It was found that dogs could best be used in static situations. They were trained to work carefully and methodi- cally. In an attack or assault where movement was rapid, the excitement and confusion distracted them, and made them relatively ineffective. Dogs could not be utilized to good advantage . on ambush, patrols. The long periods of waiting involved, often in cold and wet positions, and the necessity for absolute quiet made the dog restless and uncomfortable. As a result he lost hist alertness and became noisy. 2. Messengers Dogs as messengers were used rather infrequently,, largely because wire or radio communication could usually be employed. On occasions where wire communications were disrupted by shellfire, the dogs, proved of great value. They moved very rapidly, and due to their size attracted less attention than a human runner. As a rule, dogs were most reliable aa> messengers if their run were a mile or less in length. A team 164 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING •consisting of two men and a dog was used. The dog ran on order from one man to the other, one man being stationed at each end of the run. The dog was sent on a trial run shortly after arriving at his post, to become familiar with the route. Usually the dog first followed the trail by scent but later could depend upon sight. An example of the employment of messenger dogs was the maintenance of communication between the forward and rear CPs of an infantry battalion which had no wire communica- tion. Two teams were used during daylight hours when human runners would have been observed. The run was V& miles in length over very rough terrain and was scheduled at 1030 and 1630 hours each day. On the return trip the dog carried several pounds of supplies. It was found that while it took a man more than an hour to make the trip, a dog could cover the distance in 12 minutes. Occasionally the runs were made under intermittent shellfire. 3. Sentries War dogs proved very valuable as sentries about CPs, dumps and other installations. The requirements for sentry dogs were greater than the number of dogs available for this work. On perimeter patrols, three man-dog teams replaced six men normally used, and their use caused the apprehension of a greater number of unauthorized persons entering the patrolled area. ' p It was found that sentry dogs tended to rely almost entirely on sight and sound. If they were to be used tactically as scouts or messengers they had to be retrained to rely on their sense of smell. Dogs were not used 'on outposts with the infantry because of the long periods of quiet waiting required. 4. Mine Detectors During their refresher training in rear areas after arrival in this theater, dogs which had been trained to detect mines were found to be very unsatisfactory. Since most mines in this theater were laid sporadically rather than in extensive 165 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING fields, there were long periods of searching during which no mines were found. Tinder these conditions, the dogs became listless, losing their alertness. Although they continued to sweep the area, the dogs in reality had stopped searching. In ground which had been fought over, the dogs pointed at shell fragments, at places where explosions had occurred, and at other malodorous spots. Heavy gunfire close at hand and the loud noises of mechanical equipment, armor, and heavy traffic detracted from their efficiency. The only mine detection company brought to this theater proved so unsatisfactory during its training period that they were never used operationally in forward areas, and were returned to the United States. 5. Effect of Terrain Precipitous trails presented no difficulty to the dogs, but made it difficult for the handler to read his dog on the move, particularly in the dark. Thickly wooded or bush country made operating difficult because the leash often became entangled in trees or bushes. 6. Effect of Weather Bain and cold caused the dogs to worry about their comfort. This detracted from their working ability. Eainfall obliterated the scent of trails. Mud made movement of man and dog as a team almost impossible. Snow, if soft or melting, tired the dogs rapidly, thus shortening their effective working hours. Crust on snow was advantageous. 7. Reaction to Enemy Fire Dogs seldom appeared to be affected by small arms fire. "When in the near vicinity of mortar and artillery fire, most dogs showed nervousness, whined, etc., especially if not actually working at the time. During training, both men and dogs must become thoroughly accustomed to the sounds of artillery and mortar fire explosions, tank operation, and other battlefield conditions. 166 Chapter Four INFANTRY 167 Chapter Four INFANTRY 1 . Aggressive Action One of the most important lessons learned by our infantry troops in the Italian campaigns was the value of prompt aggressive action in any situation where our troops were advanc- ing. The lesson was not easily learned, but was based upon costly experience. A tendency to stop and take cover whenever they received enemy small arms fire became prevalent in our small units. This tendency was not only shown by some troops in their first engagement with the enemy, but was more common among troops that had been in continuous action for a prolonged period. Troops that thus permitted themselves to be pinned down were inevitably subjected to deadly mortar and artillery con- centrations which very often caused excessive casualties. German positions were habitually so. well concealed and camou- flaged that they could not easily be located. Our troops had a strong inclination, when fired upon, to dig in without returning the fire, inasmuch as they could see no suitable targets at which to fire. When they did return fire into the hostile area, the German fire either materially decreased or stopped. Some units quickly learned that the proper procedure to take, when fired upon, was to return the fire promptly, deploy a force sufficient to overcome the resistance, and keep on going. It was shown repeatedly that units which pressed their attack vigo- rously suffered far fewer casualties and were more uniformly successful than those which hesitated or stopped when fired upon. Our troops learned that whenever they stopped moving against small arms fire, they always received heavy mortar and artillery fire which caused more numerous casualties than would have been inflicted by the small arms had they kept moving. Those few units which, after being pinned down, broke under 169 INFANTRY artillery and mortar fire and attempted to get out of a shelled area by running away suffered most heavily. Controlling and directing the fire of their units proved to be one of the most- difficult tasks of squad and platoon leaders. When an infantry platoon, engaged in a fire fight, the platoon leader could not personally control the fire of the whole platoon, and had to rely upon his squad leaders. Often in rugged terrain it was impossible for the squad leader to direct the fire of all men in his squad. Too often, squad and platoon leaders engaged in, rather than controlled the fire fight. This practice, which was admittedly wrong, was most common among inexperienced leaders. In an advance our troops were often reluctant to return enemy fire because they felt that the flash and muzzle blast of their rifles would reveal their positions and thus subject them to more accurate enemy fire. It required great effort on the part of the small unit leaders to get the' men to fire their rifles, and in mountain attacks, few rifle companies ever •employed a sufficiently large volume of small arms fire. When a platoon did engage the enemy with the controlled fire of all of its weapons the results were usually most successful. The BAR was respected not alone by our infantry but also by the enemy. Generally the BAR man controlled his own firing in the attack, selecting and attacking targets he .could see or selecting likely spots at which to fire. Too often the squad leader and other members of his squad depended too much upon the BAR. Although it proved itself a valuable weapon in all terrain and under all conditions, it was often used to engage targets that were more suitable for the M-l rifle, 3. Junior Leaders in the Attack The infantry platoon leader has no means of knowing what is going on in his area except by "being there." In mountain attacks, success depends mainly upon maintaining 2. Fire Control in Units 170 INFANTRY direction and staying on the route chosen. When not actually engaged with the enemy, the platoon leader should follow the scouts at the head of his platoon where he can control direction and guide his scouts. He must advance with his men in the attack, but should not be the leading attacker, as was too often the case. During fire fights, he must avoid becoming personally engaged to the extent that he is unable to control the action of his platoon. Entire platoons, at times, considered them- selves "pinned down" when their leader was unable to move. Platoon NCOs also are inclined to do too much of the fighting themselves, thereby neglecting their duties as leaders. Squad leaders in particular were prone to take up the fight with their own rifles, neglecting or losing control of the other men in the squad, and thus failing to develop the full fire power of their units. The fact that casualties are high among their ranks is understood by all junior infantry officers, but all agree that aggressive leadership is essential. Platoons that close with the enemy receive fewer casualties in the long run than platoons which "dig in" when fired upon. Company Executive Officers and 1st Sergeants should not be permitted to stay in the company's rear area or in the CP. They must move about the company area to ensure that contact is maintained and to prevent straggling. 4. Marching (Assault) Fire In the Italian theater, experience in the use of marching fire was limited, but under suitable conditions it was found very effective. The mountainous terrain afforded very few opportunities for marching fire. Objectives were often a considerable dis- tance apart and separated by deep ravines. It was often necessary for advances to be made in single file and a platoon front was seldom possible. Much of the Italian terrain consisted of extremely steep slopes, rocky or terraced, where a swift advance was impossible. The enemy usually occupied 171 INFANTRY positions that were well selected, dug in and camouflaged, and his exact location was extremely difficult to determine. A slow advance strongly supported by fire was found necessary under these conditions. When attacking down ridge lines, over reasonably open terrain or on hills easily accessible to foot troops, assault fire was used very effectively by our troops. Commanders and troops alike favored its use where conditions warranted. Ca- sualties inflicted by enemy small arms fire were not as severe when assault fire was used in the attack as they were when other methods of advance were employed. The issue of addi- tional ammunition for these assault fire engagements was not found necessary. 5. Use of Cal. .50 MGs in Defense Caliber .50 MGs were used extensively on the winter line south of Bologna and on the Anzio Beachhead. They were used mostly for long range overhead harassing fire. In some units they were formed and fired in batteries, and were avail- able on call to fire on any appropriate missions. In other units they were placed under the control of smaller units. Crews were obtained mostly from battalion anti-tank platoons, anti- tank companies and heavy weapons companies. Most of these men already had had training with the weapon, and therefore little additional training, both individual and team, were necessary. Most of the firing was indirect and at night. Targets selected were usually supply trails, avenues of approach, prob- able assembly areas, and the immediate vicinity of buildings used by the enemy or believed to be occupied. These targets were usually located from ground OP 's, maps, aerial photos, and from PW information. Supply and communication routes were sprayed continuously during the night by short bursts from different guns. PW reports indicated that Germans were considerably harassed by this type of fire since they could not tell when, or from where it was coming. In some instances the 172 INFANTRY 50 Cal. guns were used very effectively to fire directly into the openings of caves in cliffs. The use of the .50 Cal. guns in harassing the enemy proved very effective in that it restricted his movements on trails and roads and prevented him from supplying his troops with ease or security. 6. MG Defensive Fires-Use of FPL Machine guns on the defense were generally used to coyer sectors. Their use on FPL's was very limited due to the rugged terrain. In most cases the gun was emplaced so as to cover a wide sector, and close to a good observation point. It was generally dug in and sand-bagged to afford protection to the crew. Usually one platoon of HMO's was placed close to the front line where it could give close support to the rifle- men and also be used for long range firing, at the same time having the riflemen for local security. The two sections were usually close together, between 100^300 yards apart, to facil- itate the problem of supply. This front line platoon was always coordinated with the LMG's of the rifle companies which were on the front line. The other HMG platoon usually was disposed in depth in positions to stop the enemy in case of a break through, and also to deliver long range overhead fire. The guns of the rear platoon were generally located on the reverse slope of a hill, with alternate positions, as it was found unwise to place them on the forward slope due to enemy artillery fire. Sometimes the rear platoon was Used to cover an open flank which provided a good avenue of approach for the enemy. The LMG's of the reserve company usually remained with their organization. If additional HMG's or LMG's were needed on the MLB in a defensive set-up, they were requisi- tioned and usually made available. Many heavy weapons companies however, in addition to their HMG's had eight LMG's, one set of guns being kept with the kitchen. The coordination of HMG's with LMG's within a battalion was generally accomplished by the Heavy "Weapons Company 173 INFANTRY Commander. FPL 's were used especially in stabilized situa- tions of long duration where terrain was favorable, such as the Anzio Beachhead. This terrain was flat or slightly rolling and fairly good FPL's were afforded, many of them without dead space. The guns were placed on the MLR. In some instances MGs were placed in the second story of a building away from the door or window and sandbags used to give them a firm base. A blanket or burlap was used to screen the open- ing so that the smoke and flash would not disclose the gun position. Eange cards were accurately prepared for each MG position, and each key man had a copy. They were especially essential in defensive positions because MG crews were usually relieved by other crews from time to time. 7. Use of Tracer Ammunition at Night In general, our use of tracer ammunition at night was very infrequent because its use tended to disclose our posi- tions with no compensating advantage gained. In firing indi- vidual small-arms (rifles and BARs) at night, tracers were very seldom used, and then only because tracers were packed with ball or AP ammunition. When machine guns were used for harassing purposes at night, they were generally laid during the day and zeroed-in with tracers, but during the actual firing at night very few tracers were fired. Both the HMG and .50 caliber MG belts were stripped of their tracers which were replaced With ball or AP ammunition. In a few instances, .50 caliber MG and 90-mm anti-aircraft tracers were used to point out the direction of advance and to mark the boundaries of units in night attacks. The Germans used a great deal of tracer ammunition at night. Information from PWs indicated that tracers were used mostly in light machine guns. Because of the great dispersion of the weapon, the tracers were used to help keep the guns on the target. This held true for daylight firing but 174 INFANTRY had little advantage at night. Many times our patrols could observe the trajectory of enemy fire and move from place to place under this fire without endangering themselves. When ball ammunition was used, only the "crack" was heard, and since it was difficult for our troops to tell how close the bullets were passing they had a tendency to stay under cover. Many times the Germans on one side of a hill would fire grazing tracers along its crest, thereby disclosing the approximate loca- tion of his position and informing our troops exactly where his defensive fires were sited. After October 1944 the Germans used much less tracer ammunition than they had used previously. G-2 information indicated that this was due to a shortage of that type of ammunition. 8. Grenades Grenades were used extensively by all infantry units with excellent results. The fragmentation hand grenades were very effective for close-in fighting, for stopping hostile assaults, mopping up pill boxes and MG positions, and for clearing houses. In the attack and on patrols, infantry soldiers habitually carried at least two fragmentation hand grenades. The fragmentation rifle grenade was also very effective, and with a little training soldiers became very accurate in its use. It was used against groups of personnel in the open, against MG positions, and in clearing houses by firing through open doorways and windows. Frequently it was used in conjunction with AT grenades in attacking occupied houses; AT grenades were fired through doors or windows and the rifle grenades fired close to the house to inflict casualties as the occupants came out. The AT grenade was effectively used against armored vehicles, pill boxes, houses, and dug in gun positions. This grenade had a terrific concussion effect as well as penetrating power. In one instance the use of AT grenades broke up a three tank attack on a company position at a time when 175 INFANTRY artillery support was not available. In another instance a light tank was knocked out and the crew killed by hits from two AT grenades. The smoke (WP) grenade was very effective in clearing the enemy from caves and dugouts, where at times fragmenta- tion grenades would not do the job. On occasions they were used as incendiaries. Some preferred the WP grenade to the fragmentation grenade for general use. The offensive grenade was used very little when fragment- ation grenades were available. Troops found the fragment- ation grenade could do the same job as the offensive grenade, and do it better. 9. Flares Extensive use of flares was made by a few units for both signalling and illumination, while other units used them very sparingly. The flares were used to show location of units or patrols upon occupying limited objectives, as pre-arranged signals for calling for and lifting artillery and mortar fires when wire and radio communication failed, to give directions to returning patrols, and to illuminate areas. The projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M-9 with signals No. AN-M28 through AN-M36 was often used for signalling. It was easy to carry on patrols and was capable of being used quickly. It was not always on hand when it was needed, how- ever, as it was a special piece of equipment and usually only one projector, with a few flares, was carried by the Company Headquarters group. Trip wire flares were used extensively for local security in stabilized situations. They were easily installed and gave good illumination. They were used generally to cover avenues of approach which were easily covered by machine gun or rifle fire. The rifle grenade flare was not used extensively. It was a fairly good illuminating flare, and in addition was used 176 INFANTRY for signalling purposes. It hud a range of approximately 600 feet, and burned for 20 to 30 seconds with a 20,000 candle power light. However, it had a definite "pop" just before it illum- inated which warned the enemy to "freeze" in position before the illumination took place. The 60-mm flare had a range of approximately 1,200 yards. Illumination took place approximately fiye hundred feet above the ground and the flare descended by parachute at approxi- mately ten feet per second: This flare burned for twenty-five seconds with a 145,000 candle power light, thus giving sufficient time and illumination for good observation. Another advantage of this flare was that it gave no warning before illumination. 10. Use of the Bayonet The bayonet was rarely used in the Italian campaign, and many men disposed of them during advances. In the few instances where bayonet assaults were carried out, they were successful and completely demoralized the enemy. Our troops always preferred to shoot, and it was seldom that close enough fighting was encountered so that the bayonet could be used. The German soldier seldom carried a bayonet, and our casualties from his use of it were negligible. It was the consensus of opinion of infantrymen that the bayonet should be retained as an infantry , weapon because possession of it had a morale building effect upon our soldiers, and because the fact that our infantrymen were armed with the bayonet, and on occasions used it, had a demoralizing effect on the German soldier. Training in the use of the bayonet hardens the soldier both physically and mentally, but too much training time was wasted on "by the numbers" drill in positions, parries; jabs, thrusts, etc. Actual running of the bayonet course, ;use of dummies, and training in ' 'rough and tumble ' ' fighting are ' beneficial and should be continued. 177 INFANTRY 11. Utility of the Carbine, SMG and the Automatic Pistol The carbine, cal. 30, proved to be an excellent weapon for firing at short ranges. Its modified sight which permits changes in range and deflection greatly increased its accuracy. Most small unit leaders who Were at times drawn into a fire fight preferred the carbine to the automatic pistol because of its accuracy and longer range; they usually preferred it to the §MG because of its lesser weight. The SMG proved to be invaluable in fighting in areas covered by dense foliage, in village and street fighting, in clearing out houses, and for use on patrols. Though its range is limited, its great volume of automatic fire made it an excellent weapon for covering small areas where the targets were indis- tinct or fleeting. Its large volume of fire, delivered at close range, had a great demoralizing effect on the enemy. The automatic pistol, cal. 45, proved to be a good weapon for the purpose for which it was intended, i.e. personal protec- tion against an enemy at close range. It is not considered to be a suitable weapon for leaders of small infantry rifle units. However it was the opinion of most infantrymen that men armed with the rocket launcher, men in MG and mortar crews, radio operators, and wire crews should be armed with the pistol. A carbine or rifle hampers these men in their move- ments and in the handling of their primary weapons or equip- ment. A pistol is believed sufficient for their self protection, and allows them greater freedom of movement. 12. The Browning Automatic Rifle The BAB has proved an excellent weapon and needs no modification. ' There were no complaints as to its mechanical functioning land very few stoppages were reported. Most officers suggested adding 6 more BAEs to the Company without adding to the number of magazines per BAR team. 178 INFANTRY Many suggested leaving off the bipod to save weight, figuring that in a defensive situation, when the bipod is of greatest value, machine guns (lights or heavies) could be brought up to provide defensive fires. The LMG with bipod and shoulder rest was considered excellent but should not replace the BAR, whose firepower is ample if handled by a man who really knows how to use it. The BAR was unanimously acknowledged to be the backbone of the infantry squad. Related experiences of junior officers and NCOs indicated that the Germans also held this view. In all infantry engagements the enemy constantly gave priority attention to the BAR in the squad. The BAR was credited with the disruption of many enemy counter attacks. Consequently our present BAR, and LMG with bipods and shoulder stock attachments are con- sidered highly satisfactory. Here again as with other weapons, the need of a flashless and smokeless powder is paramount. 13. The Heavy MG Cal. .30 compared to the LMG Cal. .30 In general in fast moving situations the LMG is con- sidered the better weapon because of its maneuverability and lighter weight. More ammunition can be carried by its crew, and it has been found that fire is never sustained long enough to injure the barrel. When the situation has become stabilized the HMG can always be brought up in time to establish a FPL or to deliver overhead fire. The HMG has proven its value in defensive situations and for overhead fire. Rifle company commanders preferred the addition of one LMG, and the drop- ping of one 60mm mortar in the weapons platoon, since nor- mally only two 60mm mortars were used. They also favored an increase in personnel of the LMG squad to provide addi- tional ammunition supply and to provide replacements for the LMG squad casualties which were heavy. The following modifications to the LMG were found desirable: (1) A modification on the front barrel bushing. This ' 179 INFANTRY device .did not lock securely enough and was too easily lost. By the addition of two small link chains on either side of the bushing which will fasten by insert pin on to the bipod or jacket, the bushing will always be secure,, Loss of this bushing is a serious matter as the gun will not fire automatically without it. (2) Adoption of a metal or plastic link-type ammuni- tion belt. The cloth belt was highly unsatisfactory when ex- posed to wet weather. The resultant swelling of the cloth did not permit smooth feeding and automatic fire. (3) Adoption of the German principle for change-over of the barrel; the German method is smoother, faster and. easier. 14. Caliber .30 MG Fire Light MGs delivered most of the short and some medium range fire, and were, mostly used on the front: line. They were used to cover avenues of approach during defensive periods, or during periods of reorganization in the offensive. They were also used in establishing a base of fire for maneuvering riflemen. Most of the medium range firing was done in connection with offensive movements. The normal use of medium range fire was to cover the flanks and to place fire on probable enemy positions, while the riflemen maneuvered to assault these posi- tions. . Long range MG fires were generally used in the defense for harassing missions,: the targets being road junctions, trails, supply routes and probable assembly areas. These fires were usually delievered at night. In a few instances during the offensive, on terrain covered with thick underbrush, HMGs were used to deliver long range harassing fires. This was done since, due to the undergrowth, no targets for these weapons presented themselves close to the front line. This fire was placed on probable routes of withdrawal and on routes of supply. 180 INFANTRY > Very little indirect .firing except -harassing, wa^ done with ihe .30 caliber HMG. Due to the rugged terrain our guns almost invariably could be placed in positions from which direct fire could be delivered, or which afforded partial defilade. 1 5. Alternate and Supplementary Positions for MGs and Mortars Alternate and supplementary positions were generally provided for MGs in the defense, but these were seldom, used. Normally the primary position was well dug in and offered more cover and protection due to the continuous work on the position, especially in a stabilized situation. It was usually needless to shift a MG to a supplementary position in the defense due to the fact that other automatic or semi-automatic weapons could be shifted more easily and with less exposure to cover any situation which was likely to arise. Generally, alternate positions had to be placed at least 200 yards from the primary position, due to the fact that the fire which harassed MGs most was mortar arid artillery, both indirect, and there- fore not too accurate. In moving less than 200 yards MGs very frequently would still be subjected to the same harassing fire. During the offense, alternate and supplementary positions were usually selected, but were seldom occupied. MGs were rarely moved due to receiving small arms fire, but Were usually moved when the primary position was brought under direct fire from self-propelled or tank guns. Mortar positions were generally selected in good defilade and alternate or supple- mentary positions were very seldom needed, However, one instance was reported where a mortar position' was being shelled so heavily that it was necessary to move it a distance greater than four hundred yards to get out of the impact •area. 181 INFANTRY J 6. Maximum Firing Capabilities of the 81mm Mortar Battle experience indicated that the firing of 18 to 20 rounds per minute caused overheating of the 81mm mortar after three to four minutes of sustained fire. This overheating caused premature burning of the propelling increments, which in turn caused "short" rounds, bulged barrels, and occas- ionally burns to the No. 2 man. A rate of 8 to 10 rounds per minute, however, could be maintained without dangerously overheating the mortar tube. Increased range (approximately 300 yards) was obtained by'using a total of 8 increments, but damage to the base plate and shock absorbers usually resulted. 17. HE for 81 mm Mortars - Light Projectile compared to Heavy All infantry units expressed confidence in the 81mm Mortar and its ability to lay down thick demoralizing fire with either heavy or light ammunition. Some trouble was found with the HE light failing to explode in soft soil. A supersensitive fuse for use under such conditions would be desirable. In general much more HE light was used than HE heavy, since the light projectile had a greater range, was more easily supplied to the iorward positions, and had greater casualty effect on per- sonnel. Direct hits were often registered with HE heavy on fortified positions with no greater effect than the HE light. In most cases the mortars were disposed in depth, and the rear section was the most logical one to fire the HE heavy due to shorter ammunition haul. In most cases, however, they were out of range to fire that type of projectile on appropriate targets. The firing of HE heavy damaged the mortar tubes much more than the HE light. All 81mm mortar units were in agreement that the HE light was much more accurate than the HE heavy at any range. Mortar men were reluctant to 182 INFANTRY fire HE heavy close to their front line- troops, whereas in many instances the HE light was fired successfully within forty yards of the front line. One good feature of the HE heavy was that it usually penetrated the roof of a house before exploding while an HE light did not. 18. Use of Smoke Shell for 81 mm Mortars Smoke shells were used extensively "with good results by many units. However, this type of shell was not available in abundance and was somewhat heavy to handle. Generally no more than the normal allowance for basic load was on hand. The smoke shell was usually used to register on targets, but since the smoke and HE shells were not of the same weight, some difficulties were encountered. It was felt that a smoke shell of the same weight and shape as the HE light would greatly facilitate fire adjustment. It was difficult for forward observers to distinguish between the artillery and mortar smoke shell. Many times artillery and mortars were trying to register on the same target at the same time, and it was difficult to distinguish which was which since the artillery and mortar OPs were not together. Different colored smokes available for registration would obviate this difficulty. In some instances smoke was used with success to screen the movement of patrols and tanks. In addition smoke shells were used to orient infantrymen as to their objective, and also to set fire to inflammable material, such as . hay stacks. 19. Replacement of the 81mm Mortar by the 4.2" Mortar Experience during the Italian campaigns did not indicate the desirability of replacing the 81mm by the 4.2" mortar. The 81mm mortar was heavily relied upon since it was very accurate sand effective against personnel. It had .sufficient range and was much lighter and more maneuverable than the 4.2" mortar. It delivered a heavy concentration on a given 183 INFANTRY target in a short time. The 8 1 mm mortar ammunition was lighter than the 4.2" ammunition and therefore the ammuni- tion supply -problem in rugged terrain was less difficult. : However, the 4.2" mortar proved to be a very effective weapon. Some su'ggested that 4.2" mortars be made available continuously -or permanently to the infantry regiment. A solution proposed was that the AT Company of a regiment, and the AT platoon gf an infantry Bn. be given a T/O allot- ment of 4.2" mortars and be trained to use them as a secon- dary arm, since the 57mm AT gun was rarely used in the mountains because of difficulty of movement and emplacement. -Thus when operating over terrain not suitable for the employ- ment of the 57mm gun, these AT units could be used effectively as mortar units. This could be accomplished without the need of additional vehicular equipment or personnel. Many com- manders, however, opposed the idea of having two types of weapons in the infantry AT units. 20. The 37mm Gun as an Infantry Close Support Weapon . The 37mm gun AT M3 was ineffective against tanks used by the enemy, and therefore its use in close support of infantry in mountain warfare was restricted to firing at groups of per- sonnel, MGr emplacements and lightly fortified buildings. These guns were considered satisfactory for such uses, except that in most instances it was difficult to get the gun close enough to the front to be able to use it effectively. It was not easily manhandled on rugged terrain, and the concensus of opinion appeared to be that a gun of the same capabilities of a lighter design would be desirable. The modified 37mm gun mounted on a .tripod was -introduced in the theatre in the spring of 1945. It was used by a few units on the front line with good results. It was emplaced on the MLR, and fired directly at enemy MGr positions. These positions were either destroyed or forced to change location. Those who fired the modified 37mm gun on the front line commented on its accuracy up to 184 INFANTRY 1,500 yards, its simplicity and its lightness. The only unfavor- able characteristic of the weapon was that it had to be relaid after each round fired, since the tripod mount was not suffic- iently stable. The weapon was not used sufficiently in combat in Italy fo permit a definite statement as to its suitability or desirability for use. Developments in the field of recoilless weapons will undoubtedly influence any decision as to the most effective weapon for the close support of infantry. 21. 57mm Anti-tank Gun The 57mm anti-tank gun, proved suitable for its primary role, e.g., battalion and regimental area defense against tank attack. It was f ound, however, that the weapon lacked maneu- verability. Since the crew could not manhandle the weapon any distance (except short distances on level ground) i.t appears desirable to have a self-propelled gun of the same capabili- ties, preferably full track and of low Silhouette.- Such a weapon could be maneuvered into position, fire the required number of rounds at the target and then get back under cover. During the fighting south of the Arno Eivef, where the terrain was not too rugged, the: 57mm anti-tank guns were often used on point targets, such as fortified houses and string points. However, since the guns were fairly close to the front line their muzzle flash was easily picked up by the enemy and they drew considerable fire. A self-propelled gun would have been of more advantage than the towed gun in this situation. It was suggested by many that the 57mm AT gun should have a "muzzle-brake" to reduce the muzzle blast, since, on dusty or sandy terrain it kicked up a very large cloud of dust which helped to disclose its location. 22. Comparison of the 75mm Pack How- itzer with the 105mm MS Howitzer . for Infantry Cannon Companies Cannon companies in one division were equipped With the 75mm pack howitzer, while others used the towed 105mm M3 185 INFANTRY howitzer. This difference in the equipment of units used under similar conditions and circumstances made possible a com- parison of the two weapons to determine their relative suita- bility for use in mountain warfare. The following points were considered in this comparison : a. Mobility. The M3 howitzer, which weighed, about 2,600 pounds was only as mobile as its V/z ton 6 x 6 prime mover, since it could be manhandled only short distances upon rela- tively level ground. The 75mm pack howitzer was much more mobile. Weighing only 1,400 pounds it was capable of being disassembled into separate loads which could be hauled in XA ton trucks, placed upon mules or carried by hand, although it was usually transported in 2% ton 6x6 trucks. Two complete weapons were carried in one such vehicle. This weapon could be hand-carried to positions inaccessible to mules. b. Ammunition Supply. The supply of ammunition to the pack howitzer was easier than to the M3. The complete round for the former weapon weighed 17 pounds while that of the latter weighed 42 pounds. Trucks normally carried twice as many^Smm shells as they could of 105. When supply was by mule pack train, this difference in weight of shell was very important. c. Range. The 75mm pack howitzer had a maximum range of 9,600 yards, while the M3 could engage only targets within 8,300 yards. This difference in range was increased by the fact that the pack weapon could usually be employed much nearer the enemy and thus could reach well beyond the limits of the towed gun. d. Accuracy. The weapons were considered equally accurate and both displayed the same weakness of considerable dispersion when fired at maximum range. e. Traversing Characteristics. The split trail con- struction of the M3 permitted greater traversing than the single trail of the pack weapon. To effect a traverse of over 40 mills the trail, of the pack howitzer had to be lifted and shifted from one side to the other. When emplaced on muddy or soft ground this weapon would after a few rounds, bury the spade. Thus: 186 INFANTRY it was usually necessary to dig out the spade when shifting direction of fire. f. Effectiveness. The greater weight of projectile with its larger explosive charge, gave the 105mm howitzer shell a somewhat greater bursting radius and considerably more concussion effect, than was the case with the 75mm. The 75mm pack howitzer was considered more suitable than the 105mm M3 howitzer for the use of infantry cannon companies engaged in mountain warfare, such as that encoun- tered during most of the Italian campaign. 23. Assault Team Weapons Assault teams armed with the rifle, the BAR, and the Bazooka were employed to a great extent against fortified houses and dugouts. The BAB formed the nucleus of the team. It was usually employed with a few riflemen as a base of fire, while the building was being investigated. The bazooka rocket had little effect on thick stone or concrete walla but was very effective through doors and windows. In many instances the anti-tank grenade was used effectively in the same manner. The flame thrower was seldom used as an additional weapon in such assault teams. It was found that they were not essential in attacking houses since the bazooka rocket or the anti-tank grenade fired through the door or window of ,,a house usually sufficed. The flame thrower, however, was used to great advantage in assaulting pillboxes or well protected dugouts, since the bazooka rocket or the anti-tank grenade failed to penetrate their reinforced walls. One reason for not using the flame thrower to a great extent was the lack of specialist operators. To operate it successfully in combat the soldier must be very proficient with the weapon and be able to keep it in proper adjustment. It was generally believed that 'these specialists should come from combat engineer units, and should be made available to the infantry when needed. 187 INFANTRY 24. Relative Merits of Caliber .30 Ball and Caliber .30 AP Ammunition Both AP arid ball caliber .30 ammunition were very effective when employed on targets for which they were de- signed. The armor-penetrating quality of AP ammunition was desirable during the period the enemy was employing numerous light vehicles and straffing planes. During that period front- line leaders requested an increase in AP ammunition. Both AP and ball ammunition were carried. Ordnance reports indicated the following comparison between AP and ball ammunition : a. AP ammunition was not as effective against per- sonnel as ball ammunition in that it did not have the same spattering effect. AP ammunition made a clean hole through flesh and bone, whereas ball ammunition frequently ricocheted from heavy bones and caused greater tissue damage. b. AP caused more damage to the bores of rifles and MGs, than did ball ammunition. c. Ballistic qualities of AP and ball ammunition up to medium. range were practically the same. d. AP ammunition was more effective against lightly armored vehicles. ■ The use Of a single type of ammunition (AP) was pre- ferable to using both types, and after the fall of 1943 only AP was shipped to the theater. However, both ■ball and AP were used thereafter to utilize existing stocks of ball ammunition. 25. Ammunition Stockage for Mortars and Machine Guns on positions in the Defense , . During the Winter of 1944-45, 81-mm mortar ammunition was limited and rationed to front line units. Previous to ^his time, the 81-mm mortar had been used extensively on defensive position harassing programs. Due to the limiting of the 81-mm 188 INFANTRY mortar ammuniton, .the 60-mm mortar was substituted for harassing fires and consequently a larger amount of 60-mm mortar ammunition on position was required. Ammunition for the 60-mm mortar was plentiful. Resupply of ammunition was difficult in mountain defensive positions. Mule trains were used and the minimum resupply time was usually between four and six hours. Often it was not possible to supply during daylight because of exposed supply routes. These conditions necessitated maintaining a larger amount of ammunition on position. Under such conditions there should be one thousand rounds of 81 -mm mortar per active section, and one thousand rounds per 60-mm mortar three-gun section, on position. This was normally sufficient to provide for emergency fires to stop enemy counter-attacks or patrols, until resupply can be accomplished. It was found that, because of the bulkiness of mortar ammunition and the everpresent hostile mortar and artillery fire, it was difficult to store properly large amounts of mortar ammunition" near positions. In situations where resupply could be made in a short period of time, it was advantageous to keep mortar ammunition stored in battalion and regimental dumps. A supply on position of two hundred rounds of 81-mm mortar per section and three hundred rounds of 60-mm mortar per section was sufficient under these conditions. Machine guns, at positions difficult to resupply, maintained a supply of 25,000 rounds per section of heavy machine guns, and 20,000 rounds per section of light guns. "In positions more easily resupplied, 12,000 rounds per section for both the light and heavy machine guns were usually maintained. Positions that were supplied by mule train experienced a great deal of difficulty in protecting machine gun ammunition from the weather. On long hauls, mules could not carry a case (1,250 rds.) on each side so the cases were opened and *split, thus exposing the ammunition to the weather. It was also impossible to keep moisture away from ammunition : stored on positions. Belts became wet and ammunition 189 INFANTRY corroded so that it could not be used. A constant resupply was necessary to replace ammunition rendered unserviceable by the weather. ; 26. Pioneer Equipment of Infantry Units The A and P platoon had sufficient equipment to accomplish the repair and construction which it was usually required to perform. Its work consisted mostly of preparing light field fortifications, clearing gaps through mine fields for the passage of foot troops and light vehicles, and performing light mainte- nance of roads and trails. Most A and P platoons in Italy did more supply work, than pioneer work, i.e., they carried ammunition, water, and rations to assault companies and usually controlled the pack-mule train of the battalion. The tool kits were seldom used during offensive combat, but were used extensively in defensive situations. The shovels and picks were not used a great deal by the A and P platoon but were issued to front line rifle companies where they were used for digging fox holes, gun emplacements, and shelters. The number of axes in the A and P tool chest was not ordinarily sufficient to provide for the needs of the platoon and also of the front line companies. Axes were used not only in construc- tion work and for clearing fields of fire, but also to procure the fire wood which was used to heat the buildings and shelters in which the men lived when not actually out in position. 27. The Soldier's Pack The pack carrier and haversack were considered suitable for their purpose until troops reached the forward assembly area. Prom there forward into the attack, however, it was questionable as to just what to carry. It was learned that procedures considered normal in manuals were usually imprac- tical in rugged mountain terrain. The dropping of the rolls „meant in most cases that they would not be available again untirthe unit came out of the line, or went into reserve. For 190 INFANTRY this reason in many units the men carried a light roll consisting of either a blanket or shelter-half, or both. When the blanket was carried it was usually made into a roll, tied with a tent rope and slung over the man's shoulder. When only a shelter- half was carried, it was folded and looped over the back of the soldier's cartridge belt. The procedure of bringing the rolls forward with the rations was usually not practical. In many cases the rations and ammunition were hand-carried^ over trails impassable for jeeps and mules, and to hand-carry the rolls in addition was an impossible task for the carrying party. Many night attacks were mad.e and by daylight troops found themselves where daytime movement was restricted, and were therefore unable to get their rolls forward. It was usually impossible for infantry commanders to develop any SOP for bringing up rolls at night during offensive operations ; normally decisions had to be made from day to day according to existing conditions. Some units did not use individual rolls, but made squad blanket rolls because of the reduced space required for their transportation. After the issue of sleeping bags to the individual soldier, in the winter of 1944-1945, the same difficulties Were experienced as with the blankets, in getting the bags forward during offensive operations. Only when advancing over terrain which had a roadnet suitable for jeep and trailer transportation did the procedure of transporting the blanket rolls or sleeping bags to the areas of the assault troops work satisfactorily. At other times the soldier carried his blanket or "shelter half in some improvised manner. The combat pack was seldom carried into the attack; essential items, normally carried in the haversack, were carried in the soldier's pockets or inside his shirt. Mess equipment, except for the spoon and canteen cup, were left behind with the pack. Few hot meals were served during attack operations, and the emergency ration required no mess gear other than the spoon. When it was possible to serve hot meals it was also possible to bring up the blanket rolls and packs. 191 INFANTRY In the defense, the men carried their full packs up to their forward positions. In cold weather additional blankets were issued as needed. The infantry soldier of the British Eighth Army carried a combat pack during all offensive operations, except on patrols and raids. This pack contained a water bottle, mess gear, towel, washing and shaving kit, extra pair of socks, and an emergency ration. The gas cape, which was also used as a raincoat and was very light in weight, Was made into, a roll and fastened to the top of the combat pack. The German soldier carried his full pack to his forward position when on the defense, but carried no pack of any sort in the attack. 192 Chapter Five ARTILLERY 193 Chapter Five ARTILLERY 1. Adjustment of Artillery Fire by High Performance Aircraft (Arty/R) The Spitfire and P-51 Mustang, of Reconnaissance Squad- rons, were used quite successfully for observation in adjusting artillery fire, primarily fire of long-range artillery. They were used to supplement, and not to replace, organic Field Artillery air observation. The principal advantage of the high perfor- mance plane is its greater security against enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. This advantage permits its use in adjusting artillery .fire on targets deep in enemy territory and/ or in areas protected by anti-aircraft artillery, which the organic artillery plane cannot observe with a reasonable degree of security. However, the Arty/R plane has several obvious disadvantages, such as its fast cruising speed and the necessity for the pilot to act also as observer. It should be employed •only on those missions which cannot be successfully accom- plished by the organic artillery plare. The employment of Arty/R aircraft varied with the tac- . tical situation. Its use in support of the attack during the Rapido crossing and at Cassino was quite different from its employment under static conditions. At Cassino a form of continuous patrol and area search was used. On the front south of Bologna, Arty/R was used only on special, prearranged missions against known targets, mostly hostile batteries. To reduce the danger of surprise by enemy fighters, mis- sions were flown by two planes, one to adjust artillery fire (observer) and the other to observe for hostile aircraft (weaver). The weaver is also responsible for warning the observer of enemy anti-aircraft batteries and friendly aircraft. In spite of our air superiority, the weaver was still considered essential on all missions. Both pilots were briefed as to the missions, furnished maps and photos, and instructed that if the observer 195 ARTILLERY failed to obtain radio contact with the artillery battalion, and the weaver did obtain contact, then the weaver would take over the mission. Pilots were briefed from 1:50,000 maps and photographs which they carried with them during the mission. Normally, the photographs used were the basic cover photographs taken daily, weather permitting. The target or target area, target code name from the Hostile Battery List, map reference of target, and gun-target line were marked on the photograph in china- graph or ink. In addition to the above information, special annotations were used to assist the pilots in locating targets; and adjusting artillery fire. One method was to mark the photo with range and deflection lines at 100 yard intervals. The range lines were placed over and short of the target and per- pendicular to the line of fire. The deflection lines were marked to the right and left of the target, parallel to the line of fire. Another system was to place concentric circles, at equal and known intervals, around the target. . The SCR 522 was used for communication between the Corps Artillery FDC, appropriate artillery battalions, and the Artillery/R planes. Everything possible should be done to facilitate observation of the bursts (which is more difficult from a high performance plane) and to complete the mission in the shortest possible time. Some of the measures taken to accomplish this were: a. Use of single rounds of smoke, or HE battery volleys, by caliber smaller than the 8-inch, during the adjustment on a target. b. Use of battery volleys, with a converged sheaf, during fire for effect on precision fires for destruction. Range and deflection differences were corrected during the adjustment by firing salvos. c. Correction of range and deflection differences : of the individual pieces prior to opening fire. d. Use of the most precise initial firing data, including metro corrections computed for the individual targets rather 196 ARTILLERY than the check points. Accurate initial data not only speeds up the adjustment but also facilitates marking the target for' the observer, which is often necessary. e. Use of only one weight of projectile and one lot number of powder charge on the same mission. /. Having the battalion FDC give the observer a war- ning, "stand by", five seconds before and "splash" at the instant the round lands. g. Firing all rounds on command of observer. The operations of Arty/R aircraft during the Rapido crossing and Cassino were an outstanding success. The follow- ing is an account of the organization and employment of these aircraft during the first four days of the battle,, before the break-through. When , the battle became fluid, , the normal methods of requesting sorties were reverted to. A Reconnaissance Squadron was assigned to " each corps and each worked directly with the corps counter-battery officer. Though there were some differences, the procedure was gene- rally the same in all corps. The main enemy gun areas were grouped into sectors and each sector was given a reference letter. These sectors were made to coincide with the fighter-bombing areas,; so that it was possible, through ROVER JOE, to bomb them quickly if necessary. Each hostile battery in these sectors was given a reference letter, as were some batteries too far afield to be included in any sector. Certain reference points were also chosen. All this information was marked on 1:50,000 maps and photographs, and a copy Of each given to each pilot, includ- ing the weaver pilot. Some squadrons maintained continuous Artillery/R cover from about 0800 to 1900 hours, daily. Others sent lip sorties at prearranged times. The pilot, on getting over the target area, first of all spotted and adjusted fire on any active hostile battery. If there were several batteries active in one sector, he called for fire on all known hostile batteries in that sector. If no hostile batteries 197 ARTILLERY were firing, lie would search the whole squadron area, with particular attention to known hostile batteries, and would take those located under fire. Pilots sent down all information immediately, whether of interest to the artillery only or of general interest; The counter- battery officer passed this information on to ROVEB JOE and to Corps Headquarters. This dissemination of general information by Artillery/R sorties was most important and was the main reason why the whole squadron could be used on Artillery /R. When the pilot landed, he was interrogated and a complete Tac/B report was sent to Army Headquarters. One squadron was able to send up a larger number of sor- ties than the others because its weavers were provided by a fighter squadron. One squadron had the added commitment of adjusting naval gunfire. A separate radio frequency was allotted for this purpose. The only change from normal procedure was that prior to the shoot, a puff of black smoke was emitted to indicate the ship which was to fire the mission. 2. Centralized Control of Artillery- Air OP V AOP's should normally be centralized under division artillery or group control; however, they should remain organically a, part of the battalion to facilitate decentraliza- tion when battalions are sent on independent missions. Battalions should be permitted to call upon their planes when desired. The group or division artillery air OP officer should be responsible for the administration and operation of the Artil- lery AOP. This procedure has the following advantages: a. Fewer landing fields are necessary. b. Exchange of information between pilots and obser- vers of different battalions is facilitated. Such information as the location of targets and the presence and location of enemy 198 ARTILLERY fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft units should be disseminated without delay. c. Pilots and observers become familiar with more enemy territory and" installations, are more familiar with the enemy and friendly situation in general, and can more readily maintain uniform methods and procedures. Thus, they can work with one battalion as easily as with another. d. A continuous patrol of the enemy area can be main- tained. This is highly desirable at all times to permit detec- tion and fire upon every enemy movement, active hostile battery, and any other activity. This is particularly desirable during a fast moving situation, because it is essential to maintaining contact with the enemy and to preventing his withdrawal by bringing fire on every movement. e. The group or division artillery air OP officer can be of more assistance to the battalions. 3. Night Observation with Artillery Air OP's Air observation at night was desirable, but could be obtained only on bright moonlight nights, when there was sufficient light to permit identification of terrain features. On call from the pilot, the air strips should be illuminated with floodlights or improvised equipment. A vertical light beam to guide the pilot to the field was often desirable. Experimental flights by Fifth Army Air OP Officer indi- cated that the artificial moonlight produced by the searchlights near the front was not sufficient to permit adjustment of artil- lery fire from the air for two principal reasons : ; a. The reflected moonlight "falling into the eyes of the pilot and observer more than counteracted the illumination of the ground. b. The lights were so far in the rear of the front that the enemy territory was not illuminated sufficiently and to a 199- ARTILLERY great enough depth to permit identification of target and adjustment of artillery fire. To place the lights farther forward would benefit the enemy as much as our own troops. 4. Reconnaissance with Artillery Planes The liaison plane is one of the big developments of the present war. Its use for tactical reconnaissance to a greater degree is justified and should be adopted. Through its use, Corps, division, and lower unit commanders can be kept im- mediately informed of enemy movements that might endanger them. Artillery liaison planes have been used for reconnaissance by commanders of all- echelons down to the company. They were acclaimed by all as a superior reconnaissance agency. Their successful use for this purpose has included: a. Locating targets. b. Selecting position areas, bivouac areas, assembly points, and lines of departure. c. Eeconnoitering objectives, approaches thereto, and locating enemy strongpoints. d. Eeconnoitering routes. e. Guiding armored units a cross country. ' , /. Preventing tank and tank destroyer units from run- ning into traps. g. Locating demolitions. h. Following enemy movements in pursuit. i. Locating front line units in rapidly moving situations. j. Communication in emergencies. Preparatory to several of the close-in bombardment missions by medium and heavy bombers, bomber flight leaders and navigators were given thorough orientation flights by artillery pilots in the vicinity of the objective. Artillery aircraft were used to avoid arousing the suspicion of the enemy of the coming bombardment. Because of their low speed, the 200 ARTILLERY artillery planes permitted the airmen to study the actual terrain in greater detail. Also, the Germans were more reluctant about firing on an artillery plane than on a lone bomber. On one Occasion a battalion commander actually com- manded and directed a two company raid from his seat in an artillery plane. He had radio communication direct to his ground commander and also with the regimental commander. The very presence of the AOP in the air neutralized, to a great extent, enemy mortar and artillery fire. ' Artillery liaison planes were used to accomplish many of the above missions because liaison planes of the Army Air Forces were not available. The organic field artillery Air OP planes are required for and should be employed only on artillery missions, if possible. Their use for other missions would be obviated by the assignment to division and corps headquarters of organic liaison planes. 5. Position of Air OP for Observation The primary mission of the Artillery Air OP was to locate targets and to adjust artillery fire thereon. To accomplish this mission the air observer continually concentrated on obtaining the best observation possible and at the same time maintained a reasonable degree of safety. The best position from which to accomplish this mission depended upon many factors and it varied, horizontally, from a position above or to the flank of the friendly battery, to one in front of our front lines, and vertically, from 600 to 11000 feet. The best observation could be obtained when flying at a low altitude above the terget; however, the AOP should fly beyond the range of enemy small arms. _ . To adjust artillery fire on targets deep in enemy territory or well defiladed, it was frequently necessary for the AOP to fly several miles beyond our front lines. The best security from enemy fighters was obtained when flying at a low altitude. Several artillery planes shot down in rear areas were hit by German fighters who came from behind 201 ARTILLERY and below. Our pilot should not give the , enemy fighter a change to get under him.. His safety depends upon maneuver* ability and the speed with which he can dive for the ground and fly contour or effect a landing. Furthermore, our planes were difficult to see from above, but stood out conspicuously when silhouetted against the sky. Two planes from one division artillery came back with holes through their wings and lift struts. The Germans used a new trick. Two fighters came in from above. The Cubs dived and found two other fighters waiting for them below. All four fighters joined in chasing the Cubs most of the way to their home field. 6. Artillery Air OP Landing Fields Due to the mountainous terrain and bad weather in Italy, it was frequently desirable and necessary to call upon the Engineers for assistance in constructing or improving landing fields. Fields should be prepared as well as possible to prevent accidents, to eliminate wear and tear of planes, and to facilitate air observation to the maximum extent even under adverse weather conditions. Due to our superiority in the air, the importance of a well constructed landing field was usually given priority over camouflage. Matting for runways was used to good advantage. Pierced steel planks made the best runways. Sommerfeld and Coir matting, or a combination of the two were also used. Floodlights to illuminate the field and a vertical beam to guide the pilots were used successfully. With this field lighting equipment, planes can take off earlier in the morning and return later in the evening. With air observation at dawn and dusk, enemy artillery activity, which is usually most prevalent at these times, is greatly decreased. Field lighting equipment also facilitates night flying which is possible on bright moon- light nights. In selecting a position for an artillery landing field, the following points should be considered: a. Other conditions permitting, the landing field should 202 ARTILLERY be located near the artillery command post to facilitate exchange of information, communications, and supply. b. The field should be located out of enemy light artillery range, not only to prevent casualties and damage to the field and equipment, but also to enable the pilots and observers to obtain the maximum amount of rest. c. The planes must be. out of range of enemy- small arms while gaining proper altitude. The group or division artillery air officer must be con- stantly familiar with the situation and make reconnaissance well in advance for new fields. 7. Operations Sergeant far Air OP An operations sergeant can be used to good advantage at the landing field in keeping a situation map, providing pilots and observers with proper maps and photos, checking communi- cations, obtaining and consolidating intelligence informa- tion, etc. 8. Artillery Air OP Pilot and Observer Although it was not common practice, some units developed Pilot-observer teams using regularly assigned observers. The observers were given some flying instruction in order that they might land the plane in case the pilot became a casualty. Parachutes were worn by both pilot and observer when flying combat missions. 9. The L-5 Liaison Plane Experience in the Italian campaign indicated that the L-5 was normally a better plane than the L-4 for use as an artillery air OP due to the following advantages : a. Greater weight carrying capacity. The L-5 carried the desired weight of equipment and personnel without having its performance seriously affected. 203 ARTILLERY b. Greater speed and faster climbing. Time was saved in going from the field to the observation position. c. Could be flown in wind of greater velocity. . d. Fewer maintenance problems. Many more hours of flying time could be obtained before the engine needed overhauling. 250 hours were obtained with the L-5. 75 hours was about the maximum for the L-4. e. Greater fuel capacity with increased cruising time. /. Better instruments. Turn and bank indicator is particularly desirable for night flying. g. More room for pilot and observer. h. Observation from front and rear seat was much better. i. Equipped for night flying. Greater security from hostile fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns due to its greater speed and stouter con- struction which permitted, faster dives. ' However, because* the L-4 can land on muddy terrain and operate from smaller air strip than the L-5, a certain percentage of the artillery liaison planes should be of that or similar type. 10. Air OP and the 4.2" Mortar Artillery Air OPs have successfully adjusted 4.2" mortar fire. The firing was primarily on a counter-mortar campaign. A SCR 610, with Division Artillery frequency, was placed with each mortar platoon for direct communication. In addition to counter-mortar fire, the 4.2" mortars can be adjusted on MG's and other targets that are firing from positions so close to our front line that they lie within the "no fire" zone of the artillery. 1 1. Air OP's and the Variable Time Fuze Danger to Air OPs from the random bursts of the VT fuze necessitated devising a system of clearing the area in which the fuze was to be fired. 204 ARTILLERY Inmanycases the VT fuze was not used on targets of oppor- tunity, which are the ideal target for this fuze, because of the difficulty and the length of time required to clear the AOP's. The following system was devised and found to be highly satisfactory. The first time it was tried it took an hour and a half to clear the air. Befinements to this system reduced the time required to less than 5 minutes. a. A no Cub line is established parallel to the front. b. Centers of gun areas indicated by codeword (in clear) and grid square in which the target is located, are sent to all pilots so that they can get at least 3,000 yards, on either side of the trajectory. c. All missions for VT fuze clear through. Corps FDC. ■d. A series of Code words were developed to indicate the following: (1) Bequest permissions from Corps to shoot VT. (2) Order from Corps to clear air along trajectory. (3) Permission granted by Corps arty. (4) Missions completed to Corps arty. (5) All clear from Corps Arty to all battalions. Sentinels are posted in each battery position when using VT fuzes to watch for friendly aircraft flying in or near the trajectory. As friendly aircraft approaches the danger zone, "cease firing" is given. Firingis not resumed until the aircraft has safely cleared the line of fire. 12. Tanks as Artillery Mountainous terrain greatly handicapped tank warfare in Italy. Tanks, therefore, were repeatedly used in their second- ary role, the reinforcing of artillery fires. Their advantages and problems when used in this role .were much the same as those of the self-propelled Tank Destroyers. . 13. Tank Destroyers as Artillery In the Italian theater, the Tank Destroyer battalion was used a great deal in its secondary role of reinforcing artillery 205 ARTILLERY and of direct support artillery. Various methods of attachment for artillery missions were employed successfully?. Some of. them were as follows : a. The battalion was attached to a field artillery group or to division artillery and operated its own FDC. - b. The company was attached to an artillery battalion and either operated its own FDC or was fired by the artillery FDC. The company was . usually divided into two six gun batteries rather than three four gun batteries because: a. It was possible to remove a gun for maintenance without disrupting fire. 6. The small caliber of the gun made a greater mass of fire desirable. c. Best possible use was made of limited personnel, particularly officers. d. It speeded up and simplified fire direction. e. It was usually easier to find positions for two six gun batteries than for three four gun batteries. On the self propelled gun it was found necessary to lower the rear end of the vehicle to get maximum elevation. This was accomplished by : o. Digging the rear-end in lower than the front. b. Raising the front end by running vehicle on an improvised ramp. c. Selecting a position on a favorable slope. Observed fires were habitually conducted by forward observer methods. The azimuth^ indicator on the self propelled TD proved a handicap in the delivery of artillery fires, owing to inherent mechanical defects and the lack of cross leveling devices. Unless the TD was absolutely level, inaccurate fires were 206 ARTILLERY delivered. Initial laying with an aiming circle was much more difficult because the instruments had to be in the same plane as the gun. Reciprocal laying was virtually impossible. The proven advantages of using Tank Destroyers as artillery were as follows : a. Greatly increased artillery fire. b. Freed heavier artillery of many harassing and interdiction missions. c. Out-ranged divisional light artillery. d. Obtained economical use of weapons and manpower otherwise idle. 14. Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance Company Experience in Italy indicated that the Reconnaissance Company, as such, was of little value to the Tank Destroyer Battalion. Some of the reasons are as follows : , a. The Reconnaissance Company was frequently detached and used by higher headquarters. b. It was rarely responsible for giving warning of the approach of enemy tanks. This was given by Air OP's, Artillery OP's or the anti-tank warning net. c. It presented a difficult administrative problem, because in many cases the entire company was not employed together. The Reconnaissance Company was used in the Battalion for the following : a. It furnished personnel to man artillery OP's. Gun company personnel, if available, would be better for this purpose. b. Elements Were attached to gun companies to sup- plement the work of the T/O personnel therein. 207. ARTILLERY c. Elements were used for area and route reconnais- sance but very seldom to select gun positions. d. It formed a pool of replacement personnel for labor, communications, liaison, and to man captured equipment. This made it a general reserve rather than a reconnaissance company, and it was of great value as such, and contributed much to the efficiency of the battalion. Many officers felt that an air OP Section similar to that of the artillery battalion would be of more value for general and distant reconnaissance than the Reconnaissance Company. Many of the present functions of the Reconnaissance Company could be performed more efficiently by the gun companies if additional personnel were assigned to the gun companies. 15. Towed VS Self - Propelled Tank Destroyer Experience in Italy indicated that the towed TD gun was less satisfactory and generally inferior to the self-propelled. The towed gun had the single major advantage of being easier to conceal initially. Some of its disadvantages were: a. It could not be effectively manned in the forward combat area. Casualties were excessive. b. Lack of communication made control and coordin- ation difficult. c. While reasonably satisfactory as a defensive anti- tank gun, the towed gun, due to its lack of mobility and armor, had little value in an attack, in pursuit, in supporting infantry or armor in local engagements, or in many of the other roles tank destroyers were called on to perform. d. While satisfactory as an artillery piece, it required a larger crew a self propelled gun. The self-propelled Tank Destroyer's advantages over the towed gun were: 208 ARTILLERY a. More mobility for continuous support in fast moving situations. b. Armored protection for gun cfeW. •'•<?.• Radio ia #aeh carrier made communication problems simple. « d. It was ready for action on the move or when it pulled into position. 1 6. Use of Reduced Charge with 3rr TD Gun in order that tank destroyer guns might be employed more efficiently in indirect fire missions supplementing Field Artil- lery, a reduced charge, low muzzle-velocity HE shell was developed. This ammunition was used in the Fifth Army very success- fully. It better enabled the Tt) to fire close in missions and proved to be very accurate. The 3" gun being a flat trajectory weapon forced the TD's to occupy positions with very little defilade when serving in the artillery role and using their normal ammunition. The RC shell permitted the- occupation of much better positions. The dead space was greatly reduced. The main disadvantage was that the propelling charge was not great enough to recoil the tube its full length, causing the powder casing to remain in the breach,, and requiring that it be extracted manually. A more complete firing table was required. The table used was fairly accurate, but included neither data for metro correc- tions, time of flight and drift, nor most of the data necessary for accurate unobserved fires. 17. Employment of the Tank Destroyer as an Assault Weapon Tank Destroyers were used repeatedly as assault guns in close - suport of the Infantry both in rapidly moving situations and during static periods. 209 ARTILLERY Many TD officers felt that this was their most valuable and effective employment.. In this role, they were used for the direct support of infantry patrols and for the neutralization and destruction of strong points, pill-boxes, houses, and anti- tank guns. 1 8. Use of the 3" Illuminating Shell During the action on the Anzio Beachhead